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Roots and Role of the Imagination in Kant:
Imagination at the Core

Michael Thompson
ABSTRACT

Kant‟s critical philosophy promises to overturn both Empiricism and Rationalism
by arguing for the necessity of a passive faculty, sensibility, and an active faculty,
understanding, in order for cognition to obtain. Kant argues in favor of sense impression
found in standard empirical philosophies while advocating conceptual necessities like
those found in rational philosophies. It is only in the synthesis of these two elements that
cognition and knowledge claims are possible. However, by affirming such a dualism,
Kant has created yet another problem familiar to the history of philosophy, one of faculty
interaction. By affirming two separate and exclusive capacities necessary for cognition,
Kant has bridged the gap between the two philosophical traditions, but created a gap that
must be overcome in order to affirm his positive programmatic. Kant himself realizes the
difficulty his new philosophy faces when he claims the two sources of knowledge must
have a “common, but unknown root.” To complete Kant‟s program one must ask: “What
bridges the gap between sensible intuition and conceptual understanding?”
In my dissertation, I turn to Kant‟s philosophy and find the answer to this
question in the productive imagination. In order to evaluate the viability of this answer, I
iii

problematize the imagination as it has been found in the history of Western philosophy.
By tracing the historical use of the imagination in archetypal figures from both empiricist
and rationalist traditions, one finds a development of imagination that culminates in the
fundamental formulation found in Kant‟s Critique of Pure Reason. In his critical
philosophy, Kant synthesizes the imagination (Einbildungskraft) and the use of
imagination found in both traditions, thus demonstrating its role in both sensation and
understanding. By employing the imagination at both sensorial and conceptual levels,
Kant has found, I argue, the liaison that overcomes the dualism established by his
requirements for knowledge, as well as the common root for both.
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Introduction

Due to technical vocabulary, complexity of thought and overall intricacy of
Kant‟s philosophical position, isolating any one element of his cognitive apparatus in
order to make clear its function, status, role and employment in cognition presents an
interpreter with a number of challenges. For example, isolating sensibility from the
rest of the cognitive structures e.g. the understanding and reason, and determining its
constituent role in knowledge production appears to be nearly impossible if not
entirely so. How can one understand this element without reference to its
counterpart, and, furthermore, how can one clearly determine its role in cognition
without the contraposing faculty with which it combines in knowledge production?
By focusing on one element in Kant‟s philosophy, one runs the risk of failing to
illustrate said element‟s proper place in Kant‟s critical philosophy. And yet, one
cannot understand Kant‟s philosophy without providing an analytic of the elements
by which one can isolate constitutive parts and determine them in their interactions.
For this essay, I would like to propose that an isolation of one element is not
only possible, but also necessary in an interpretation, defense and emendation of
Kant‟s critical works. By focusing on the imagination, one will be able, I argue, to
interpret and defend Kant‟s critical evaluation of scientific, metaphysical, practical
and aesthetic knowledge. Knowledge is, according to Kant, a synthesis of two
1

separate and heterogeneous faculties, sensibility and understanding. With such a
formulation, Kant must present an explanation for how two such disparate faculties
can be synthesized. The imagination, I contend, is just such a liaison between
sensibility and understanding. My intent here is to focus on the imagination in order
to gain greater insight on this “blind but indispensible function” as well as to defend
Kant‟s description and prescription for knowledge claims.
Moreover, by focusing on the imagination one is able to further illustrate
central doctrines of Kant‟s critical philosophy. Describing the functions of other
faculties as well as the origin and development of their products is one such chief
concern. By defining knowledge as a synthesis of the products of sensibility and the
understanding, intuitions and concepts respectively, Kant presents himself and the
reader with a considerable dualism. Sensibility has its own processes and products
separate from understanding. So too does the understanding have its own processes
and products removed from the influence of sensibility. By bifurcating knowledge
production between two separate faculties, Kant resurrects and defends a doctrine that
will reconcile the passivity of empirical sensation with the activity, spontaneity, of
intellectual processes involved in understanding. But such a dualism presents Kant
with a number of problems: What are the origins of the products of both capacities,
that is, what is the source for the elemental factors involved in the separate faculties,
what do they have in common, and what ensures the correct applicability of concepts
to intuitions, in short, their objective validity? If they are mutually exclusive faculties
and their products are radically different, how can such a synthesis come about, and
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what applicability do we find in human experience, in short, their objective reality?
Kant must address not only the sources and the correctness of the products of the
faculties, but he must also demonstrate that they are connected in application and use
in knowledge claims. By turning to the imagination, I hope to present a coherent
interpretation and defense of this central doctrine of Kant‟s critical works, but also to
gain insight into this overlooked and often marginalized, but necessary, capacity of
human cognition.
Rather than approaching this topic through the regular means—by examining
the arguments found in the Transcendental Deduction of the 1st Critique, an approach
most Anglo-American Kant scholars pursue—I prefer to examine the imagination in
several of Kant‟s works. The Anglo-American debate has combined to present a
standard interpretation, one which posits Kant‟s pure concepts, categories, as having
no explanation other than his assumption and emendation of Aristotle‟s categories in
conjunction with a table of logical judgments. To combat this interpretation, I would
like to center the focus of this protracted debate around the use Kant makes of the
imagination. The mediating capacity of the imagination, between sensibility and
understanding, is a provocative suggestion Kant himself makes, one to which nonAnglo-American philosophers only occasionally attend and Anglo-American
interpreters generally neglect. Treatments of the imagination in Kant‟s corpus,
however, one finds to be remarkably incomplete. More often than not, imagination is
discussed in context of Kant‟s 3rd Critique and analysis of aesthetic judgments. But it
is precisely with the aesthetic that Kant begins his critical enterprise. Therefore I
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propose to examine the imagination not only in context of Kant‟s 3rd Critique, but
also in terms of the Transcendental Aesthetic of the 1st Critique, his discussion of
sensibility, and its connection to the Transcendental Analytic, Kant‟s discussion of
the understanding. By focusing on the imagination, I propose to draw connections
between Kant‟s works and to provide an explanation for the list of pure concepts Kant
provides, all under the auspices of determining the objective validity and reality of
our concepts. The general thesis of this work is that Kant‟s use of the imagination is
well-informed and radical. And as such, I propose to illustrate the various treatments
of the imagination from various archetypes in the history of philosophy, to
demonstrate formulations that presage and pre-figure Kant‟s understanding in order to
provide a heuristic against which Kant provides his own account. By employing the
imagination as the liaison between sensibility and understanding, Kant draws upon
the historical tradition that attributes this mediating function to the imagination, but
he also transforms the imagination from the specious and mistrusted faculty of
tradition into a necessary element of human thinking.

4

Chapter One: Problematics

The Problem of the Imagination

The imagination is largely an untreated and ambiguous topic in the history of
philosophy. The ontological status of both the imagination and its products as well as
the epistemic role they play in human cognition is underdeveloped in most major
philosophical thinkers. From some of the earliest Western philosophers, Plato and
Aristotle, to the end of the modern period, Kant‟s critical works, authors acknowledge
some use of the imagination in cognition, but more often than not excoriate the
imagination as an instrument of folly. Plato broadly cautions against imaginative
mimesis while Kant indicates the importance of the imagination while failing to
expound upon it properly. This comprehensive confusion might indeed lead one to
say the state of the imagination is a mess.
The difficulty of this inquiry is compounded by several factors. Not only are
primary texts often inexact, obscure and inconsistent, but secondary authors
discussing the imagination in the various primary authors of tradition are in radical
disagreement concerning how the inquiry should be approached. Scholarship on this
issue is divided as well as divisive. Depending on proclivities, scholars typically
evaluate the uncertain status of the imagination according to literary, psychological,
or philosophical perspectives or any combination of thereof. Also, depending upon
5

proclivities, scholars approach this issue from a conceptual or historical or
phenomenological standpoint. Methodology is always at issue; whether to focus on
particular individuals or represent the entirety of history, whether to pursue
imagination conceptually or descriptively, often phenomenologically.
One further obfuscation is whether one can look to a certain author or group
of authors and distill a theory of the imagination, or whether one attempts an inquiry
more comprehensive in scope. Certain scholars prefer a fine grain analysis of one or
few primary authors, others favor a global approach writing topically, but
superficially, on a great number of authors. The former presents deeper analysis
while losing comprehensiveness, the latter is all-inclusive while risking critical rigor
and philosophical insight. It would seem that not only is the state of imagination a
mess, but also the state of commentary on the imagination, is a mess.
Even with such intricacies, I believe the state of the imagination and the
authors who deem fitting to discuss such obscurities may be summarized according to
three generalizations: those who find the imagination as a superordinate faculty, those
who find the imagination as subordinate and subservient to other faculties and those
who find the imagination as a mediator between faculties. The first of this three-fold
division are those literary and philosophical masters we find in the 19th Century
Romantic movement, particularly English Romanticism, and German Idealism.
These authors sing paeans to the glory of the imagination, the sine qua non of human
experience. Literary figures like Baudelaire, Coleridge, Keats and Blake exalt the
imagination in sentiments such as:
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imagination created the world1
The primary IMAGINATION I hold to be the living power and prime
Agent of all human Perception, and as a repetition in the finite mind of
the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM2
and
The world of Imagination is the world of Infinite and Eternal… There
exist in that Eternal World the Permanent Realities of Every thing
which we see reflected in this Vegetable place of Nature.3
Soberer thinkers such as Fichte, Schelling and Hegel also promote the imagination as
the
central creative process that allows human experience. Fichte observes:
Through this passage of an indeterminate product of the free power of
imagination to its total determination in one and the same act, that
which occurs in my consciousness becomes an image [Bild] and is
posited as an image. It becomes my product because I must posit it
through absolute self-activity.4
In Fichte‟s cryptic phraseology, he attributes certain processes enabled by the
imagination as the cornerstone of the appearance of self and world at all. A more
aggrandizing sense of the imagination is difficult to behold.
Conversely, there are those who denigrate the imagination and marginalize it
as subordinate to all other processes involved in human experience. Most notorious is
Plato‟s relegation of the imagination [eikasia] and products of the imagination [eikos]
1

Baudalaire, Charles. “La Reine des Facultés” in Curiosités esthétiques [et] L’Art romantique, ed. H
Lemaitre (Paris: Garnier, 1962), p. 321. from Casey.
2
Coleridge, Samuel Taylor. Biographia Lieteraria, ed. George Watson (London: Dent, 1965), p. 167.
from Casey.
3
Blake, William. Between 1790 and 1820, The Poems ed. W.H. Stevenson (London: Longman,
1971). p. from Brann.
4
Fichte Wissenschaftslehre p. 3.
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to the third remove from reality. Plato decries the imagination because of its mimetic
function, stating “imitation is far removed from the truth.”5 Imagination, for Plato, is
the lowest form of human experience and knowledge.6 Less conspicuous, but more
telling, is a general oversight for most thinkers to treat of the imagination at all and
the implication that it is subordinate to more important matter of cognition and
metaphysics. Even the seemingly most systematic of philosophers, like Aristotle or
Kant, offer only oblique references and obscure explanations for what appears to
most as an integral portion of both cognitive processes and metaphysics. Edward
Casey attributes this to the Platonic invective against imagination at the beginnings of
Western philosophical discourse. “The course of philosophical theorizing about the
imagination” he writes, “is launched in a highly critical vein.”7 Thus, a consequence
of Plato‟s critique is an original suspicion and mistrust of the imagination that carries
into most subsequent philosophers.
A third way of evaluating places the imagination as a mediator between other
powers of the mind. According to this view, imagination is neither the “queen of the
faculties” nor is it a mere slave or false mimesis of higher, truer cognitive processes.
Integral to human experience, this third way argues for the imagination as the
mediator between sense perception and intellection/reason/understanding. This route
neither belittles nor exalts. Classically, authors like Aristotle, Kant and most

5

Plato. Republic, Book X, 598b” in Plato Complete Works ed. John M. Cooper (Cambridge: Hackett,
1997), p. 1202.
6
Republic 513e.
7
Casey, Edward S. Imagining: A Phenomenological Study (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1976), p. 16.
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medieval thinkers attribute some mediational felicity to the imagination. Aristotle
claims:
Imagination (phantasia) is different from either perceiving (aesthesis)
or discursive thinking (dianoia), though it [imagination] is not found
without sensation, or judgement (hypolepsis) without it.8
Kant echoes this sentiment when he writes,
Synthesis in general, as we shall hereafter see, is the mere result of the
power of imagination (Einbildungskraft), a blind but indispensable
function of the soul, without which we should have no knowledge
whatsoever, but of which we are scarcely ever conscious.9
For this group of thinkers, the imagination is typically both a
faculty/capacity/function, with a specific product. The faculty is denoted by the
unique function the imagination obtains in the transference of sense perception to
thinking, and no knowledge, no judgment, no intellection about what is availed by the
senses is possible without the employment of the imagination.
These three evaluations, superordinate, subordinate and mediational are
representative of the three standard approaches to imagination. Prima facie, one can
attribute the ranking of the imagination to each groups‟ approach and definition of the
imagination, and this depends upon the very conceptualization the word
“imagination” warrants for each group. Moreover, the etymology of imagination
further demonstrates the mire in which one finds oneself in such an inquiry. The
Latinate imagination has no clear etymological foundation. Phonetically, it is related
8

Aristotle De Anima III.3 in The Complete Works of Aristotle ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1984) p. 680.
9
Kant, Immanuel The Critique of Pure Reason A78/B103 trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York:
Macmillan & Co, 1965), p. 112.
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to the noun imaginationem and the verb imaginari. Another clear connection is to the
noun imago, the product of such activity, from from the Latin imaginem and imitari.
From these last words we gain not just imagination and image, but, also, imitate and
imitation. The Latinate “imitation”, mimus, is thus traced back to the Greek mimesis,
mimo. Plato‟s condemnation of imagination can be attributed to this mimetic
function found in the etymology of the term “imagination.” Imagination, according
to the head of the Academy, neither creates, discovers, nor thinks, it merely copies
what has presented itself. The term Plato employs, however, is that of eikasia.
Another difficult term to disclose fully, eikasia, engenders terms still in currency
today. Icon, iconoclast and idea all cluster around eikasia and eikos, which is closely
akin to the Greek eidola, eidos. The connection between icons and that which they
represent in religious ceremony is not far from the original understanding of what
ideas are and what they entail. The correct eidos is to grasp reality; so, too, to possess
a true icon is to possess something of the divine.
But eikasia is not the only Greek term for imagination. Although Plato
employs eikasia, phantasia was also available to the Greek speaking world.
Phantasia is the nominal form of the verb phanesthai, to appear. What appears
through the process of phanesthai is phantasia or a phantasia. Phantasy, or fantasy,
in its original usage had little to do with flights of fancy, it pertained to what was
appearing/what appears. In ancient and medieval use, phantasia, phantasy, is the
very process of presenting what appears. Ancient and medieval thinkers appealing to
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the mediational nature of imagination draw from this source. What appears to the
senses must appear to the intellect by means of phantasia.
In German, one finds two terms for imagination, both Imitation
(Nachahmung) and Einbildungskraft, each with their own etymological origins.
Imitation follows the Latin etymology closely, but Einbildungskraft has different
sources. Literally, it is a, ein, power, kraft, of formation, bildung, from das Bilden.
Futhermore, das Bilden possesses several connotations; from building in a literal
constructive sense to articulation in physical and mental. The imagination is the
power to build or construct. Mediational employment of imagination in German
thinking, Kant especially, draws from this sense of building a bridge between sense
perception and understanding.
Traditional etymologies lead from imagination to imitari to mimesis and
phantasia. Unorthodox etymologies, however, might also prove insightful. The goal
behind such etymological discussion is to capture what concepts the term
“imagination” brings to bear. And while much of the standard etymological picture
explains the subordinate and mediational camps of imagination authors, further
inquiry may shed light on the third. What we seek is not literal phonetic and
morphological etymology, but a conceptual etymology as well. To explain the
superordinate elevation of imagination, further etymology can be unearthed.
If one focuses on the phoneme “mag” in imagination, one is easily led to the
mago, magus, found in Latin. The magus, a wise and often magical individual,
possesses truth and utilizes exceptional means to obtain such. Wizardry and magic
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appear to be instruments of imagination and supernatural abilities lend themselves to
those who employ imagination. But with this supernatural access typically comes
mistrust. Also, in tracing the development from mim(o) in the Greek to the Latin
imitatio, one apprehends that in the transliteration the first consonant “m” is dropped.
Mim(o) first becomes “imo” to which is then added further phonemes. Pausing at this
transitional point, however, another set of related, but often overlooked words comes
into appearance. “Imo” is phonologically related to “emu” as found in the family of
words surrounding emulate and emulation. Conceptually similar, emulation is a
copying, a mimesis. Additionally, with emulation, comes the connotation of
attempting to equal and often overpass. The superordinators of imagination subscribe
to this understanding of imagination. The imagination is not merely some faculty, or
a middle player in the process of human experience. Rather, the imagination
surpasses all other processes to ascend to the apex of human experience. Imagination
is the world and creates the world for these authors. But as with magic and
supernatural abilities to obtain truth, just such ennobling of the imagination meets
with skepticism and mistrust. This very sentiment of both glorification and wariness
is found in the ancient Hebrew term yetser. Yetser can be both good (yetser ha-Tov)
and/or bad (yetser ha-Ra). Yetser derives from the same root word yzr as creation
(yetsirah), creator (yotser) and create (yatsar). A creative impulse, one marked by
caution, informs those authors who wish to elevate the imagination to a creative
impulse.

12

In contemporary discussions of the imagination, recent authors have attempted
to acknowledge both the historical and etymological curiosities of imagination and to
account for the equivocity of imagination in its conceptual and etymological
obscurities. Prodigious authors such as Jean-Paul Sartre, John Sallis and Edward
Casey approach the imagination from a phenomenological perspective. Sartre
continues a roughly standard interpretation accounting for the imagination as a
hermeneutic device through which both pretensions (projections) and retentions must
proceed and then concerns himself with a theory of the nature of images. He
surmises “the only way to establish a true theory of the being of images is to propose
nothing which does not have a direct source in reflective experience.”10 The latter
two authors follow Sartre‟s phenomenological lead, but focus on the verbal
component of the term “imagination,” Sallis calling it a force or power at work in
human cognition, Casey exploring the imagination as it takes place in an act, in
imagining. Casey‟s assessment of the problem of the imagination explores the
ambiguity that the term has received in canonical accounts and proceeds to describe
the details involved in the imagining act itself and not any evaluation of powers or
faculties. Sallis commends Casey for his methodological approach, but chides him
for reducing the imagination to mere imagining, while himself treating the
imagination as many classical authors do while employing a phenomenological
method.11

10

Sartre, J.P. Imagination trans. Forrest Williams (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1962), p.

3.
11

Sallis, John Force of Imagination (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2000), p. 15.
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In a different vein, historical scholars have attempted to provide individual
accounts, epochal understandings and entire histories of the imagination. Each of
these factions attempts to arrange etymological and historical facts into a coherent
narrative for their respective projects. The range of historical scholarship runs the
gamut from particularists to generalists. With Robert Brumbaugh12 and his
exploration of images in Plato‟s mathematical treatises, one finds specialists who
focus on a particular individual, even an obscure doctrine of a singular individual, in
history. With figures such as Jacques LeGoff13 and Murray Bundy14 who represent
the authoritative voice for medieval scholarship on the imagination, one finds an
epochal conceptualization. With historians like J.M. Cocking, who until his death
worked on a manuscript delineating a complete history of imagination, Richard
Kearney and Eva Brann, one finds an historical approach that borders on the
comprehensive.
With so many approaches and so many projects, with so many interpretations
and with so much disagreement, what is to be made of the imagination? The first
theme of this essay—tracing the history of imagination up to the time of Kant—
presents considerable obstacles.

12

Cf. Braumbaugh, Robert S. Plato’s Mathematical Imagination: The Mathematical Passages in the
Dialogues and their Interpretation (Bloomington: Indiana University Press) 1954.
13
Cf. LeGoff, Jacques The Medieval Imagination trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press) 1985.
14
Cf. Bundy, Murray W. The Theory of Imagination in Classical and Medieval Thought (Champaign,
IL: University of Illinois Press) 1927.
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The Problem of Kant Studies

The second theme of this thesis—the imagination in Kant—fares little better.
Kant scholarship does not find itself in much better shape than the arena of
imagination. While there are well-established translations, well-rehearsed arguments
and well-defined doctrines of Kantian philosophy, methodological and conceptual
disagreements have relegated the field to certain fiefdoms, which, once certain claims
are made, are bitterly defended. And, once and again, forays are made into other
lands, exploratory, invasive raids are made in attempt to expand empires. These
empires, much like feudal lands are bequeathed to trusted vassals, inheritors of the
realm.
Much as we find with the imagination, Kant scholars disagree on
conceptualizations, methodology and specificity. Depending on whether one pursues
the Marburg, Southwest or Anglo-American schools of thought, disparate
interpretations and infighting occur on issues aesthetic, metaphysical, epistemic,
moral and now even environmental. One oversight in the establishment of these
feudal properties is a holistic approach. Much current scholarship confines itself to
the well-documented “critical period,” roughly 1781-1894. Inherent in this narrow
approach is a marginalization of the “pre-critical” period and the late writings of an
academic in retirement, one that might present a coherent narrative to Kant‟s life and
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works rather than the disparate story commonly told.15 An integrationist approach is,
however, fraught with peril of its own. With internal inconsistency, evolution of
ideas, different versions of the same texts, difficulties surrounding legitimacy of late
texts and seeming ravings at the end of his life, attempting to provide and account of
the entirety of Kant comes across as fool-hardy. Kant studies, while not mired in the
same morass as imagination, does find itself in an analogous situation, an abundance
of source material and yet no cohesion. And so, a similar question arises, what
should one make of Kant? More specifically, what should one make of imagination
in Kant?
I propose to attempt my own foray into such an imperiled landscape; I
propose an integrationist approach to determine the role imagination plays in Kant‟s
philosophical corpus. It is not lightly that I undertake this project, but with caution in
mind; my aim is not to tilt at windmills. Like any interpreter, one must pick and
choose salient features to one‟s project. Much of Kant scholarship provides exacting
analyses of many key issues. One, however, that is not thoroughly represented is
Kant and the theory of imagination.
More often than not, Kant and his employment of imagination are relegated to
marginal treatment or, worse, isolated to a passing footnote. For those authors that do
treat the imagination in Kant more extensively, the focus is isolated on one or perhaps

15

Manfred Kuehn is one author who makes excellent inroads overcoming the common conception that
Kant breaks completely with a Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy during the “silent decade” after which
he begins his “critical period.” Kuehn illustrates trends in Kant‟s thinking that present developmental
connections from the so-called periods of Kant‟s life. While not a biography, this work follows this
lead by drawing connections between different works and periods of Kant‟s life in order to show the
development and importance of imagination in his thought. Cf. Kuehn, Manfred Kant: A Biography
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 2001.
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a few texts.16 Sarah Gibbon‟s work, Kant’s Theory of the Imagination, is the only
text that attempts an integrationist account of the imagination in all three critiques.
Conspicuously lacking, however, is much connection to the pre-critical period, the
Anthropology and the Opus Postumum.17 Moreover, by emphasizing “the possibility
of cognition from the point of view of the judging subject”18 and the mediational role
of imagination, Gibbons misses a more radical origin of the resources of cognition,
that is from the imagination itself.19 Furthermore, Gibbon‟s work fails to illustrate
the historical tradition from which Kant draws his development of imagination,
subsequently failing to note the radical transformation of this faculty in Kant himself.
No volume exists that attempts to integrate a comprehensive and radical view of the
imagination and its employment in Kant‟s corpus.

Methodology

In order to undertake such a project a programmatic must first be established.
Attempting to combine a thematic delimitation of imagination within a particular
individual‟s philosophy runs counter to most methodological intuitions. One needs
16

Makkreel, Crowther, Kneller etc. Plus a host of papers on imagination and perception.
With the exception of Kant‟s Inaugural Dissertation.
18
Gibbons, Sarah Kant’s Theory of Imagination (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 6.
19
A theme certainly understood by some of his contemporaries and many of his students, and one
which is capitalized on by his immediate inheritors, the German Idealists.
17
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either to present a comprehensive theory of the imagination or narrow the search to a
particular epoch or individual, so standard concerns with methodology dictate. I
would rather, however, assert that the story of the imagination is one that needs be
told, and in the telling of that story we find in Kant‟s philosophy a climactic and
radical use of the imagination. In his works, Kant employs two imaginations, both
productive and reproductive. The latter employment accounts for much of the
standard mediational interpretations of the use of the imagination, one necessary for
cognition, one that is more often a mere instrument in higher order cognitive
processes.. The productive imagination as Kant presents it, however, implies a
fundamental grounding of all cognitive capacities in imaginative acts.20 The
categories of pure understanding themselves, as I intend to address later are products
of the imagination. Likewise, the unified manifold of intuition, that may then be
subsumed under a category, is a product of the imagination. The act of synthesis
itself, as Kant pointedly reminds his reader, is “the mere result of the power of
imagination”21 In recounting the story of the imagination, I am really presenting
preliminary attempts to understand an elemental power, which finds its rightful, if
undocumented, employ in the philosophy of Kant. In tracing the history of the
imagination, I hope to discern certain philosophical precedents, ones that inform
Kant‟s use, and to demonstrate his continuity within the historical tradition. Once the
history is complete, the second effort is to determine to what extent the imagination
informs Kant‟s philosophy. The claim already alluded to is that in Kant we find a

20
21

A unique function not to be misunderstood as mere phantasy/fantasy.
A78/B103.
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synthesis and radicalizing of the importance of imagination. His two-fold description
of reproductive and productive imagination incorporates the historical dimensions
while involving transcendental arguments for the necessity of imagination in human
cognition. After Kant, the history of imagination is changed forever.
In order to carry out this project, I will employ a variety of methodologies.
Archeological, etymological, historical, inter and intra-textual analysis will be
offered. I propose a four-fold methodological inquiry. Following John Sallis‟
methodological explication in The Gathering of Reason, I will present four levels of
interpretation/interrogation: duplex, projective, inversive and subversive.22 Duplex
interpretation is mainly used in the historical exegesis of the imagination as it has
unfolded in archetypal figures from the history of philosophy. This strategy involves
primary documents and a duplication of them as representative of certain species of
philosophical inquiry on the imagination. In presenting a copy of another author‟s
thought, the image-making function of imagination is inherently at work, or, perhaps,
in these cases a sketch/schema-making function. Furthermore, in the reproduction of
others‟ theories, room is made for reflection on the topic. This reflective process,
while remaining within the horizon of the original author‟s framework, sanctions
clarification of the conceptualization and aims of the author‟s use of the imagination.
In duplicating historical authors the imperative is to faithfully present the authors‟
understanding.
Projective interpretation is a process by which one subordinates duplicative
reflection in favor of a reflective recovery. Projective interpretation attempts to
22
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return to origins in the historical understanding of the project. The endeavor is to
return to the origins from which one may gain insight on the current project. In
venturing a history of imagination, the promise is to return to Kant‟s conception with
a more robust sense of the precedence that has led to Kant‟s use. This is not to imply
causal connections between authors or an evolutionary conceptualization of the
imagination in history. Rather, the endeavor is to uncover the experiential dimension
from which traditional authors draw their explications, or lack thereof, of the
imagination. Reflection on the origins and the history of the imagination support and
corroborate Kant‟s radical theory of imagination by informing it and being
transformed in it.
The third interpretive strategy, the inversive, will chiefly be employed in the
inter- and intra-textual interpretation of Kant‟s theory. Inversive reflection broadens
the textual base by inverting components found in the faithful duplicative process.
Rather than merely presenting the standard formulations found in textual sources, the
inversive process promotes insight, perhaps not ventured by the author. By drawing
attention to obscure and often inconsistent passages in Kant‟s philosophy, I hope to
draw out the nature of Kant‟s understanding and the radical employment he makes of
the imagination. The promissory note here is that such inversion will unearth a
concealed stratum in Kant‟s philosophy, perhaps unbeknownst to the author himself.
As Kant himself expressed, “it is by no means unusual, upon comparing the thoughts
which an author has expressed in regard to his subject, whether in ordinary

20

conversation or in writing, to find that we understand him better than he has
understood himself.”23
The final stage of interpretation is the subversive. In this phase, one reinstalls the texts within the general history, to subvert tradition in order to gain insight
on current issues. By returning to the history with new-found reflection, the leading
question in this inquiry; “what do we make of the imagination?” will once again be
promoted. In turning away from specific texts, one returns to the conceptual issue at
hand. This final phase of interpretation is intended to gain ground on contemporary
questions still present in both scholarship on Kant and the imagination. This last
interpretive strategy will not find complete execution in this work. For the sake of
brevity, only general consequences of Kant‟s transformation can be drawn in this
work. The tenor of this text, however, resonates with the implications of Kant‟s
ingenuity. Unfortunately, these suggestions can only be hinted at in the closing
remarks of this work. However, the first three interpretive strategies, I believe, come
to fruition. Not only will a faithful reproduction of archetypes of philosophy and
their use of the imagination be presented, but I will endeavor an archeology that
attempts to unearth the origins and questions that prompt such uses of the imagination
in the history of ideas. Drawing from these duplicative and projective exercises, I
will attempt an inversion of the imagination in Kant‟s critical works, while
illustrating preliminary connections with some of the non-critical works. The
implications and integrations necessary to the final stage, the subversive, are
presented in abbreviated form, but offers promising research in the future, one that
23

A314/B370.

21

will perhaps be able to shed further light on the imagination both itself and within the
greater context of Kant‟s complete works.
Following these interpretive strategies for the imagination I hope to maintain
the reflective openness such a term connotes. It is my understanding that I approach
both topics from a generalist view yet with particular application. In using these
strategies, I look to delineate the imagination and demonstrate its conceptual
stronghold in Kant‟s philosophy. Boldly stated, the imagination is the mark of
human finitude, human life and human experience. It remains at the center of
perception, judgment, protentions for the future, the retentions of memory, synthesis
and a sense of identity- it is at the heart of the any knowledge obtainable by humans
cognition. Following the romantic German and Anglo Idealists, it is the sine qua non,
without which human cognition would not be human cognition. But mitigating the
romantic nostalgia, my claim is merely that it is integral to the processes. This
position does not deify the imagination as found in romantic sensibilities. Rather, it
gives the imagination its proper dignity among the processes of human cognition.
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Generalist Narratives

When surveying the literature that deals with the imagination and its role in
human cognition, it is not until the beginning of the sixteenth century and the work of
Pico della Mirandola, On the Imagination published in 1500, that one finds a text that
thematically examines the topic on its own. Fortunately, Pico‟s work establishes
precedent in treating the imagination as a topic worthy of exclusive treatment;
unfortunately, Pico‟s ideas are not original, but merely a compilation and summary of
the fragmentary treatment of the topic in Medieval thinking. Nevertheless, Pico
ushers in an era in philosophical investigation where the imagination begins to play a
more prominent role and embarks upon establishing the imagination as a topic worthy
of consideration in its own right. Quite recently, authors have taken up the work of
Pico and have begun to chart the historical dimensions of the imagination, expanding
Pico‟s work from a compilation and thematic coherence of only the Medieval period,
but have begun to include the echoes of imagination in Plato, the references Aristotle
makes to the topic, the place of imagination in the cognitive hierarchies of the
Medieval period, the role and possible transformation of imagination in the modern
period, and even the suggestion of a post-modern imagination. The imagination, it
would seem, has arrived.
The contemporary approaches vary as much in methodology and content
as the history of philosophy displays for any topic. The trends in scholarship
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run from particularists to generalists; from analytic to continental, psychological
to philosophical to religious.
The foremost generalists who address the history of imagination are Eva
Brann and Richard Kearney.24 Both authors present a comprehensive
accounting of the history, provide detailed analysis of individual and epochal
conceptualizations and attempt a coherent narrative for the development of the
imagination. Unfortunately, with these general concerns their similarities are at
an end.
Brann‟s formidable compendium, The World of Imagination, attempts to
exhaust multiple fields of inquiry concerning the imagination; including
philosophy, psychology—classical and experimental—, religion and literature.
This voluminous work centers around Brann‟s central claim that, while given a
pivotal role in various disciplines, the imagination has long suffered from
limited explanation, and her endeavor is to provide a unifying explanation
throughout the disparate fields. Central to her claim is the understanding of the
imagination as a “faculty of representation” responsible for „creating‟ images.
This fundamental function is manifest in various formulations throughout the
history of ideas;
a) in philosophy, as a power mediating between senses and reason by
virtue of representing perceptual objects without their presence.
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b) in psychology, as a class of representations, quasi-sensory or quasiperceptual which occurs in the absence of the usual external stimuli
and which may have behavioral consequences different from those
attendant on their sensory counterpart.
c) in ordinary discourse, as the capacity for seeing things in one‟s
head.25
Notably, all three definitions cluster around the ability and/or product of presenting or
re-presenting the objects of sensation as ideas. This representing, or “image-making”
as Brann describes it, is the signal and exclusive function of imagination. Throughout
history, commentators- philosophical, psychological, religious or literary- all employ
imagination homogenously, or nearly so. What is missing, however, is adequate
explanation for the homogeneity of the image-making function found amongst the
various authors.
Kearney, on the other hand, denies homogeneity of the imagination in his
work, The Wake of the Imagination. Here Kearney plots a course through history
demonstrating an evolution of use and conceptualization of the imagination. He
accords his own methodology the laudation of genealogy, tracing the family
resemblance of all the terms used as imagination. In its first employment, in ancient
Greek and Medieval thought, the imagination is merely a mimetic faculty. Kearney‟s
paradigmatic metaphor for this epoch is a mirror. What human imagination performs
in this era is an image-making function of nature, deus sive natura. The locus of
reality and truth is located in the natural order of things. Moreover, meaning
ascription is located in the original. Human cognition in its imaginative capacity
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simply mirrors the world in its original meaning. In ancient Greek culture, the
meaning of objects and the world is found in the dynamic cosmos of change and
becoming. The imagination in its reproductive capacity has the ability to create
temporary stases in the world of flux and thus ensconce meaning in eternal,
immutable ideas. In Medieval thought the imagination finds itself not reproducing
merely nature, but the order of the universe as created by God. Human understanding
as reflected in the mirror image of the world is ultimately dependent/derivative on the
totalization depicted in God‟s knowledge or nature‟s order. Both ancient and
medieval formulations are inherently, Kearney claims, theocentric.26
Shifting from ancient and medieval imagination and the metaphor of the
mirror, Kearney describes and compares the modern conception of imagination as a
lamp to that of the ancient/medieval epoch of a mirror. This productive imagination,
found in the humanistic considerations of modern era, is the source of light and
inspiration within human experience. No longer dependent upon a transcendent
world, moderns find themselves with the power and position to provide themselves
with meaning in the world. According to Kearney, this anthropocentrism marks the
modern paradigm as it concerns the imagination. Humans are no longer mere
derivative beings, but are, rather, the inventors and creators of their world.
The final stage alleged by Kearney is the ex-centric imagination found in the
postmodern era of ubiquitous images. Because of the sheer number of images and the
technologically-enabled reproductive capacity we find in contemporary culture,
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Kearney argues that the images afforded by imagination have no clear originals,
neither in theo- nor anthropocentricism. Images of images of images characterize the
postmodern condition. Losing sight of the originals, no longer are humans nor the
world/god the locus of meaning, rather, meaning arises from a “labyrinth of looking
glasses” from which no origin can be found.27 Kearney‟s metaphor shifts, once
again, from the lamp to the bricoleur,28 someone who plays with fragments of
meaning, which she herself did not create. This process, Kearney claims, is even
unconscious to the bricoleur herself. Often, creative artists, wordsmiths, poets, or
philosophers, believe themselves to be the author of meaning, yet they are merely
recombining already given fragments to express different permutations of already
existing elements. According to Kearney, the development of the imagination has a
linearity that can be traced from ancient, anonymous, theocentric, mirror-like
mimesis; to modern, self-expressive, anthropocentric, lamp-like creativity; to postmodern, unconscious, ex-centric, labyrinthine playing. Because of the ubiquity and
commonality of images and imagining, the imagination, he declares, is a “species
under threat of extinction.”29
Before the long argument for evolving imagination, Kearney offers a
summary of the Western conceptualization of the imagination. He enumerates the
two basic definitions of the imagination as follows:
a) as a representational faculty, which reproduces images of some preexisting reality
27
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and
b) a creative faculty which produces images, which often lay claim to
an original status in their own right30
Kearney even extends this analysis to four ways in which the imagination may be
conceived. In order to represent or produce, the imagination may employ different
approaches. Kearney cites them as the four main meanings of the term imagination,
which are the following:
a) the ability to evoke absent objects which exist elsewhere, without
confusing these absent objects with things present in the here and
now
b) a construction and/or use of material forms and figures such as
paintings, statues, photographs etc. to represent real things in some
„unreal‟ way
c) a fictional projection of non-existent things as in dreams or literary
narratives
d) the capacity of human consciousness to become fascinated by
illusions, confusing what is real with what is unreal.31
Kearney‟s approach allows him to embrace the equivocity that accompanies
imagination through the many translations and transliterations. Without isolating a
singular definition of the imagination, he manages to agree with much of what Brann
argues for, while maintaining a polysemantic undertstanding of the term.
The disagreement between Brann and Kearney is precisely about development
of the imagination, or lack thereof. Brann cites the homogeneity of the imagination,
with its conspicuous lack of treatment in the history of philosophy, as a viable and
interesting contemporary issue. It is the “missing mystery” in the history of ideas,
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one that needs exploring, explanation and demonstration. For Kearney, it is the
interesting development among epochal changes that elicits interest and demands the
“story of the imagination” be told. More importantly, it is precisely the nature and
employment of imagination upon which they seemingly disagree.
However, upon closer scrutiny, both authors do actually describe remarkably
similar accounts of the imagination as it appears in the use of historical figures.
Neither Kearney nor Brann discount the representative power of imagination. Neither
deny the subordinate, mediate, and superordinate denigrations and elevations recited
from the historical record. Neither deny the claim that the imagination possesses the
ability to present that which is absent. What the two authors do disagree upon, is the
role imagination takes in meaning ascription, world constitution and experience
orientation. In short, they disagree on the way humans understand the imagination.
Both authors agree on the use and function of the imagination as a liaison between the
senses and the intellect. The imagination in its reproductive role, they both contend,
does mediate between the senses and the intellect. In addition to the standard role of
imagination as handmaid to reason or intellection, is the often overlooked application
of reason and judgment back into the practical life-world. It is in this second aspect
that Kearney cites the true difference between his three paradigms of the imagination.
If the imagination is merely a reproductive capacity, then it is just a mediator. If,
however, the imagination serves a more productive role in meaning and orientation,
then he has a strong case for his evolutionary story of the imagination. Yet, it is just
at this juncture that Brann and Kearney can be reconciled. If the function of the
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imagination is nearly always the same, it is on other metaphysical issues, those
pertaining to the sources of meaning and whether humans create meaning or receive it
from an external source, that Brann and Kearney disagree. The imagination may
indeed be the same throughout the course of history, but what it reproduces, or
produces for that matter, and the source of the „original‟ is the issue at contention.
Kearney‟s extrapolation from imagination to meaning-making is the contention that is
outstanding. It needs both explanation and justification.
The aim of this historical section is to follow the historical ledger, largely as
Brann, Kearney and others have, in order to present a coherent narrative or story of
the imagination. I hope to continue in the spirit of Brann and Kearney, both in
illustrating the role of the imagination in historical figures, developing a story of the
imagination, but, moreover, to isolate signature insights of antecedent philosophers in
the understanding and employment Kant has of the imagination. This historiography
is an attempt to continue the work of Brann and Kearney. To do so, I will supplement
both Kearney and Brann‟s treatment‟s, providing the way specific philosophers
understand the imagination in particular epochs, something Brann tends to overlook
in arguing for a single imagination in history, and isolating a single function of the
imagination, a claim Kearney never denies, but fails to include in his development of
human orientation. In short, my own historiography is a synthesis of these two
approaches. In so doing, I hope to demonstrate in greater detail both the agreement
and disagreement between these two eminent scholars, and to continue work begun
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by these authors in excavating the imagination from the arcana of the history of
philosophy.
And yet, this historical section is more than presenting an account that offers a
suggestion of reconciliation between these two authors, one that can affirm an
essential function of the imagination while leaving room for variety in the use of its
products. This historical section purports to build a narrative of the imagination, to
show its fulfillment and culmination as Kant employs it in his philosophical system,
while finding historical precedent in his predecessors. The historical sections will
begin with ancient Greek philosophy and end with a pre-amble to Kant found in the
empiricist philosophies of Locke and Hume.
With all the contention concerning the imagination, as a linear development,
as an essentially static faculty, whether it is subordinate or superordinate- all these
issues can only be addressed by addressing the history proper. So it is to the ancient
Greeks I propose to turn first. But before beginning, I feel it imperative to establish
some programmatic concerning the analysis and treatment of the historical
individuals represented here. The figures represented in this abbreviated history are
chosen because they are the earliest recorded harbingers of schools of philosophy that
arise as a consequence of their works. From Plato is established a trend in thinking
that is roughly approximate with his writings, Platonism; from Aristotle we gain
Aristotelianism and his dominant influence in Western philosophy for nearly twothousand years; from Augustine and Aquinas we are left with a trenchant
Scholasticism, the likes of which are only overthrown (arguably) by Descartes
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himself and his foundationalist paradigm for philosophy and science; from Descartes
both rationalism and empiricism arise.32 These archetypes of philosophy each, in
their individual ways, influence the discourse of the imagination. And, in order to tell
the story of the imagination, each figure must in turn be treated to trace the subtle
transformations, in our understanding of the imagination itself. What I propose in
these historical sections is to treat each figure independently by interrogating the
understanding and use each figure places on the imagination in their particular
philosophical formulations. The hope is to illustrate how the imagination works
within their philosophical systems, which, in turn, will shed light on their archetypal
understandings of the imagination. This archeology of the imagination will in turn be
able to demonstrate developments of imagination, if there be any, and establish firm
precedence for Kant‟s employment of this faculty. In order to interrogate these
historical figures, it will be important to ask several questions, all of which some will
be able to answer, and others who will be able to answer only some of the questions.
Inherent in such a topical treatment, the single most important question is: “what is
the nature of the imagination according to person X.” But such a questioning elicits
more questions than answers. To facilitate answers to this overriding question, I
propose to decompose this broad question into narrower foci. One deep problem with
the imagination is its role in cognition; whether it is reliable, and whether the
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“figments” of the imagination are in any way real. Thus I intend to address these two
concerns by explicitly asking two related questions:
1) What is the ontology of the imagination and its products?
and
2) What relation do the products of the imagination bear to the
deliverances of the senses?
The first question interrogates the metaphysics of any particular historical character
and places the imagination within his schema for establishing the ultimately real. The
second question addresses questions concerning the role of imagination in veritative
judgment formation, that is, it addresses the epistemic question.
Because the study of cognition has historically found itself entrenched in
problems of its own, I propose to examine the imagination in terms of faculty
psychology. This approach is not an attempt to entitize certain powers or capacities
of the mind itself, but, rather, allows us to draw contrasts between different,
recognized powers of the mind by nominalizing these capacities.33 This
nominalization of the powers of the mind permits predication in order to ease
discussion of the capacities and functions of our mental abilities. Since this common
heuristic is found in many of our historical figures, I feel it appropriate to address
these thinkers on their own terms and to continue employing the vocabulary of
faculty psychology. In doing so, another question arises:
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3) Where, in a particular thinker‟s faculty psychology, do we find the
imagination? or In the hierarchy of cognitive faculties, where do we
find the imagination?

Answering this third question will assist in evaluating the responses to the other two
interrogatives. In other words, by applying the two basic questions to the faculties of
the mind, we are then left with the questions, “Is the faculty of imagination and its
products real (in any deep sense of the term) and what role(s), if any, do they play in
making knowledge claims?”
A fourth question, one quite sublunary yet salient to the task of this study, is
to ask:
4) How do these formulations of the imagination presage or pre-figure
Kant‟s understanding, or, alternatively, provide a heuristic against
which Kant provides his own account.
This last question is the tie that binds the historiography from the preliminary
chapters of this thesis from those that address Kant‟s works. In order to prove the
contention that Kant employs the imagination in a conventional sense, but radicalizes
the imagination into the ground for both sensibility and understanding, I hope to
recount the established view in order to demonstrate the innovation in Kant‟s
thinking. Investigating this last question will facilitate an understanding of the
narrative of the imagination and Kant‟s place within it.
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Chapter Two: Imagination in Greek Philosophy

Promethean Imaginings

Arguably, Western culture has been molded by two primary influences, Greek
culture and concepts and Judeo-Christian theology. The Hellenic culture of
speculative philosophy and the biblical tradition of Judeo-Christian revelation have
provided Western thinking/philosophy with most of its formative concepts and have
exercised an enduring influence.34 Not surprisingly, the theoretical framework by
which we understand the imagination finds its roots in the Greek tradition. As
Richard Kearney notes, “the first properly philosophical categories of imagination are
to be found in the writings of Plato and Aristotle.”35 This does not imply, however,
that imagination is not manifest before these two behemoths of Greek culture and
philosophy.
Poetic mythos had long been employing imaginative thinking, both in the
production of myth and in the depiction of the narratives expressed. Poets, rhapsodes
and sophists utilized imagination in the production of their artistic and pedagogical
representations. Homer figuratively paints a picture of the travails of Odysseus and
rhapsodes claim to interpret the words of Homer by emphasizing certain elements,
highlighting with embellishment others, and down-playing even others by use of
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imaginative variation. Even in Greek myths themselves we find elements of
fabrication and the art of making. The Promethean myth provides a curious moral
tale, cautioning humans against the hubris of claiming the status of original creator.
At most, humans create images or replicas of Nature. Prometheus‟ punishment is a
reminder to the audience what occurs when one attempts to assume the privilege of
divine fabrication/creation held by the gods. Fire and the subsequent creative arts
enabled by this unique catalyst of change and forge-craft, once exclusively the realm
of the gods, was bequeathed to humanity by Prometheus‟ theft, but at a dear price.
The primary punishment was Prometheus‟ bondage, but the secondary cost was the
epistemic uncertainty concerning the correspondence of the creations of humanity to
those of the gods. Quite literally in some cases, the artifacts of human creation are
considered forgery by use of fire/imagination. Consequently, “the stigma of the theft
was thus attached to imagination as that Promethean foresight which enabled man to
imitate the gods.”36 This imitative understanding of imagination with its
metaphysical and epistemic duplicity is explicitly documented by Plato and Aristotle
and relegates the imagination to an often necessary component for human
representation, both as knowledge and in artifacts, but one that undermines any
claims to veracity. Imagination as imitation does not, however, end with the Greek
thinkers, it continues into medieval philosophy as well. From Plato and Aristotle we
see the first formulations of the imagination that gestate and increase in subtlety in
medieval thought.
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Plato

In Plato, we find an ambivalent account of the imagination; ambivalent
because, while Plato seems extremely caustic to works of art, he also accedes the
necessity of images in discursive thinking (dianoia). This ambivalence is to have
ramifications for the history of philosophy. Suspicion of this faculty is to remain in
many of the treatments of imagination, even while acknowledgment of its power will
be understated. Kant himself will suggest that certain imaginings should be
considered folly and yet finds proper place for this powerful faculty. This
ambivalence in Plato draws directly from his metaphysical view of reality, and,
subsequently, the assignation of epistemic verity, or lack thereof, in the physical
world of human sensation. It is in Republic Book VI that we find the articulation of
Plato‟s metaphysical model, the so-called divided line analogy.
The real, according to Plato, is located in the world of the Form(s),37 which is
inaccessible by human sensation. The Form of the Good, for example, is, rather,
accessed by intellect (nous) through the process of “pure seeing” (noesis). Literally,
the Form of the Good is “seen” with the soul through pure understanding/reason, the
purely intelligible. Plato likens the act whereby the soul comprehends the truth of the
Form(s) to a metaphor of seeing objects by the visible light of the sun. In his words;
“when the [soul] focuses on something illuminated by the light of truth and what is, it
37
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understands, knows and apparently possesses understanding, but when it focuses on
what it mixed with obscurity, on what comes to be and passes away, it opines and is
dimmed.”38 What “comes to be and passes away”, according to Plato, is the realm
not of truth, but of doxa, belief. In the act of noesis, the knower comes to
comprehend the truth, which is unchanging, permanent, immaterial, and eternal. The
visible, material world provided by sensation cannot meet the criteria of seeing the
Form(s) with the figurative “mind‟s eye.” What humans gain by the deliverances of
the senses are merely sensible, commonly visible, tactile and/or audial representations
obscured by becoming and decay. Thus sensation cannot yield knowledge of the truth
and is relegated to the realm of facsimile or mimesis of the truth of the Forms.39
These replications, however, can never be true copies or images of the Forms, owing
to the operations of sensation and its inability to reproduce the constancy required for
episteme, true knowledge.40
In Plato‟s divided line, purposive, creative images and even accidental
reflections are even further removed from the Form(s) than sensation. Since the nonvisible Form(s) are the locus of truth and objects in the visible world can never
maintain the permanence of the Form(s), these objects are imperfect replications of
the true Form. Moreover, artistic representations and reproductions of the objects of
sensation, are thus replications of replicas. Eikasia is the name Plato ascribes to this
act of reproduction, and he firmly places it at the lowest division in his divided line

38

Republic, 508b.
Republic, 510 d-e.
40
Theaetetus, 186e.
39

38

analogy.41 To illustrate, Plato describes three types of bed. The first “is in nature a
bed, and… a god makes it.”42 Because it is “the very one that is the being of a bed”
there can be no two beds made by “the god”. In Plato‟s divided line, this original
bed is placed at the level of intelligibility- the form of bed. As such, there can be only
one. The second type of bed is that made by the carpenter. The carpenter fashions a
visible, physical bed, one that comes into being by the manipulations of the carpenter
and yet does not remain, for its materiality is subject to decay and the process of
becoming. The third bed belongs to the artist. An artist‟s likeness of a bed merely
imitates what the god or the carpenter make. Plato tells us “the artist‟s representation
is a long way removed from the truth, for it touches only a small part of each thing,
and a part that is itself only an image.”43 The artist‟s reproduction of any visible
object is an imitation of something that itself is not ultimately real. Artistic
representations, Plato argues, are three removes from reality. The first, true reality,
belongs to the Form of the Good, from which “the god”/demiurge creates the form of
bed, only one of which exists, as it is the being of all things humans classify as beds.
The visible objects created by craftsmen only imitate the intelligible being that the
form of bed itself possesses. Visible objects accessible by sensation already present
an initial chasm between reality, intelligibility, episteme, and the world of material
objects, availing themselves only to sensibility, doxa. The visible bed is already an
imitation of the form of bed, which is derived from the Form of the Good. Simply, at
the level of doxa, human understanding is already two removes from reality. Yet
41

Republic, 509d-e.
Republic, 597b, also Timaeus 29-31.
43
Republic, 598b.
42

39

redemptive at the carpenter‟s level is the act of making that participates in the form
(and presumably the function) of bed and we accord belief (pistis) to the reproduction
because of its participation in the form of bed. When viewing an artistic
representation of a bed, however, say a painting of a bed, only the superficial qualities
of the object remain, even the integral participation between form and function is lost.
A painting of a bed cannot be slept upon. As an imitation of a representation of the
form of that is drawn from the Form(s), artistic works are at three removes from
reality. Such distance from the real, Plato suggests, presents only the merest of
appearance and in so doing presents us with little more than illusion. Plato‟s
excoriating criticism of eikasia leads him to banish artists and poets from the
Republic, for they peddle illusion and do not further human development toward the
Form(s).44
But even at the level of eikasia, the physical representations found in works of
art, Plato wishes to make a distinction between veracity and falsehood.45 In image
production, in imagination proper, we can distinguish between faithful and illusory
imitation. Among the many images found at the level of eikasia, Plato distinguishes
between iconic images (eikones) and phantasy (phantasia). The former imitate
faithfully, and are thus true images of forms, while the latter are purely illusory. Art
works and images that represent unfaithfully, like those depicting the gods or heroes
in manifest immoral and irrational behavior, depict falsehoods and are pure
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phantasy.46 This imaginative or creative imagination, what will come to be called the
“creative imagination”, is just a species of deceit.47 They play upon strong sentiments
and desire, irrational portions of our soul, and encourage immoral actions.48
However, should poets depict elevating and ennobling sentiments in their work—
those that encourage intellection over passion, rationality, morality and truth—then
Plato can readmit these artists into the Republic.49 Making for such allowances, the
severest of strictures guided by pedagogical purposes, Plato ultimately displays the
ambivalence and irony in his position on images.
In another powerful metaphor, the allegory of the Cave, Plato further clarifies
the difference between faithful and unfaithful employment of images in judging. He
describes the process by which individuals may be liberated from the fetters of the
visible, hence imagistic, thinking to determine true judgments.50 At the initial level of
judging, in bondage, individuals are beholden to images projected upon the wall of
the cave. Plato suggests that accurate prediction of the sequence of images, that is,
judging the order correctly, wins high esteem.51 By mixing the phantasia presented
with rational judgment, according to the order in which images appear from memory,
faithful predictions of order can be produced. Plato argues that “sensation makes
some sort of impression in the soul,” which is then stored and called upon as needed
through memory.52 Memory may be either faithful or false, and faithful memory is
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rewarded by the accurate prediction of the objects of the visible world, which is
afforded through sensation. This mixing of phantasia and rational principles in the
act of judging indicates a proper pedagogic function of imagination, if only at the
level of the visible—shadows this case. Instructive here is Plato‟s willingness to
employ images as they arise in memory, informed by rational principles, in the act of
judging, in order to provide for empirical efficacy, prediction.
Furthermore, in the process of discursive thinking, “Plato concedes that
knowledge, episteme, may at time have recourse to what he terms „thought images‟ in
order to enable our human understanding (dianoia) to give figurative expression to its
abstract ideas.”53 Analogous to the usefulness of imagistic thinking and memory in
the prediction of empirical events, images may also be employed in discursive
thinking to aid in the representation of abstract ideas. Plato‟s most celebrated
example of the role of imagistic thinking in discursive thought is that found in
geometrical practices. When mathematicians
use visible figures and make claims about them, thought is not directed
to them but to those other things that they are like. They make their
claims for the sake of the square itself and the diagonal itself, not the
diagonal they draw, and similarly with others. These figures that they
draw… they now in turn use as images, in seeking to see those others
themselves that one cannot see except by means of thought.”54
In other words, when mathematicians utilize material models and sketches as inexact
representations of abstract forms, “the dianoetic power picks up natural shapes and
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diagrammatic drawing and interprets them as images.”55 Thus, dianoia stands a
middle-ground between pure thinking (nous) and sensibility. It employs the spatiality
and visibility of sensation to provide the exemplars found in abstract ideas. In
drawing a circle, the geometer imperfectly represents an object, whose properties
include all points on the circumference equidistant from the center, for the purposes
of diagramming and exploring further consequences of its abstract definition. Such
diagrams may prove useful in clarifying relationships, aiding memory in faithful
representation of abstract entities and discovering subsequent properties. So also this
obtains for other natural images. In the process of abstraction and discursive
thinking, images of visible objects are stored and compiled in memory, in order to
facilitate human understanding of different forms. By sensible exposure to multiple
instances of a type of object, memory records the natural shape, and perhaps other
characteristics, and, by contrast and comparison of these shapes and characteristics,
that is discursive thinking, renders an image employable for latter use with
subsequent exposure to similar objects. Thus, a form, an exemplar, imperfect though
it may be, of any type of object is produced. Accordingly, these abstract ideas
generated by human understanding cannot be lauded as the form of any object, as the
epistemic verity of the form may only be attributed to noetic understanding, but the
importance of image production that enables abstract thinking can no longer be
denied. Plato must afford some positive use of imagination to explain the process of
abstract thinking and its relation to visible objects. In addition to natural and
geometric images in the education and employment of discursive thinking, Plato
55
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allows one further use of the imagination, that of the artist for moral and pedagogic
edification. Such examples are, presumably, like those works such as Plato‟s own
dialogues. By fostering discursive thinking through the use of image, metaphor,
allegory, and analogy, Plato can accept artistic representation as positive in a
pedagogical schema that can lead to truth. Ironic as his condemnation of imagination
may be, Plato affords a positive role, one that follows his own lead.
This ambivalence is the most commonly featured characteristic of Plato‟s
imagination in the remarkably sparse commentary offered on the topic. Generalist
historians such as Kearney, Brann, Sallis and Cocking all note Plato‟s seemingly
mixed attitude to the imagination and the place of images on the divided line.56 This
ambiguity is characterized by the use of twin terms eikasia and phantasia.
Commentator H.S. Thayer mitigates this confusion translating eikasia as likeness and
phantasia as semblance.57 Likenesses are created in an attempt to replicate the real
for the purposes of exploring and disclosing further characteristics. Semblances, on
the other hand, are taken for the real and thus mistake mere facsimiles for the real.
This division within images supports Plato‟s division of true images, icons (eikones),
from false, fantasy (phantasia). In addition, this affords Plato the opportunity to
reintegrate images and imagistic thinking, myths and geometry, into his ideal state,
but only on the condition that any reference made by images or imagistic thinking are
in the promotion of the Form(s).

56

Cf. Brann, pp. 35-40; Cocking, p. 13; Kearney, pp. 87-105; Sallis (1995), p. 13; Sallis (2000), pp.
46-51.
57
Thayer, H.S. “Plato on the Morality of the Imagination” The Review of Metaphysics (30: 594-618) p.
594-595. Also in Sallis (2000), p. 46-47; Cocking, p. 13.

44

Robert Brumbaugh presents a notable work decribing how mathematical
schemata provide just such semblances that can abrogate Plato‟s often difficult
mathematical analogies.58 Brumbaugh‟s stated goal is to provide a “new primary
source material for the study of Plato” by describing diagrams which “were intended
to accompany and clarify [Plato‟s] text.”59 Laudable as this project is, unfortunately,
Brumbaugh does little in the clarification of imagination in Plato. Rather, he focuses
on providing mathematical diagrams for esoteric references in Plato‟s corpus. The
upshot of Brumbaugh‟s work is to show that the discursive mathematical examples
Plato employs are indeed imagistic and these images do indeed aid in dialectic by
which human cognition approaches noetic thinking. Images do have a beneficial
place in Plato‟s hierarchy. It is in the eikastic representation of diagrams by which
humans represent mathematical truths that propels the dialectic forward to “pure
knowing.” Eikastic images are, in the final analysis, at the level of discursive
thinking, a propaedeutic encouraging the dialectic to continue.60 As a propaedeutic it
is “a matter of seeing the truth instead of an image… that is, in that appearance that
[the image] offers.”61 The knowledge obtained even at this level of thinking is still
knowledge of particulars62 that are beginning to be generalized over groups according
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to hypotheses.63 Knowledge of kinds begins to obtain and from this initial
propaedeutic, images, at last, must be left behind in order to obtain true knowledge,
episteme. Thus particular images perceived through sensation may be legitimated, so
long as they are of mathematic, or moral, edification. In a strange reversal from the
standard Platonic interpretation concerning the images and the beneficence of such
entities, images may be employed to advance human understanding to the level of
knowledge.
It is by precisely distinguishing these beneficial images, eikones, from mere
illusion; it is by dividing educational images from those that compel humans to
immoral behavior, and it is the demarcation of true images from those that lay claim
to the truth, mere fictions, that Plato bequeaths a legacy to Western philosophy. In
the words of Richard Kearney:
the human imagination is only deemed legitimate to the extent that it
acknowledges the three following conditions: i) that it is an imitation
rather than an original; ii) that it is ultimately subordinate to reason;
and iii) that it serves the interests of the divine Good as absolute origin
of the truth. 64
Such constraints emphasize the subordinate position of imagination to reason and/or
noetic vision in Plato‟s hierarchy. Furthermore, because the imagination found itself
in no philosophical discussions before Plato, and after the systematization of
philosophy found in his works, the imagination is indelibly marked. The first two
criteria are to have long standing influence on conceptualizations of imagination, and
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the third occupies a playful situation of disappearing and re-appearing in the course of
Western thought.
In summary of Plato‟s ambivalence to the imagination, we can enumerate
prohibitions and exceptions of the use of the imagination and image making that will
reverberate through the history of philosophy. By and large, artistic representations
are to be condemned:
1) on epistemic grounds. Artistic images are not real, do not represent
the real, and are mere facsimiles, three removes from reality, yet
are often depicted as truth.*
2) because they are non-didactic. Artistic images teach us nothing of
the reality of things.*
3) because they are irrational. Artistic representations prey upon
extremes of desire, eros. They introduce conflict and
contradiction, which directly oppose reason, which unites.
4) because they are immoral. Artistic representations often depict
immoral actions of the gods and heroes.
5) because of the propensity to idolatry. Taking the superficial
depiction as truth amounts to elevating an eikon to the level of
permanent being.65
Plato‟s condemnation is grounded on a fusion of any, and often all, the five
explanations. Any image production that runs afoul these objections, violates Plato‟s
programmatic for knowledge and knowledge acquisition. Proscriptions three through
five are strict censure and typical image making is usually in violation of them.
Condemnations one and two however, are mitigated. If an image is not taken for the
real, but merely a representation of the truth and the image‟s purpose is to guide the
maker of images to the Form(s), such employment is acceptable. With these two
exceptions, images may find some place in veritative cognition, thus becoming
65
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integral to human understanding. So long as images faithfully depict, schematically,
make no pretence to the final truth of the object, and can be employed in the upward
movement of discursive thinking, then images may be of some use in knowing.
Likewise, when artistic representations make no pretence to depict reality, they may
be deemed acceptable. Provided humans concede the inferiority of visible
representations to the Form(s) and avoid mistaking visible, material, changing images
with the eternal, immaterial permanent truth of the Form(s), representation in any
form is deemed acceptable. “What distinguishes this legitimate function of images
from the normal practices of artists and sophists is that they are never treated as ends
in themselves. They serve rather as instrumental means for mediating between our
sensible experience and our rational intelligence.”66 By conceding the superficial
nature of visible representation, humans can then employ images, though discursive
thinking, in the pursuit of truth.
As an inheritor of Western philosophy and these expansive legacies, Kant will
reject the first of these criteria. The latter two will be affirmed, as I intend to argue.
In his employment of imagination, Kant will be influenced by the concern that images
and imagination is subordinate to reason, but not in the way Plato imagines. It is not
the case that the imagination is governed by reason in determining its role in true
judgments—Kant does not express belief in a world of pure Form(s) that is accessible
only by reason. Rather, reason aids in the use of imagination by providing
parameters. Nevertheless, reason and imagination are working in conjunction to
provide the basis for epistemic claims. The last criterion will find implicit expression
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in Kant‟s moral philosophy and the ability to formalize maxims and employ them in
the concreta of particular actions, always in the furtherance of morality. Despite the
temporal and philosophic differences, we find the very first suggestions of
imagination and its proper function in human cognition in Plato, a legacy to be found
in Kant‟s philosophy.

Aristotle

Aristotle states: “Imagination (phantasia) is different from either perceiving
(aisthesis) or discursive thinking (dianoia)67, though it [imagination] is not found
without sensation, or judgment (hypolepsis) without it.”68 With this concise
formulation, Aristotle gives us the key to unlock his philosophy of the human mind.69
Because the imagination is a name traditionally given to one of the capacities of the
psyche and because the human mind (nous) is atop a hierarchy of possible kinds of
psyche,70 if we wish to comprehend his role for imagination in cognition, we must see
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its place within the larger setting of Aristotle‟s faculty psychology. It is within his
text De Anima, that we find Aristotle‟s full exposition of the possible types of living
beings, the possible types of souls, living beings. It is here that Aristotle demarcates
living beings into three different groups- plants, animals, and humans, according to
the type of soul each possesses- vegetative, sensitive, and rational respectively.
Vegetative (or, often, reproductive) souls possess only the capacities to obtain
nutrients, grow, decay and reproduce.71 Their marked lack of locomotion, according
to Aristotle, precludes any movement, which is based upon appetition and desire, and
thus any real interaction with the environment. In the middle of his hierarchy,
Aristotle places the sensitive soul. In addition to the capacities of the lower life forms
(yet altered by a higher capacity) the sensitive soul possesses sense perception. It is
sense perception and the ability to respond to the environment, according to painful
and pleasurable stimuli, that separates animal souls from those of the vegetative life
forms.72 In contrast to the vegetative soul, the sensitive soul indicates a certain
awareness and interaction with its environment. But this immediate awareness found
at the sensitive level does not imply intellection or thinking,73 merely the capacity to
exercise mechanical reaction, not deliberate action. To the immediacy of sense
perception, the rational soul adds the possibility of mediated awareness, one that
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allows for multiple, repeated re-presentations, which in turn allow for possibility of
discursive thinking.74 The awareness attributed to sensitive souls is merely of
particulars and is a reaction to pain or pleasure. The rational, thinking, soul, however,
operates at a level re-presentation75 that allows for discursive thinking and the
possibility of universals, abstraction, and generalization that typify the most advanced
living beings.76
Aristotle‟s faculty psychology, and consequently his divisions among the
souls, is predicated upon the existence of forms in substances. Aristotle suggests two
distinctive types of forms: sensuous forms and essential forms, that is, those
perceivable by the distinguishing faculties of animals and thinking beings, by
sensation the former and thinking the latter.77 The sensitive faculty perceives the
sensible form in objects of experience, which determine the various sensible qualities
of the things we see. The rational faculty perceives the essential form, which
characterizes the nature of the thing and makes it what it is. Hence the sensitive
faculty perceives the particular form, the rational the universal form. 78
If we follow Aristotle‟s assertion, concerning the distinction between
thinking, imagination and sensation, and the order of descending necessity for the
capacity above it, we find the imagination lodged between the key faculties that
differentiate rational beings from animals, and also between the two different types of
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forms these faculties perceive. This unique position allows Aristotle to employ the
imagination when discussing both sense perception and rational thinking. In fact,
with proper understanding we can come to see the imagination as the faculty that
allows for the conversion of sensuous forms into the essential forms. (And possibly
the other way around.)
In depicting the sensitive powers, Aristotle claims:
every sense is receptive of the forms of the sensible objects without
their matter, and in the sort of way in which wax receives the
impression of a signet ring without the iron or gold, for the wax
receives the impression.79
When the senses are affected by an object in the environment, the sense organs are
affected in a way that responds to their proper function e.g. the eye sees color, hearing
sounds etc. The organs receive the particular, determinate form of the object
perceived i.e. when seeing red the eye is imprinted with the form red or hearing
middle C the ear it impressed with the form middle C. The sensitive powers are not
limited, however, to the standard five senses of touch, taste, sight, smell and hearing.
To the standard canon Aristotle adds the ability to perceive information that is not
administered by any one particular sense, i.e. motion, rest, magnitude, number and
figure.80 These common sensibles are conveyed through various different senses and
are not the specific intuition of any particular organ i.e. both sight and touch can
convey the figure of an object. In addition to the particularity of sensuous forms
perceived by the various senses, their determinate qualification owing to the
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singularity of the object, Aristotle adds that “sensations are always true.”81 What our
body receives from its environment by means of the sense organs is always
accurate.82
What we have at the end of the process of sensation is a disparate group
perceptions, each according to the special organ or the tandem operation of several
organs in the case of common sensibles. But what the sensitive faculty does not
provide is a cohesive unity that combines these various perceptions. This is the
domain of the imagination. Imagination, as its name suggests, is, for Aristotle, the
power or habit “by virtue of which images are formed for us.”83 Imagination is the
faculty in which the sensuous forms, particular sense impressions, presented by
sensation are unified into a singular presentation. Imagination combines the black
and white patches received by my eyes, the smell of animal dander received through
my olfactory sense, the sound of barking and the figure of a canine to produce the
image of a dog- a particular image of a particular dog, a dalmatian.
This initial level of imagination, one which Aristotle describes as the
sensitive/perceptual, is found in all animals. This explains how animals, essentially
sensitive according to their defining faculty, the sensitive entelecheia, receive
information from their environment, process it into a unified field and pursue or avoid
the phenomenon according to the pleasure or pain it engenders. Aristotle asserts that
the sensitive imagination is immediately operative when sensation occurs, for it is the
means by which animals unify the various sensations presented in experience. As an
81
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advanced form of animal, humans also possess this ability to perceive a unified field
to which they can react according to the pleasure or pain it causes, (but this too will
be altered by nous, the defining faculty, entelechia, of rational beings.)84
If the imagination was limited to just this unifying aspect, it could be
considered merely another operation of the faculty of sensation. But, as Aristotle
points out, rational beings can present images to themselves that are no longer present
e.g. I can remember the dalmatian I saw as an eleven year child. This second
function of the imagination, the one most salient to rational beings, Aristotle entitles
the deliberative/rational imagination. In the sensitive soul, one governed by appetition
and sensation, imagination only performs an operation that allows for immediate
discrimination of objects in the environment, that they may be pursued or avoided. In
the most complex soul, the rational, one which possesses all the faculties of the lower
and nous, imagination performs the same function, but also adds another role, a representative role, to its repertoire. As this second function of imagination suggests,
rational beings can present images of sensation long past- that is, imagination is the
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faculty that allows for memory and the awareness of the passing of time, according to
Aristotle.85 Souls of this type now have the capacity to re-present objects and events
past for contemplation and deliberation in the present. This second function
illustrates how imagination is transformed by the defining faculty/entelechy of a
thinking/rational being.86
In order to understand how discursive thinking employs the imagination,
Aristotle offers us a telling analogy. “To the thinking soul,” he writes, “images serve
as if they were the contents of perception (and when it asserts or denies them to be
good or bad it avoids or pursues them).”87 Imagination and the images it produces are
thus at the very heart of the capacity to think—as the opening quote of this section
suggests, there is no thinking without images, according to Aristotle. Nous employs
the images afforded by the imagination to evaluate, discriminate and judge the forms
it perceives. As the name of the second feature of imagination suggests, the images
are to be employed for deliberative purposes. By Aristotle‟s analysis, discursive
thinking perceives the form offered in the image, and is afforded the opportunity of
evaluating, comparing and cataloguing these forms.
It is at this point in Aristotle‟s faculty psychology that a subtle, yet
informative distinction is made. Much like the sense organs receive an imprint of the
object of experience—that is, it receives the form (sensuous) of the object perceived;
thinking, Aristotle asserts, perceives the form (essential) of the image presented by
the imagination. Thinking does not intuit the particularities of the image, but rather
85
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perceives those forms without which the image would not be what it is—“the faculty
of thinking thinks the forms in the images.”88 Deliberative imagination provides
thinking the opportunity of doing so, by what will come to be known later as the
function of recombinant imagining. This function allows discursive thought to
remove, add, unify, divide and discriminate certain particular qualities in the images,
in order to see if the object still remains what it is. We can remove the spots from the
dalmatian and it will remain a dog- it will certainly no longer be a Dalmatian, but it
will remain a dog. By adding or removing particularities to the image, thinking
compiles a list of essential requirements for a thing to be what it is, the essential form.
Systematic knowledge of universals (scientia) is the final product of this protracted
activity.
By the process of evaluative thinking, Aristotle completes the movement that
began with the perception of a particular, with all its variety and contingency, and
arrives at the essential knowledge concerning the subject at hand. Thus Aristotle can
say “actual sensation apprehends individuals, while what knowledge apprehends is
universals.”89
At the universal level, thinking is disconnected from the world and operates in
the realm of theoria, but it is not necessarily removed from the world. The most
important function for (calculative) thinking, in Aristotle, is the ability to re-enter the
world with the judgments obtained in discursive thinking. It is here that imagination
re-surfaces, in the form we most often recognize it today. One concrete realm where
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imagination is employed in our engagement with the world is when we deliberate on
a course of action. Unlike the sensitive souls, rational animals have a calculative
ability that can imagine various scenarios, determine the probable consequences and
decide on actions accordingly. After providing a compendium of knowledge
concerning concrete situations in the world, the imagination provides the means by
which we can envision how possible scenarios might come about (that is based upon
this volume of knowledge and the particularities of the specific situation).
Thus we can see that imagination is both an internalizing process by which we
move from sensation to thinking, as well as one by which we think and then act in the
world. Not only does it provide us the contents of thought, it lends itself to rational
deliberation with the purpose of acting in the world. Imagination, it turns out, is the
medium through which we engage with the world, it is the link between the world of
experience/sensation and our understanding of this world.

Because Aristotle distinguishes these two types of imagination, sensitive and
deliberative; because Aristotle‟s analysis is scattered throughout many different texts;
and because Aristotle‟s own analysis is seemingly inconsistent and incomplete, there
has been a good deal of commentary and even more dissent among Aristotle scholars
regarding the status of this vital process. The place and role of imagination has led
some commentators to conclude the “imagination has an unsatisfactory halfway status
between perception and the intellect and its exact position is never made clear.”90 It
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is to this discussion that I now wish to turn, in hope that the ongoing debate may
enhance the preliminary view sketched above.
Commentators on Aristotle depict his imagination in a wide variety of
different possibilities. Standard interpretations, like the one expressed above, define
the imagination as an image making faculty, a distinct faculty by itself (phantasia)one that involves an imaginative state (phantasma), that by which imagination takes
place (phantastikon), an imagined object (phantasmaton) and imagining
(phanezesthai).91 This standard interpretation is represented in the literature by such
notable characters as R.D. Hicks92, W.D. Ross and, to some extent, D.W. Hamlyn.
And while these figures where instrumental to provide a canonical theory of the
imagination, they are not without their critics- in fact they split a median between two
extreme and polemical positions.
Martha Nussbaum represents one faction in the current polemic regarding
Aristotle‟s phantasia. Her interpretation involves imagination in a hermeneutic
process that attends to certain features of sensation in order to provide a familiar
“seeing as” that can then be employed by discursive thinking. Nussbaum does not
limit the imagination to an image producing capacity, for this locution, driven by its
ocular metaphor, overlooks imagination‟s discrimination in the other senses.
Nussbaum does not deny the image producing function of the imagination, but,
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rather, wishes to expand its role to an overall discriminating faculty that attends to,
orders, and focuses sensation into something employable. According to Nussbaum‟s
account, the imagination is a distinct faculty, but one whose role is greater than just
image production.
On the other side of the polemic is Michael Wedin. Contra Nussbaum‟s
interpretation, Wedin affirms the image making function of the canonical theory, but
denies the imagination any independent status as a faculty. The imagination, he
claims, “is not a full faculty” but “is surely involved in the actual use of such
[complete] faculties.”93
The disagreement between the two polarized factions is owing to the source
material from which each commentator draws their central theory. Wedin claims
DeAnima 3.3 to be the definitive and complete account of Aristotle‟s imagination, to
which any disagreement, inconsistency or confusion in auxiliary passages must
conform. On the other hand, Nussbaum, while recognizing the importance of the
DeAnima 3.3, emphasizes passages found in the Parva Naturalia De Motu Animalium
and even the Posterior Analytics. Her approach is “not to try to read the
inconsistencies away, or to try to make everything fit with what seems the most
technical passage, but to allow Aristotelian phantasia the broad scope… that it
evidently has… and recognize the diversity of the phenomena in question.”94 The
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fundamental disagreement between the two factions centers around two basic issues;
whether the imagination is a separate and complete faculty, and of what does the
nature of its activity consist. However they may he argued separately, I find both
issues spiraling around a unifying, but as yet unnamed issue- the fullness and
completeness of a faculty being based upon an exclusive, active capacity for which no
other faculty can account. In conjunction with this issue is the concern whether the
imagination as preparation and presentation of the unified sensations can fulfill
Aristotle‟s criterion of an independent faculty and as such entitle historians to trace
the use of imagination in his corpus.
On the first issue, the disagreement is more tacit than explicit. Integral to
Wedin‟s formulation is the “functional incompleteness of imagination.” According to
his analysis, “faculties are certain potentialities… which must be capable of actual
use” and thus the “imagination can hardly be a genuine faculty if it has no actual
use.”95 In other words, Wedin argues if there is not actual, presumably active, use of
a purported faculty, then the so-called faculty is not complete and distinct to itself.
Modestly, and wisely I think, Nussbaum does not posit such a strict definition of
faculty based solely upon this single criterion. She may even be willing to grant
Wedin this premise, but will add further criterion for the definition of a faculty. (But,
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if so, perception might not be a faculty—depending upon the weight you give the
sensus communis)
Following his premise concerning the status of faculties in regard to their
activity, Wedin continues and attempts to show that the activity of the imagination
occurs simultaneously with sensation, as in the case of the sensitive imagination
found in animals or with thinking, as in deliberative imagination. This second issue
reflects back on the first and is rallying point of either faction in the debate. He
contends that the unification of the sensibles occurs in sensation, in the sensus
communis, and that imagination is merely a passive re-presentation of the initial
presentation afforded by common sense.96 Nussbaum suggests this interpretation
likens the imagination to a mirror, which reflects what is given to it, but without
actively creating any images itself.97
Furthermore, Wedin denies phantasia the power of movement. He
reinterprets DeAnima 3.10 433a20-21 to say that movement in an animal that is the
product of an imagination and desire, is not the activity of imagination, but the
activity of the animal, not any specific faculty. To support this view Wedin adds that
it is either the sensitive faculty (the sensus communis located firmly within the faculty
of sensation) that unifies the sensations, to which animals immediately respond, or the
thinking faculty that demands/conjures bygone images98 that they may be the
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inspiration for action. It is desire, either immediate or mediated, he concludes, that
creates movement, not the imagination.
The imagination, Wedin contends, has no role found outside the operations of
other faculties. This interpretation does not deny the imagination, in either role, “has
no occurent or episodic employment but only that it will not be the actual
employment of a full faculty.” To this he adds, “in reading the imagination as a
general [re]presentational capability subserving other faculties, the it will… occur in
the course of another faculty‟s operation.”99 Thus without any active, exclusive
employment Wedin concludes the imagination to be an incomplete faculty, one that
acts only at the behest of another, that is it only acts passively upon command and
never at it own initiation or actualization.100
Nussbaum, more than any other commentator, takes exception to Wedin‟s
final pronouncement about the independent activity, or lack thereof, of the
imagination. In her analysis she approaches the issue much the same as most
commentators, but her emphasis on De Motu Animalium and the Parva Naturalia set
her apart from many contemporaries While she employs the main texts, Nussbaum‟s
orientation to the faculty of phenomenon is not one of standard faculty analysis, but,
rather, from action. She approaches the imagination from a passage Wedin has
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explicitly tried to explain away/denied.101 Following Aristotle‟s analysis in DeAnima,
Nussbaum encourages caution regarding the completeness of chapter 3 and purported
inconsistencies in the other works.
Nussbaum‟s attempts to establish the activity of phantasia by pointing out the
standard interpretation, that the imagination produces images of the data of sensation,
which will than be employed in thinking, entails several requirements overlooked by
most commentators. Nussbaum suggests that the mirror analogy contains a naïve and
flawed understanding about how likenesses are created, viewed, and understood. In
her words; “we can never copy an object in all the ways it is; we are always
representing it as something.”102 Implicitly involved in this process of “seeing as”,
according to Nussbaum, is the activity of discriminating, of focusing our attention on
certain features of the image. If the imagination is a process of reproducing and
representing what we perceive through sensation, the imagination must determine
what features are more salient to our seeing. This is to say that the imagination
selects background and foreground information when depicting any given imagecertain features are more readily available e.g. the visual is usually given priority over
the olfactory. Nussbaum‟s claim is that if the imagination were merely a mirror, all
the features would be represented according to how they are received by sensation,
without particular focus.
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Nussbaum goes even further to claim that sensation is a passive faculty.103
“We are always,” she writes, “passively receiving perceptual stimuli...” If sensation
is passive, the discriminating, distinguishing and unifying- the activity- required to
produce an image must take place elsewhere. Nussbaum continues saying, “… but
when we actively focus on some object in our environment, separating it out from its
context and seeing it as a certain thing, the faculty of phantasia, or the phantasiaaspect of aisthesis, is called into play.”104 Imagination, thus, is a capacity above the
mere re-presentation of the data of sensation. It is more than even mere unification in
image production.105 It underlies, according to Nussbaum, our very ability to
discriminate object from background. It is our ability to see the data as something
intelligible. “The phantasia is just our interpretation of the data presented to us.”106
To support the use of imagination outside of sensation Nussbaum cites
DeAnima III.3 which tells us sensation is always present, but not imagination is not.
Nussbaum interprets this passage as saying that while we are always receiving
sensation, we are not always attending to it, that is we are not always seeing the data
as intelligible.107 In a related issue Aristotle presents us with a surprising turnabout.
In De Somno, 455b10-13, Aristotle describes the faculty operative in sleeping.
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During sleep, Aristotle contends, sensation is incapacitated,108 and yet there is still a
re-presentation of images. Sensation accounts for these images. As wakefulness is
necessary for thinking (reflecting) as well, neither can thinking be the operative
faculty.109 In dreaming, then, Aristotle provides one case in which imagination is
operative without sensation or thinking.
Even according to Wedin‟s criteria, Nussbaum‟s interpretation accounts for
the imagination as a separate and distinct faculty. While it does not occur
independently of another faculty, it meets the fundamental criterion of performing an
active function not accounted for by another faculty. A point might be made here
about the overzealous restrictions Wedin places on the definition of faculty here. If
his premise holds, locomotion will be subsumed under either sensation or thinking
just as imagination is, for locomotion never occurs without either desire operating
immediately on the data of sensation or the manifest order of thinking, which is the
rational mediation of the data of sensation. Because it may have ramifications that
expressly contradict Aristotle‟s text,110 perhaps, Wedin‟s restrictions are too severe.
Thus we can see that Nussbaum‟s analysis, despite its broadening of the
imagination‟s sphere and influence- to an extent that the imagination acquires powers
not explicit in Aristotle‟s works; is more both more plausible and more generous to
the texts and the standard interpretation. Imagination is, minimally, a faculty in its
own right, one that is responsible for the activity of making images, and, perhaps, our
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attending to and understanding these images as intelligible (at least distinct from their
background, that is making an image rather than just a blooming, buzzing confusion.)

The use Aristotle makes of the imagination in his corpus can now be
correlated with the programmatic questions established for this historical inquiry.
When discussing the nature of the imagination in Aristotle, one must be careful to
distinguish between the imagination as it is elucidated in terms of sensitive souls from
the function it performs in rational souls. In sensitive souls, the function is to collate
the deliverances of the senses into a single image entity, to which the organism
responds according to appetition, pleasure and pain. This production of images from
the immediate deliverances of the senses allows for Aristotle to expound what the
senses are and the role they perform in the interaction animals have with their
environment. The immediate production of images allows animals to perceive as a
single entity that which is presented in perception. When we turn to rational souls,
this basic image making function of the imagination continues, but owing to a change
in the superlative faculty, nous, in the case of the rational soul, a corresponding
change in the functions of the imagination. As the complexity of the soul increases,
so will the functions of the imagination. The changes to imagination highlight the
chasm between appetitive souls and the rational soul Aristotle explains for our
distinctly finite, human existence.
In the rational soul, just as in the sensitive soul, the imagination performs the
function of collating the deliverances of the senses for the presentation of objects
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immediately before the perceiver. The additional function is the ability to re-present
these objects when they are absent. This reproductive capacity allows for discursive
thinking, which in turn allows for the determination of essential forms, intellectual
knowledge of objects, as well as the production of fictions. This re-productive
capacity coupled with variation found in discursive thinking affords a curious note of
productivity. Strictly speaking the imagination is reproducing images for
employment in discursive thinking, but the variation found in discursive thinking, the
addition and removal of qualities or features must surely be coordinated with the
imagination in the presentation of a new image. Thus there is even in the earliest
framing of imagination as a component in abstract thinking an allowance for a
creative or productive feature. The coordination of imagination and discursive
thinking present new material for further employment. Hence the imagination is
integral in the production of knowledge, but also, when discursive thinking goes
awry, the production of fictions.
This re-presentative ability of the imagination as found in rational souls elicits
the epistemic and metaphysical questions cited earlier as threads of thematic
continuity throughout this historical section. Aristotle is adamant about the truth of
perception in normal, non-diseased, sense apparatus. Combining this article with the
simplistic function of imagination found in sensitive souls, Aristotle can affirm that
animals have immediate perception of their environment, one which is inherently
faithful to the circumstances of the given situation. Judgment and error do not occur
in sensitive souls and hence Aristotle deems that animals may have a faithful
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presentation of their environment. When turning to the rational soul, however, the
epistemic status of images becomes more specious. One might contend, that if a
rational soul merely operates at the level of sensibility thus employing the
imagination as the collation of sense data, human might never err. This evaluation
seems to fit with the general suggestion that, if humans never make judgments, they
can never err. But this is not the case for the rational soul in Aristotle. Because the
imagination is governed by nous rather than sensation in the rational soul, the
reproductive capacity and the employment of this capacity in discursive thinking
alters the fidelity once ascribed to an animalistic imagination. Error may occur in the
hermeneutic component of imagination as well as in the fidelity of the memories
produced by imagination. Aristotle even goes so far as to say that that images are
“for the most part false” or “can be “true or false” in human reproduction. This error
is owing to the lack of immediate experience found in the primitive imagination.
Because of a temporal remove—that is, because of the mediated nature of images
presented by rational imagination—Aristotle cannot ensure the faithfulness of images
presented by the imagination in memory. Furthermore, because of the role
imagination performs in discursive thinking itself, the adding or deleting of certain
qualities in the presentation of images to dianoia, the creations of this discursive
imagination may not be faithful to any objects in the world e.g. we can create images
in thinking of chimeras, satyrs, etc. In order to mitigate this inherently fictional
ability of discursive imagination Aristotle recommends recourse to logical forms and
the justificatory presentation of our memory and perceptions working at optimal or, at
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least normal, levels. In conceding the fallibility of images through the role of
imagination in discursive thinking Aristotle bespeaks the phenomenological
difficulties found in human experience itself. Aristotle wishes not to explain away
the problem of error, but to account for how it is possible, and this possibility centers
around the presentations available to human thinking—that is to the presentation of
the imagination itself.111
The development and distinctions of types of imagination found in Aristotle
are to have profound implications for the history of philosophy. Not only will
Medieval thinkers appropriate and refine these distinctions, but, moreover, their
legacy extends to modern philosophy. The appetitive imagination found in animals
and its ability to provide sense-collation and presentation of environment finds echoes
in the reproductive imagination in Descartes and Kant. Furthermore, the distinction
of an imaginative process unique and definitive of rational beings, a discursive
imagination, will find a correlate in the productive imagination of Kant. This
primitive version of imagination establishes the precedent of two modes of
imagination, one at the sensorial level, and another, at the level of discursive thinking,
while introducing another concern—that of the connection between sensation and
thinking. This heritage that questions the connectivity of thought and sensation
becomes a central issue in epistemic concerns, one which Kant will take up, but also
nearly every philosopher in the interim. Although definitions of empirically real
objects will differ amongst the various figures in philosophy, this concern will loom
large for the remainder of philosophical concerns.
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Chapter 3: Imagination in Medieval Philosophy

Transition from Ancient to Medieval

In the development of historical progression, the medieval philosophers find
themselves the inheritors of the concepts of Greek philosophers. They are not,
however, mere imitators of Greek thinking. Medieval philosophers112 acquire the
concepts of Greek philosophy and blend them with biblical theology. The
combination of Greek ontology with Judeo-Christian theology “reached most explicit
expression in the famous „Christian synthesis‟ of medieval philosophy.”113 The
synthesis of ontology and theology prescribes a new type of philosophical inquiry,
that of onto-theology, which equates the ontological-philosophical concept of being,
found in Greek philosophy, with Christian theology‟s belief in God. The expression
and systematization of onto-theology finds its apex in the philosophical writings of
Thomas Aquinas.114 Central to this paradigm of reasoning is the identity of static
being with a divine creator, while becoming is associated with the physical world.
Following Platonic and neo-Platonic thinking, being is characterized as eternal,
unchanging and true. Objects of the physical world in which we humans find
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ourselves, however, come into existence and decay until they no longer are, literally
they have gone out of being, they are no more, they are non-existent. Objects in this
world, while seemingly acquiring the status of being, do not or cannot maintain the
eternal, unchanging status identified with Being/God. Rather they are transient
objects that seem to come into being and eventually ebb out of existence, they are the
objects of becoming and decay. The Medieval philosophers incorporate this
conceptual apparatus into their theology and identify God and Being.115 Hence the
Medieval philosophers describe an absolute, true order that never alters, now
identified with the Christian god that is the author of the universe, and the physical
world with the Greek conception of becoming and finite, human understanding. The
relegation of human knowledge to a lower stature in onto-theology emphasizes the
subservience of finite, human knowledge, philosophical though it may be, to religious
questions that support faith in a specified type of divine creator.
Inherent in the medieval schema is the conceptual framework established in
Hellenic culture—that of a natural order of things of which humans possess only a
finite perspective and thus fallible knowledge. All human knowledge (better said
opinion) is an attempt to parallel and duplicate God‟s infinite understanding. The role
of imagination in this process finds original expression in the founding fables of their
worldview, much like in Greek culture. For the Judeo-Christian medieval, the
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exemplification of imagination is found in the Adamic myth and the expulsion of
humankind from the Garden of Eden. Both Adam and Eve succumb to the temptation
to possess the knowledge of God, to know good and evil and to become like Him.116
By eating the fruit of the knowledge of good and evil, humans have aspired to
knowledge possessed only by the divine. To such emulation and theft humans are
forever cast out of paradisiacal glory. As punishment for duplication of God‟s
knowledge Adam and Eve are expelled from the garden and, parallel to the
Promethean story, a stigma is attached to humankind‟s ability to create and employ
the imagination in the process of representation, both artistic and epistemic. The
ability for abstract representation and the knowledge obtained by such processes are
relegated to mere duplicity of higher order, divine knowledge. Thus any processes by
which such knowledge obtains, the imagination in our case, will be infused with
suspicion and questions concerning its legitimacy and use. Yet, neither Greek nor
medieval Judeo-Christian understanding of the imagination is left exclusively to the
myths of their cultures. Employment, evaluation and often condemnation of the
imagination are found explicitly in archetypal thinkers of their respective times. In
Greece we find explicit treatment of the imagination, however incomplete, in Plato
and Aristotle. Continuing this treatment in the Medieval period, authors such as St.
Augustine of Hippo and St. Thomas Aquinas loom large in the development of
cognitive capacities and their role in both human and divine ordering.
Contrary to common opinion, the medieval period is not a barren landscape
concerning philosophical questions concerning human cognition and the status of
116
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capacities of the mind. Rather than the “dark” ages as they are often described, the
medieval period was an excess of riches in these respects, and in so doing will
provide a deeper exploration of developments of cognitive capacities. Eva Brann
describes the Medieval period as “rich in acute and interesting distinctions, the kind
brought about by a subtle and steadfast application to the matter and by a reverently
refined reading of the received texts.”117 What we find in the medieval period is a
careful development of the Greek concepts found in the works of Plato and Aristotle.
As Brann continues she notes that, despite its excellent exegesis and explanation of
Greek thinking concerning the imagination, along with its incorporation into JudeoChristian theology, the medieval treatment of the imagination is “poor in
revolutionary new departures.”118 Thus, while the Medievals refine and expand
conceptual understanding of imagination, they are, to a great extent, mere inheritors
and imitators of Greek concepts, within a newly established theology of course, and
can be viewed as extensions of Plato and Aristotle.
Aristotle‟s influence in the medieval period is not insignificant. His
elaboration of the processes of cognition and expression of these processes in terms
of faculty psychology pervades medieval literature. In the accounts of these
processes, two dominant schools become prevalent in the transition from Greek to
Medieval thinking. The first group that describes the processes of human
understanding lays claim to the imagination as a faculty open to divine, spiritual or
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intellectual influences. This “top down” school of thought, found most typically in
neo-Platonic thinking, draws from the obscure passages in Plato‟s Republic, and
suggests images in dianoetic thinking, encountered and elaborated in geometric and
moral reasoning, can faithfully represent the Form(s). Because the images employed
in geometric and moral reasoning are employed as hypotheses that pure thinking,
noetic intellection, confirm as first principles, the imagination may have a role in
knowledge acquisition in even the harshest of neo-Platonic critics. These critics will
caution against most employments of images, but, in exceptional cases, when the
images may be received from noetic thinking itself, the images enjoy an epistemically
privileged position. The “top down” schools argues that those faithful representations
employed in the inherently imagistic thinking at the lower level must have been
originated from the Form(s) or, in Medieval thinking, God Himself. Without eternal
truth as the source for the images employed, the processes of geometric and moral
thinking cannot serve as a propaedeutic for dialectic and consequently pure
intellection.119 Without a source from above, “a downward mirroring of intellectual
objects,”120 the veracity of these images can never be confirmed and Plato‟s general
critique of imagistic thinking still obtains. Images, because of their imitative and
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often duplicitous nature, cannot serve to determine axioms nor first principles— a
problem Plato clearly foresaw.
A second trend in medieval philosophy, one that follows Aristotle more
closely, presents a “bottom up” model. It is this second school of thinking that
characterizes most medieval philosophers. According to the “bottom up” model,
nothing comes to the imagination nor is any image produced that does not first come
from, up through, the senses. The imagination is typically found next to sense
perception and memory in a hierarchical order of the faculties. These hierarchies are
significant because they are “an ordering, which while assigning to each element [of
cognition] a lower and higher place, also gives each its proper dignity.”121
The cornerstone to both approaches is the blending of Greek concepts within
Christian theology. Much as we find in Greek philosophy, all the hierarchical,
medieval systems claim the imagination plays a significant role in cognition, but, in
order to satisfy epistemic concerns, must be properly subordinated to reason.122
Following the guiding influence of the Greek philosophers, the imagination does play
a vital role in human cognition, but it must be placed properly in the hierarchy and,
lest it succumb to the same fallibility found in those Greek thinkers, imagination must
be governed by higher order faculties. And while the Medievals seem to
acknowledge the difficulties of image making and image employment in finite
cognition, they attempt to ameliorate the problematic nature by allowing reason
and/or revelation to guide the use of images in seeking truth and epistemic verity of
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objects of experience—the very same task Kant will perform in his fundamental
formulation of imagination (although Kant depends upon reason alone). To
exemplify how the imagination as found in Plato and Aristotle is incorporated in the
onto-theology of the medieval period and the subsequent developments we shall turn
attention to Augustine, Richard of St. Victor and Thomas Aquinas.

St. Augustine of Hippo

Augustine typifies the early medieval ingenuity of “conscripting theology and
ontology as joint allies in the pursuit of truth.”123 He promotes the use of
philosophical concepts to articulate the Christian faith and theology surrounding the
Bible. Faith, which is of paramount importance, Augustine argues, can be maintained
by one of two possible ways. One way faith can be maintained is by trust in
authority. Trust in patristic order—priests, cardinals and popes—and the messages,
doctrine and recommendations from positions in authority can guide faith and aid in
the contest between belief and doubt. John Marenboom notes that
in the earliest days of the Church, zealots had little need for abstract
speculation in order to preach the commands of the Gospels and
elaborate their obvious moral consequences. [And yet] as Christianity
became first the leading, and then the official, religion of the Empire,
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it gained more and more followers who would not so easily sacrifice
the rational and humane values of a classical education.124
Augustine finds himself in this pivotal period where the Church has recently become
the official religion of the Roman Empire, and he himself sympathizes with classical
education.
The second way faith can be maintained, the one Augustine recommends,
attempts to reconcile classical teaching with biblical faith and is a faith based not
upon dogmatic authority, but reasoned argumentation and synthesis with already
obtained knowledge. To accomplish this synthesis, Augustine recommends the
inquirer utilize a metaphysical understanding of the categories of Being to explain
and understand the descriptions provided by belief. By this prescription, Augustine is
an important forerunner of the famous doctrine of “faith seeking understanding”
(fides quaerens intellectus). He himself establishes a route to and through faith that
seeks understanding, not merely dogmatic obedience. Rather than obediently comply
with dictates of authority on issues relating to the faith, Augustine suggests that
humankind may equate Yahweh, the god of creation, to Being. According to this
formulation, the Christian god is not only the source of being/existence (ousia, on) we
find in this world, but also the very Being that exemplifies the permanence of that
concept.125 Surely, this onto-theological alliance was “to have a profound and
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enduring impact on the subsequent evolution of medieval thinking about
imagination.”126
From the influence of Plato and neo-Platonism, Augustine draws the correlate
of God with Being, and any being of lesser status is equated somewhere on Plato‟s
divided line, as physical objects of doxastic appearance, or, further down, as
reproduced images. Augustine‟s chain of being exemplifies the hierarchical order,
placing God atop the chain with facsimiles and illusion at the lowest levels.127 In
addition, Augustine is “the first Latin author to use the term imagination in a
consistent philosophical manner, combining biblical distrust of images with the Greek
and neo-Platonic view of phantasia as a hindrance to spiritual contemplation.”128
Because of humankind‟s inability to claim the products of the imagination as real or
permanent, imaginative thinking, while perhaps practically useful, such products and
subsequent knowledge claims find themselves placed at the margins of Augustine‟s
chain of being. The imagination is treated according to the standard, classical
mimetic model, and the stigma attached to imitation, such as that found in Plato,
translates directly into Augustine‟s philosophical treatments. The epistemic
difficulties classically attached to images and their ontological status plagues human
employment and necessitates a role as unreal and illusory creation. Once again, we
find human creation, those images fastened by the mimesis of sensation in a mental
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process, subordinated to God‟s creation. Only one can be univocally real, thus human
creation and expression must be a mere incomplete reproduction of God‟s eternal
knowledge.129
The ethical prescription found in Plato also works its way into Augustinian
philosophy, with a characteristic theological innovation. Demonic possession is often
attributed to anyone who claims to be able to depict, in representative form, the truth
of God. Early mystics become denounced as heretics and infidels for attempting to
summon a mere representation or image of the divine, tantamount to idolatry, 130 and
are often accused of trafficking with the devil. Satan himself is often described as the
master of illusion and carries this effect by imposing on human thinking the mistaken
identification of the image with the real. In his Confessions, Augustine will move
away from the Manichean heresy and will suggest that it is not the entitival character
Satan, but distraction from, or movement away from contemplation of God that is the
very nature of sin and evil. By denying Satan, or at least the Manichean version of
the source for evil and error,131 Augustine shifts the burden of sin, heresy and evil
onto individuals, and in so doing, levels more criticism against the imagination for its
role in diverting humans away from the contemplation of God. This theological
innovation resonates with the human use of imagination already established—echoing
Plato‟s caution against taking the image, a superficial and impermanent being and
elevating it to the level of permanent being. In short, Augustine cautions against
129
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images found in idolatry.132 With such serious indictment of images and human
imagination, there seems little hope for redemption for such a problematic element of
human cognition and representation, indeed little hope for any use of images in
human thinking that gives the divine its due respect.
However, the imagination can prove useful provided it is guided by
illumination, the direct intellection of eternal truth(s). Much like in Plato, Augustine
does leave a positive account for image making and images in the depiction of his
theology. Augustine himself employs metaphor and imaging in his philosophical
discussion of the Trinity found in his De Trinitate, by likening parts of the Trinity to
parts of the human soul.133 This complicated work introduces series of triads in
various different aspects of human experience, but its overall theme is to provide a
working analogy of man made in the image of God—an ironic and provocative
suggestion for some redemptive use of the imagination.
Like the Christian divine trinity, Augustine argues that the human soul can be
divided into three main parts. The first division, the “outer man” represents the world
of immediate perceptual experience. Outer man is “endowed with sensation, and with
it perceives bodies.”134 “Inner man” is “endowed with understanding” and concerns
itself with mental representations provided by memory.135 The final third of
Augustine‟s trinity metaphor is found in an extraordinary function of the rational,
inner man, that of contemplation. Unlike the outer man or lower, inner man, which
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both deal with temporal matters and objects, this superior function is “engaged in
contemplating eternal things and terminates in awareness alone.”136 This tripartite
structure is equated with sensation, understanding and contemplation, respectively.
Accompanying each division is a mode of understanding unique to each level. The
possible modes of “vision”, as Augustine calls them, further elaborate the distinction
between these three different levels of human experience.
The first and lowest level of vision is “composed of the thing visible, the act
of vision (visio) and the desire for vision” and roughly corresponds to Aristotle‟s
animalistic imagination or sensus communis—a place for the collation of the
deliverances of the senses for a unifies “picture” of the environment.137 Augustine,
however, does not wish to term this lowest level as image or imagination. Rather,
Augustine employs the term “visio,” “impressio” or “sensus” to indicate the means by
which human perception encounters the outward object. This sense-image is a bodily
manifestation, in which a body “begets a form as a likeness of itself, which occurs in
the sense when we sense anything by seeing it.”138 This sense-image will become the
material of representation for the corporeal image found in memory in the workings
of the “inner man”, the second level in Augustine‟s hierarchy, wherein we will find
the imagination proper.
At this second level of images the movement from outer to inner occurs and
the imagination proper, the imaginatio, is addressed. Corporeal images, the objects of
the imagination proper, are the reproduction of the sense-image of objects no longer
136
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present.139 At any given stage of his analysis Augustine adheres to an architectonic of
triples. At the level of sensation, he describes the object e.g. a stone, the actual
seeing, and the power that holds the sense of the eyes on the thing being seen, the
conscious intention. For sensation and sense-images this triple structure appears noncontroversial, but at the level of inner man the newfound threesome is quite
informative. When dealing with the corporeal images of inner man, Augustine
denotes the image stored in memory, the attention to the objects of thought in the
mind, and intention of the will that unifies the two. The production of sense-image at
the level of “outer man” provides the image stored in memory (or we might think the
representation or object of representation), but the ability to recall and to use these
images, one might say the ability to use imagination, is integrally connected with the
attentiveness to the objects of thought, thus dependant upon the human will to conjure
the images and hold the attention on the objects.140 But the will‟s capacities are not
merely to capture and hold, but also alter. As Bundy notes:
This faculty of internal vision… may only reproduce the pictures
stored in the memory, and then it differs from memory only in
function; but, in virtue of the freedom of the will, it may become a
faculty of „diminution and addition… By the exercise of this faculty,
if the image of a crow, for example which is very familiar to the eye,
be set before the eye of the mind, as it were, it may be brought, by the
taking away of some features and the addition of others, to almost any
image such as never was seen by the eye.‟141
By diminution and addition the inner image, the spiritual image, may be varied to
produce an object that has no corresponding object in the world. These phantasies
139
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brought about by willing and imagining are one sort of object that finds
condemnation in Augustine.
By elaborating the imagination of “inner man” as a tripartite structure of
image, attention and will, Augustine can discuss the possibility of error entering into
his system, of which there are many kinds. In terms of corporeal images and human
knowledge, the single most egregious error to be made is the “misshapen kind of life”
a rational soul lives “when it lives according to the trinity of the outer man.”142 As
rational souls, the worst error we can commit is to concern ourselves with the
corporeal images of the temporal world. As being made in the image of God, we
have, according to Augustine, the capacity to contemplate “eternal things” and,
possibly, to obtain knowledge of permanence, i.e. the kind of knowledge God enjoys.
If one spends her entire time concerned with impermanent objects, the corporeal
images of the objects of this material world, she falls short of actualizing this highest
potential of a rational being. Literally, one sins by the willful distraction from the
contemplation of eternal truths.
Important as the moral imperative to pursue contemplation may be, Augustine
does not wish to ignore the many ways of falling into error when dealing with
corporeal images and knowledge of the temporal world. Simple mechanical errors
can account for some mistakes when judging human perception. Sometimes the
flame of a candle can seem to be doubled when we stop focusing our eyes. And
while there is one object we judge there to be two.143 Yet mechanical failure is not
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the worst of errors for corporeal images. Because of the power of diminution and
addition, because we can willfully alter the image employed in representations, we
can create new corporeal images, that are then stored in memory. The main force that
may motivate this kind of recombinant variation is desire, either for knowledge or as
curiosity. Often, Augustine suggests, this desire can overwhelm the passive storage
unit that is memory and we can willfully supplant the sense-image of perception with
that the created-image of variation. Furthermore, with the span of time and the
forgetfulness of our variation, either because of lack of attentiveness or because
desire assists in forgetting, we often replace sense-images with these newly created
phantasies.144 These phantasies are deemed real, and for Augustine, this is
tantamount to willful sinning. It is, very much in the platonic sense, mistaking the
illusory for the real. If humans either vary the content of the images found in
corporeal imagination or attribute permanence to the objects of corporeal
imagination, they have exceeded the bounds by which they may safely judge their
experience, and thus may fall into error.145
However, should corporeal images be guided by reason and intellectual
vision, the possibility for error is removed. According to Augustine, the inner life of
humans, as noted above, is divided into two functions. The lower portion of inner life
concerns itself with corporeal images, with knowledge of the world of perception.
The higher function of inner life contemplates eternal being. While the lower half of
inner life “is carried on with sensible things and with what the consciousness has
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imbibed from them through the senses,” it “is nonetheless not without its share of
reason.”146 Reason guides the cataloguing, variation and experimentation of
corporeal images. However, reason finds a higher vocation in examination of “nonbodily and everlasting meanings.” The use of this reason is to “make judgments on
these bodily things according to non-bodily and everlasting meanings; and unless
these were above human mind they would certainly not be unchanging, and unless
something of ours were subjoined to them we would not be able to make judgments
according to them about bodily things.” 147 In contemplation, human reason is
illuminated by divine grace, that we may then see the metaphysical status of bodily
objects and images. In intellectual vision one “sees”, much like in Plato, the truth of
the objects under contemplation.
In addition, the judgments we pass on the corporeal level are remonstrated and
corrected by the truth divined in illumination.

The highest level of vision, the

intellectual, is the very aspect of Augustine‟s trinity that confirms the “top-down”
model which mitigates against error in human judgment when employing images in
cognition. Provided that intellectual vision has provided the content of non-bodily
and eternal meanin—thus emplooyed, often by use of metaphor, to the level of
imagistic representation—Augustine will vouchsafe the veracity of images and
judgments made determining corporeal images. It is intellectual vision alone and not
corporeal vision that allows one to see the world in its “essence,” and it is the
application of the eternal truths to corporeal images that will allow for any knowledge
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of the material world to be guaranteed.148 Augustine‟s version of intellectual vision
is one that depends upon the grace of a divine creator in allowing, often through a
retrograde use of discursive/dianoetic thinking, true, corporeal representations to be
made.149 Although, at the highest level of vision, contemplation, Augustine implies
that no images whatsoever are at work, he does allow for intellectual vision to
countenance corporeal images and a body of knowledge of the material world.150

It

is at this point that Kearney‟s evaluation of medieval imagination becomes apparent:
it is the author of the universe alone who can guarantee the veracity of thought.
Humans are left, once again, to be merely the imitators and supplicants to a higher
order that determines the truth of their expressions.
Augustine‟s understanding of images and imagination presents an early and
interesting case to characterize the Medieval period. While prima facie Augustine
seems to present the “top down” model for understanding where the imagination fits
into a schema of human understanding, this misrepresents Augustine‟s description of
148
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the source of corporeal images. Images that are found in human cognition inevitably
have their source in sense perception. Even those images found in dreams can be
traced to and are derived from sense perception.151 The corporeal imagination is an
organizing faculty, one necessary to collate sense perception that a transition from
outer objects of sensation to be evaluation in the inner processes of represenation and
judging to occur. Knowledge amounts to organizing the data provided by sensation
and ordered “in the light of intelligible forms”- form essentially dependent upon a
divine order.152 Upon scrutiny, we find that Augustine‟s understanding and role of
imagination in human cognition and corporeal knowledge, is fundamentally that
derived from Aristotle, the “bottom up” model, but with the rider that human
knowledge, if there is to be any true knowledge, must depend upon superhuman
intercession in the form of divine illumination. The mediating capacity of the
imagination in the generation of corporeal images, Augustine maintains, detracts from
the process of spiritual light that is the source of true knowledge. Augustine‟s use of
an Aristotelian model for sense perception and faculty psychology in combination
with a Platonic understanding of metaphysical hierarchy, combined with his
theological commitments represents the difficulties with which the early Church dealt
in attempting to synthesize classical education and biblical theology.
It should be noted that Augustine is not the only early Church father to read
and analyze Platonic and neo-Platonic writings. Augustine knew no Greek and had to
151
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rely upon the available translations within the Empire for his insight. Eastern Fathers
of the Church, those native Greek speakers had privilege access to original text and
were closer to the sources of the Greek heritage, and exhibited greater influence than
those of the West, and thus might be considered truer inheritors of Platonism and neoPlatonism, who integrate Greek philosophy into Christian theology. However, owing
to the popularity of Augustine‟s early writing and his devotion to rigorous logical
argument that consequently always upheld his faith and theological commitments,
Augustine‟s popularity was unparalleled in the early Medieval period, a legacy that
proves formative in the subsequent middle and late stages of philosophical
development in the Medieval period.153
One such character who is familiar with Augustine‟s philosophical and
theological writings, along with the traditions of the Eastern Orthodox writings and
Arabic interpretations is Richard of St. Victor. Echoing Augustine‟s understanding of
the need for imagination and highlighting Augustine‟s mistrust, Richard of St. Victor
continues medieval skepticism of the imagination in his work, Benjamin Minor,
cautioning his readers against “the corruptive influence which imagination may exert
on the practices of spiritual contemplation.”154 Richard of St. Victor, a late twelfth
century mystic (?-1173) and prior of the Augustinian abbey and school St. Victor in
Paris, presents a further elaboration of Augustine‟s considerations on the
imagination.155 In looking to Richard‟s work, we are provided an exegesis and

153

Marenboom (1988), 16.
Kearney, 119
155
Haren, Michael Medieval Thought: The Western Intellectual Tradition from Antiquity to the
Thirteenth Century (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 114.
154

88

development of Augustine‟s philosophical themes, demonstrating Augustine‟s
connection to Plato, while, at the same time, providing a vivid metaphor illustrating
the paradoxical nature of imagination found in medieval thought.
Continuing the hierarchy of Augustine, Richard of St. Victor establishes
spiritual contemplation at the apex of human activities, sense perception at the lowest
level, and places imagination as a mediator between the two. Spiritual contemplation
resembles Augustine‟s intellection or intellectual vision in virtue of contemplation‟s
absolute separation from the corporeal world. Sense perception, now properly
named, is the correlate of Augustine‟s corporeal vision. Circumscribed by this
dynamic antithesis is an analogous movement found in Augustine, that of the inner
versus the outer.
Contemplation is a wholly internal event, one developed by spirit, perhaps
with supplication to divine, that is spiritual, aid and enables one to grasp “a Supreme
Being which exists of necessity in itself.”156 Sense perception, on the other hand,
deals only with the contingency presented through the transient perceptions given to
human experience through sensation. Richard contends that the imagination is the
means by which sense experience, received from the outer, corporeal world, can be
translated into a form which can be employed by reason (ratio). For Richard,
Augustine‟s tripartite hierarchy appears to be refined into a four tiered system,
affording contemplation the highest position, in which reason plays a signature role;
followed by reason itself (often applied to the images and sense perception); then
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imagination; and finally sense perception.157 To demonstrate this very position and to
elaborate the respective role and dignity afforded to each faculty, Richard employs a
colorful, biblical allegory, the story of Rachel and Bilhah.
Rachel, mother of Joseph and the rightful transmitter of the line of Israel, was
the first and favored wife of Jacob. In Richard‟s description, she is likened to a
mistress, “reason illumined by divine revelation,” contemplation, who inhabits the
holy of holies, and employs reason.158 Owing to her exclusive status inside the holy
of holies, interaction with the unclean is beneath her station, lest the purity of the
temple become defiled. Yet as first wife and mistress of the house, Rachel must
execute her duties in the maintenance of the house, while at the same time separating
herself from the menial and debasing projects that elicit corruption. Rachel must
prevent a servant such as one of the senses from being in the habit of “break[ing]
irreverently into the inner secret chamber of her mistress,” lest the purity of
contemplation become sullied.159 In order to discharge her duties Rachel hires a
handmaid, Bilhah, to serve as intermediary between herself and the despoiling outer
world. And so Rachel can discharge her duties pertaining to daily maintenance and
yet secure a privileged position at a distance from the mundanity and contingency of
the corporeal life. Bilhah serves as an intermediary to communicate between the
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higher and lower, while preventing the necessity of any direct contact. 160 Reason—in
the form of contemplation—can discharge its duties in maintenance of the individual,
without sullying itself with the uncertainty and contingency of sense perception, by
utilizing the imagination as a liaison, thus leaving itself available in the purity of
inner reason to seek an understanding of God.
And yet Richard cautions Rachel against placing too much trust in Bilhah, and
consequently us against trusting too much in the imagination. By frequenting the
impure, outer world of the servants, Bilhah‟s loyalty becomes divided, by serving two
masters simultaneously. For maintenance of the home, Bilhah is forced to interact
with the outside world and conform to the demands established by the parameters of
the servants‟ abilities. At the same time, Bilhah is expected to convey and enforce
the desires and recommendations of Rachel in order to best harmonize the structure of
the home. By executing the demands of both masters, Bilhah understands the pivotal
role she occupies, which subsequently results in Bilhah‟s own overestimation of her
powers. In Richard‟s words, Bilhah becomes garrulous and loquacious.161 Rachel
finds herself in a curious predicament: she cannot command the fortunes of her own
home by herself, but owing to her dependence on Bilhah “nor can Rachel rule in her
own house; with such persistence does Bilhah din in the ears of the heart that Rachel
cannot live without her.”162 The imagination, in its pivotal role as liaison, assumes
the role of master, determining what information reason receives as well as
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performing reason‟s dictates in the corporeal world.163 Should such a situation arise,
reason can be corrupted aware from its primary consideration, contemplation of the
divine, being forced to return from such lofty pursuits to attempt to regain mastery of
her house. Because of the imagination‟s frequenting the corporeal realm, and the
subsequent contamination, and by restricting and controlling the information reason
receives, reason can be corrupted away from its primary consideration, contemplation
of the divine.
This analysis and caution against trust in and overuse of the imagination
exemplifies, again, the onto-theological commitments of the medieval period.
Contemplation of the divine, the execution of reason, remains the single most
important goal of philosophical reasoning, to justify and illustrate the truth of biblical
revelation. The condition of human finitude and the necessity to interact with the
contingent, and thus less real, world of the corporeal demands a liaison between
contemplation for truth and sense perception. Richard claims the imagination as just
such an intermediary, yet admonishes a strict reservation in the translation of the
corporeal into contemplation.164 In Richard of St. Victor we find, however, an early
formulation that the imagination plays a two-fold, paradoxical role, one of
transmitting the outer world of sensation to the inner world of reason, but also an
inversion, the imagination also communicates the dictates of reason for execution in
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the outer world of sense experience. The caution is that the imagination has no
bearing on truth, just maintenance of our corporeal bodies. For the purposes of
transmitting information from sense perception to reason the imagination is
indispensable, but for contemplation, the imagination is merely a distraction.
Augustine‟s explanations of the tripartite soul of man in conjunction with the
analogy provided by Richard of St. Victor provides yet another connection with the
imagination Kant inherits. The Augustinian characterization of the human soul into a
tripartite structure bears striking resemblance to Kant‟s tripartite division of
sensibility, understanding and reason. Unlike Augustine, Kant does not describe
explicitly describe imagination at work at these various levels, rather, he argues for
the independence of the imagination. And yet, even with a separate faculty for the
imagination, Kant manages to import much of the epistemic considerations, most
saliently the need for a liaison between sensibility and understanding. One further
parallel between Kant and Augustine is the role the imagination plays in discharging
the duties of reason, particularly in the practical domain. That the imagination is
garrulous and finds itself at various levels of human cognition, Kant is willing to
concede, but whether the imagination is subservient to reason or whether it plays an
active role in reason itself is yet to be determined.
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St. Thomas Aquinas

St. Thomas Aquinas is hailed by most as the culmination and apotheosis of
medieval thinking. He “represents what many consider to be the crowning
achievement of the medieval synthesis of Greek and biblical learning, rehearsing and
rearranging the principle stages of Western ontology and theology in a magisterial
system or summa.”165
Eva Brann states:
“In regards to the imagination, as in much else, Thomas presents a
summation of previous thought in such a way as to revivify subtle
internal problems and to broach deep ultimate questions. The subtlest
and most difficult problem is the function of the imagination‟s
„phantasm‟ in cognition, and the deepest question concerns the
significance of the fact that the human being is imaginative.”166
In few words, Brann captures the very spirit of Aquinas‟ project. Aquinas is not
merely concerned with a rational explanation, following Augustine, of his theology,
but also humanity‟s place within the onto-theological framework. His Summa
Theologica intends not only to define and defend key issues concerning his religious
perspective, Aquinas‟ works also reports to explain and defend the workings of
human activity within this religious perspective. Central to his explanation of
humanity is a description of human knowing and the elements of cognition necessary
to accomplish this feat. Inherently, imagination becomes a central, albeit a still
ambiguous issue. In so doing, Aquinas will bring Medieval onto-theology into a
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systematic whole, describing a hierarchical structure wherein the roles and positions
of God, angels, humans and animals will find their place. To satisfy this goal,
Aquinas must provide exacting divisions and distinctions that explain the descriptions
he provides.
St. Augustine was deeply influenced by Plato and neo-Platonic philosophy.
Aquinas, on the other hand, was influenced by Aristotle and the Aristotelian tradition
assumed by the catholic Christianity of his time. Just as an understanding of
Augustine‟s philosophy depends to a great extent on understanding the Platonic
themes resonating in his onto-theology, so, too, does an understanding of Aquinas
depend largely on reference to Aristotle. Aquinas further refines the hierarchical
systems developed by his predecessors, eventually concluding a five-part faculty
psychology: namely intellect, reason, imagination, common sense, and sense
perception. The order and epistemic veracity of knowledge acquisition descends,
from the highest, intellect, to the lowest, sense perception.
Aquinas‟ philosophy assumes much of Aristotle‟s faculty psychology, only
further elaborating it. And, in order to provide divisions among beings, Aquinas
makes direct appeal to Aristotle‟s explanation of souls. John Marenboom notes that
“despite these obvious and admitted debts, Aquinas did far more than merely follow
Aristotle in his account of the intellect. The Aristotelian elements in his discussion
belong to a fuller, theological theory, which depends on a hierarchical view of
intelligent being.”167 The commitment to Aristotle‟s divisions of vegetative, animal
and human souls works well for Aquinas to explain objects of empirical experience,
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but presents trouble when explaining the nature of angels and God. Yet it is precisely
these last two that Aquinas‟ theological commitments add to Aristotle‟s already wellestablished philosophy. It is precisely along the line discussing intelligence and
intellectual properties that Aquinas will add God and angels to Aristotle‟s hierarchy
of beings and provide the distinctions necessary to defend his theology. It is also in
this context that Aquinas proves illuminative of human cognition. One chief
difficulty in Aquinas‟ explanations is the inconsistency with which he treats human
cognition. Because of his commitment to explaining the differences between angels,
humans and animals, Aquinas‟ treatment is not always linear. In order to gain insight
into human cognition in Aquinas, it is necessary to look at those types of souls against
which Aquinas puts humans in relief.
Angels and disembodied souls, Aquinas informs us, are created beings
endowed with the forms that are the sources for their knowledge.168 These immaterial
beings are dependent upon God for the forms that are the objects of knowledge. But
what they grasp is the immediate, immaterial forms which comprise intellectual
knowledge. Knowledge, according to Aquinas, is always general, as opposed to
particular; a form, a species, that accounts for all particulars that lay claim to the
forms.169 Intellectual knowledge knows no particulars, only the forms. And while
angels or disembodied souls have access to these immaterial forms, embodied human
souls cannot have direct access to these forms. Humans, it turns out, experience
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material particulars and their knowledge is dependant upon the particular experiences
afforded by the senses. Yet Aquinas insists that human knowledge is possible. What
knowledge humans can possess amounts to intellectual determination of the
“quiddities” of material things.
One distinction in currency during the Middle Ages, with which Aquinas was
familiar, that may prove instructive in distinguishing between the knowledge of
humans and disembodied beings, is the one made by the twelfth century Dominicus
Gunisalvi, Archibishop of Segovia, between intellegentia and intellectus. The former
is knowledge dependant upon mystical communication; the latter is knowledge
achieved through “science”.170 The former illustrates the dependency of disembodied
beings upon their creator to provide objects of knowledge through either innateness
during creation or mystical transference and constant dependency. In Aquinas‟ view,
the former, intelligentia, is the species of knowledge afforded to beings that cannot or
do not experience material particulars, yet still obtain/possess knowledge. Whether
or not humans are bestowed this direct knowledge of immaterial forms is highly
disputed among Aquinas scholars.171 Those that favor immediate, mystical insight
follow the Augustinian tradition of divine illumination as a possible understanding of
the process. Prophecy is often cited as one direct example of this possible
deliverance of knowledge.172 Thus there may still be room for a top-down model of
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knowledge acquisition in Aquinas, one which affords infallibility to intellectual
knowledge.173 Possible or not, these cases would be extraordinary and rare. Human
knowledge typically, if not exclusively, involves sense perception of immediate
particulars and a transformative process by which these particulars are transformed
through abstraction into generalities (species in Aquinas) of material forms. Human
knowledge, independent of direct mystical intervention, employs a more scientific
approach, often called reason/reasoning, to determining the intelligible species
available to human intellectus. In the fullest sense of intellegentia, angels are
intellectual, Aquinas tells us. In comparison, humans are merely rational.174 Since
the nature of a being‟s intellectual knowledge depends upon the nature of the being,
humans, it would seem, need another explanatory mechanism to determine
knowledge. 175
Furthermore, human pursuit of quiddity needs parameters in which it operates.
But first a note about quiddity. “A thing‟s „quiddity‟ is its whatness,” its essence or
its being.176 This is not, however, to be confused with its form or substance. It is not
the single core constituent, such as substance or matter, nor all of its constituents
together in a single form. Rather, “quiddity” is the definition or essence of a thing.
Quiddity cannot be the mere form of something, as form does not contain matter.
Neither can it be the matter of any object, as matter may change, while form remains.
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In apprehending what a thing is, humans experience the particular, material object
and exercise the process of abstraction. Integral in this process is the material and the
form of the object perceived. If one wishes to apprehend the quiddity of man, one
must abstract from the flesh and bones of any particular human. But any definition of
man would be misleading if it suggested a man can exist without flesh and bone.177
Hence what humans apprehend in cognition can be definitive for any
species/generality, but human knowledge usually (if not always) comes from a
particular to a generality. In Aquinas, this is the essence of cognition. This
movement from particular to universal and back again, is one that employs
imagination as a liaison from material particulars to immaterial ideas.
Following Aristotle‟s empirical model, human cognition necessarily begins
with sense perception. Expanding upon Aristotle‟s understanding of sensation,
Aquinas develops further refinements. Perception, often cited as outer sense, is
divisible into the five main modes of sensation i.e. sight, touch, smell etc. This
process of receiving information from the object of perception is primarily a passive
experience.178 For each sensation there is a particular organ receptive to the kind of
stimuli offered. For color there is sight; for odor, the sense of smell. “A sense is the
power to undergo” the change caused by the object of sensation. This change is not a
physical one, eyes do not become red when seeing a red object, rather, it is an
intentional change. Intentional change is likeness (similitudo) of the sensible object.
And sensation accomplishes this by taking in the form, not physically but
177
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intentionally, of the object. Kenny provides a helpful example to demonstrate the
meaning of this cryptic doctrine. He writes:
The sweetness of a piece of sugar, something which can be tasted, is a
sensible object; my ability to taste is a sense-faculty; and the operation
of the sense of taste upon the sensible object is the same thing as the
action of the sensible object upon my sense.179
The sweet of the sugar is the ability to effect the taste faculty in an organism. The
intentional awareness of tasting sweet is the quality of sugar that the taste faculty
affords the tasting organism, the person tasting sugar. But the tongue does not
become sweet with the tasting of sugar. Rather, it transmits the “sweet information”
to another faculty to be processed and collated with other sensations that might
accompany other senses in the consumption of sugar. The five sense faculties are
discreet and perform an operation to provide particular data from the material object
to the intentional mind that determines the properties and quiddities of objects.
As the five faculties are separate and provide disparate forms of objects to the
organism, Aquinas, following Aristotle, accounts for the collation and subsequent
further discrimination to a single faculty, the sensus communis, common sense. With
a shift in faculty, a shift in the object also obtains. Aquinas informs us that “each
power is defined in reference to that thing to which it is directed and which is its
object.”180 The sense faculties were defined by their ability to perceive a material
object and their disparate properties, the common sense is the faculty that directs its
attention to the intentional forms provided by the separate senses, in order to collate
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them into a single entity.181 This shift in faculties, also solicits a shift in Aquinas‟
terminology. The common sense is not one among the outer senses. It is, rather, the
lowest level of a group of faculties Aquinas identifies as “inner sense.”
Inner sense might better be described as the imagination complex, a series of
faculties at work in translating the deliverances of the senses into materials for
rational thought. That it is sensorial is suggested because the images produced at this
stage still resemble the perception afforded by sensation, most specifically in its
spatial aspect. But images are not sense perceptions, rather, they resemble the
deliverances of the senses, and no organ can be determined by which these “senses”
are received.182 Simultaneous with collation and discrimination in the sensus
communis, the imagination proper in Aquinas, that is the image-making process of the
imagination complex, forms images, likenesses (similitudo) according to the spatial
form, quite often the shape, of the sense perceptions. Aquinas tells us that;
For the reception of sensible forms the proper and common sense is
appointed; but for the retention and preservation of these forms, the
phantasy or imagination (phantasia sive imagination) is appointed,
which are the same, for phantasy or imagination is, as it were, a
storehouse of forms received through the senses.183
The imagination, in its capacity to create images, gives form to the deliverances of the
senses, a form usually based upon the spatial shape of the object of sensation, but a
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form which can be utilized by the mind, an intentional form.184 To this special
function Aquinas gives the name imagination-formalis, and distinguishes it from the
retentive power, imagination-thesaurus. The generation of images in the
imagination-formalis is distinguished from the imagination-thesaurus, the latter being
merely a storehouse of the images created. Both apprehension and retention are, at
this fundamental level of cognition, attributed to the imagination. Yet the
imagination complex is not complete even with this mediating function accounted for.
Once mentalistic images have been formed and placed in the store-house of
imagination, Aquinas accounts for reminiscence of these forms by appealing to the
faculty of memory proper. The memory, in close conjunction with imaginationthesaurus, is the ability to recall, to bring forward, to present in human cognition,
what is no longer present. Memory is the active process that allows access of the
forms of past sensation, those stored in the imagination-thesaurus, to be presented in
the absence of the object of sensation. At this level of cognition, Aquinas is willing,
albeit begrudgingly, to admit as much of animals. Following Aristotle‟s description
of souls, sensitive souls must have some means by which to engage with their
environment, a reproductive imagination that permits of basic memory. Animals do
seem to have the ability to perceive, react, and even remember aspects of their
environments. Under ordinary conditions, animals do not run into walls, find
nourishment, and even do so based upon a rudimentary memory. It is not until the
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cogitative or estimative power, the next element of the imagination complex, that
Aquinas draws stark demarcation between animals and humans.
The cogitative or estimative power in the imagination complex adds feelings
to images to create something contemporary philosophy calls ideas. Initially, the
emotive contribution may be simple as joy or grief, utility or danger. To a mouthfoaming canine representation given by the senses, is added the feeling of danger,
and, thus, an idea of the danger of rabies comes about. According to Aquinas to this
emotive attribution the cogitative power provides a general judgment, often the
product of trial/error and associations. Once again, Aquinas allows room for animals
to present something akin to emotive attachment to image presentation, but falls short
of attributing ideas to animals, describing the estimative power in animals a matter of
mere instinct. It is this cogitative power, a general judging, not limited to mere
visceral reaction, that truly distinguishes animal from human cognition. Important to
note at this point in Aquinas‟ hierarchy of faculties is the inability to perform the
higher without the lower, and yet the supervening importance that each phase has at it
approaches intellection, intellectus.
The final faculty Aquinas attributed to the imagination complex is often called
phantasy by commentators. This phantasy is not the reproductive process attributed
to the imagination proper. Rather, it is the recombinant capacity solicited by the term
phantasy in its common usage. Phantasy resembles what some previous philosophers
termed discursive-comparative thinking. By adding, deleting and transforming
characteristics of images, phantasy compares and contrasts the deliverances of the
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senses translated into image/idea in order determine the quiddity of objects. In its
appropriate measure, phantasy is guided by reason. Often phantasy is attributed with
the active intellect engaged in discerning universals in the act of knowing; that is,
determining the quiddity of any object.185 Unlike the passive intellect responsible for
image production—or, rather, reproduction from the senses—the active intellect
found in phantasy employs the images of the imagination complex to discern
essences. Error production in human cognition is typically attributed to this function
in Aquinas‟ faculty psychology. Although the reproductive function of imagination
proper in Aquinas‟ imagination complex will lead to error production, under normal
conditions the passive, reproductive image-making faculty is faithful to the
deliverances of sensation. It is in the discursive process, by which one begins to
modify the faithful images, that error is typically found. Aquinas‟ solution to error
production is the prescription that phantasy be subservient to reason. With reason
guiding recombinant permutations of images, quiddities can be faithfully
discerned.186 But the possibility and commonality of error production or misuse of
phantasy leads to an inevitable mistrust of this faculty. While phantasy is necessary,
the possibility that it can leave the auspices of reason and produce fantastic creations,
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which leads to misinformation and error in judgment concerning the reality of these
creations, elicits caution. But since reason is given the place of privilege in Aquinas‟
hierarchy, such concerns he assures us can be ameliorated. Moreover, it is only under
the guidance of reason that this creative process in imagination can have legitimate
use, and hence any extraneous activities ought to be dismissed. Thus imagination is
subordinated to reason.
In Aquinas, the process by which human cognition and human knowledge
operates, following Aristotle, is one that involves objects and sensory deliverances.
Between sense perception of particular, material substances and universal, immaterial
species (knowledge) the imagination plays an integral role. “As always, the
imagination, or rather its images, have a middle status between the being proper to a
form in matter and the being proper to a form that has come into the intellect through
abstraction from matter.”187 This is to say, images produced by the imagination
remain at an ambiguous level of being representative of the form found in matter and
the form found in intellectual activity. An image is without matter yet not without
material conditions.188 The imagination and its products, images, are the integral
liaison necessary for human cognition. The faculty of the imagination is responsible
for communication of the so-called “outer” object, delivered by the senses, and its
apprehension and determination by the mind, intellectus. Images at the reproductive
level chararcteristic of the sensus communis and the imagination-formalis and
thesaurus allows Aquinas to affirm the Aristotelian doctrine that, under normal
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parameters, the senses represent faithfully. Images are indeed real and present the
deliverances of the senses when the object is both immediately before the subject and
when the object is absent. Certainly, Aquinas concedes the possibility of error in
memory, when the storehouse of images is actively called upon in the service of
reason. The image that is recalled in phantasy may have certain additions or deletions
accompanying the process of recall. Furthermore, in the discursive process of
phantasy, error often occurs. Thus Aquinas‟ censure of phantasy and his strict
prescription that phantasy be regulated by reason. Without reason‟s guidance
phantasy may add or delete various qualities of the object presented to create new and
untoward phantasms e.g. chimera and satyrs. But, with the guidance of reason,
knowledge of the “outer” world, science, is possible.
It is important to note here that the “outer” world of the objects of sense
perception is never called into question. The world in which humans find themselves,
is not a question of epistemic uncertainty. This leads Kearney to make the ascription
that the ancient and medieval conceptualization of the imagination as theocentric.
Without calling the existence of the world into question, no proof the external world
is necessary, a proof that will become quite consuming in the modern period. The
objects discovered in the experience are indeed real, ensured by the cosmological
article of faith deus sive natura. What is deemed philosophically important is to
explain how it is that humans can have knowledge—that is, general knowledge—of
the object, the particulars, they perceive. The imagination, it turns out, is mostly
reproductive in its capacity. The function attributed to the imagination is to re-
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present the data received by the senses in an attempt to coordinate the “outer” world
of objects with the inner world of mental representations. But owing to the ability to
distort the presentations of the senses by recombinant imagining, Medievals, like
Aquinas, are forced to subordinate the imagination, lest it create illusions, to reason.
Hence the imagination, while necessary for scientia, is met with mistrust and
stigmatized as an often unruly faculty of cognition.
From the work of Aquinas Western philosophy is to inherit the formal element
of images. In its most mundane form, imagination today produces resemblances
based upon shape and form. And yet this formal requirement of explanation is to
have a deep impact on Kant‟s understanding. As I argue later, it is upon the forms of
intuition that we find imagination at work in Kant at its most basic and fundamental
level. Furthermore, the guidance of reason that Aquinas suggests, while incomplete,
also finds resonance in the Kantian formulation. If one understands the guidance of
reason to be logical forms, the connection becomes even more pronounced. As I
intend to demonstrate later, these elements—form, logic, imagination—are at the very
heart of Kant‟s critical enterprise and Aquinas‟ characterization is an important
precedent. One important innovation of Aquinas, that is to have a lasting impact on
the history of imagination is the explicit discussion of the intentional nature of image
and image production. Improving upon Aristotle, Aquinas‟ intentionality regarding
images as well as representations in thought will provide endless discussion between
the connection(s) between representations in thought and objects in the world. This,
too, will become a central concern of Kant.
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Chapter 4: Modern Philosophy

Transition from Medieval to Modern

From the Medieval period through the early Renaissance and into 17th and 18th
Century philosophy, a remarkable transformation in philosophical thinking transpires.
No longer is philosophy entirely subservient to onto-theological justification (if it
ever was). Rather, by the period of Descartes‟ writings, philosophy begins to
extricate itself from nearly 1500 years of theologically driven inquiry. Whereas
philosophy was once a handmaiden to the royalty of theology, with the advent of
modernity, philosophy resumes its role as an independent organ for inquiry. While
this transformation is, in part, attributed to economic improvements, humanistic
concerns and a resurgence of once-lost philosophical texts; more importantly, this
revival owes a debt to the reclamation of scientific observation, once started by
Aristotle and resumed by figures like Francis Bacon and Thomas Hobbes.189
Reliance on the deliverances of the senses, and the cataloguing of this data into a
scientific compendium brings the epistemic question of the reliability of the senses
and the transition from “outer” objects to the “inner” objects of mental functions to
the fore once again.
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The spirit of modernity is a resurgence of independently-minded individuals
who center scientific research and philosophic inquiry on matters answerable by
human interrogation, not on the speculative dependencies of theology.190 Bacon‟s
celebrated proto-scientific method proves exemplary in re-orienting inquiry away
from religious concerns to those regarding observable nature. Accompanying this
new inquiry is a turn away from Scholasticism and scholastic explanations. No
longer will appeals to final causes, implanted by God according to design, suffice to
answer whether, why and how operations of the terrestrial sphere obtain. Rather,
investigations concern themselves with nature and attribute mechanical causes to
phenomena witnessed by human observers. Descartes assumes this mantle of
Enlightenment and modern ideals—he is willing to explore the nature of himself, his
soul, God, and the world—by appealing only to human reason and returning from the
lofty dependence upon theologically centered explanations for objects of human
experience.191
However, as in any change—social, theological, or scientific—new regimes
inherit the legacies of their former times. Brann notes that it is impossible to specify
one peculiarly modern result, except to observe that the old questions re-emerge in
new contexts, driven by new motives and methods.192 In other words, the
transformation is gradual rather than immediate, and vestiges of medieval thinking
find their way into much of the thinking of early modern philosophy. Chief among
190
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the remnants of medieval philosophy is the faculty psychology developed by
scholastic figures such as Aquinas and Augustine and their earlier predecessors Plato
and Aristotle. The preeminent philosophers of early modernity retain the semantic
connotation of terms such as „intellect/intellection”, “understanding”, “sensation” and
“imagination”. Theological considerations also still loom large. The debate,
however, shifts from the nature, essence and epistemic access humans have to God to
questions concerning its existence; that is from God‟s comprehensibility or lack
thereof to whether such a being exists at all. Atheists like Hobbes unapologetically
deny the existence of God, while others, like Bacon, leave the question available for
further inquiry, more appropriately left to theologians than philosophers concerned
with “natural science”.193 But even this idea, science, springs from medieval and
ancient sources. Scientia, the compendium of knowledge as it has long occupied
philosophers, and even onto-theological philosophers, remains the central concern of
modernity. Modern philosophy, like ancient and medieval, concerns itself with
describing the parameters of human knowledge about the world. In modernity,
however, a new consideration is added to the debate. Figures like Bacon and
Descartes focus not just on the content of scientia, but also in the manner, the
methodology, by which it is known. This preoccupation with methodology
characterizes not just how humans know, but will also have a profound impact on
193

Unapologetically may be a bit strong here, and yet his ontology of material substances and
mechanical causality imply just such a position. It is his shrewdness in writing that permits a vast
discussion of
God while maintaining the ability to deny such a being exists. For more on Hobbes‟ atheism cf. Edwin
Curley‟s “‟I Durst Not Write So Boldly‟ or, How to read Hobbes‟ Theological-Political Treatise.” in
Hobbes e Spinoza , Atti de Convegno Internationale, Urbino 14-17 octobre 1988 ed. Daniela
Bostrengi, (Naples: Bibliopolis) pp. 497-593. Also Douglas Jesseph‟s “Hobbes‟s Atheism” in Midwest
Studies in Philosophy XXVI (2002) pp. 140-166.

110

what is omitted and added to the list. One further legacy, one that converges on the
central inquiry in this historical section, is position of the imagination as a liaison
between sensation and intellection, and the subsequent mistrust bequeathed to a
servant that serves two masters.
Rene Descartes finds himself the inheritor of this medieval patrimony. His
philosophical inquiry centers around the upsurge of humanistic thinking that marks
the scientia of early modernity. In rejecting Scholasticism, most markedly
Aristotelian metaphysics and the notion of substantial form as well as Aristotelian
teleological explanations for causation, Descartes breaks with the Jesuit tradition
imparted to him during his formative schooldays. In advocating matter in motion as
the explanation for causal interaction among physical substances, regarding both
change of form, place and inertial states, Descartes breaks with the entrenched
philosophy of 1500 years. This significant breach will inevitably land Descartes
under the scrutiny of Church censors, and unless protected by anonymity and a
benevolent patron, he may have found himself in considerably less desirable
circumstances. Nevertheless, Descartes did break from the metaphysical tradition,
yet still maintained many of the concerns of medieval thinking. In other words,
Descartes‟ break was, just as his philosophy, radical in spirit, but gradual in
practice—although it was radical, it was not apparently violently so, the root his
discord was quite pronounced even if his presentation was gradual. In order to more
clearly see the transformation inculcated in modern philosophy, one can turn to the
understanding of the imagination found in Renaissance thinking. In Pico della
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Mirandolla, we find a summary of the Medieval positions out of which modernity
will emerge.

Renaissance- Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola

“Renaissance writers do not, by and large, expend the same theoretical
ingenuity on the imagination as do their predecessors. Instead they attend to its
practice.”194 With this glib statement, Brann summarizes the consensus of scholars
regarding the imagination in Renaissance thought. Generally, Renaissance thinkers,
like most, do not address the imagination in direct terms. They prefer to make
oblique references and maintain the “missing mystery” while employing its use. One
exception to this trend is Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola‟s work On the
Imagination published in 1500. Innovative as a single work on the imagination was
for its time, Pico‟s contribution to literature concerning the imagination is not,
however, innovative in its treatment of the theme. Rather, “this text, standing on the
threshold of modern thought, at the same time gathers up virtually the entire ancient
and medieval reflection on the imagination.”195 By attending to Pico‟s work, an
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elegant summary of the major themes regarding the imagination and the motivating
themes entering modernity may be obtained.
One immediate benefit of examining Pico‟s work is to clarify the shifting
terminology that has beleaguered earlier works. His theme is the power of the soul
which the Greeks called phantasia and the Latins imaginatio. He collapses the
distinction found in works like Aquinas and declares them one and the same.
Moreover, he favors the Latin terminology because of the resemblance to its activity.
196

This power is responsible for images which it forms, images which are linked to

likenesses of things that are delivered through the senses.
The comprehensiveness of Pico‟s treatment combines the themes of both the
Platonic-Augustinian tradition with that of Aristotle-Aquinas. John Sallis notes that
the Platonic understanding of image as eikasia is present in Pico‟s work.197
According to Sallis, Pico‟s religious views commit him to allocating the original,
veritative image in God and subsequent images, both objects of the world and in
human cognition are but replications of the image-original. Pico suggests a Platonic
eikastic model, asserting that through the beneficence of God‟s plan humans possess
the ability to know through senses, imagination and reason, and that ultimately all
human knowledge is guaranteed and dependant upon this beneficence. But, just as
quickly as Pico suggests such Platonic themes, he dismisses them as tangential to his
purported project of discussing human imagination, imaginatio.198
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To address human imagination, Pico appeals, not to Plato, but to Aristotle. In
following both Aristotle‟s and Aquinas‟ lead, Pico summarizes the imagination as a
power of the soul:
a) that produces forms
b) that is a motion generated by sensation, but with its own
productivity
c) that is a force related to all powers
d) that fashions likenesses and transmutes impressions
e) that is a power of assimilating all things
f) that enables the power of retention
g) without which no knowledge, not even opinion is possible199
A more apt summary of the historical record could not be afforded in a single work.
It is from such a summary list that the overture of the early modern period may be
seen. Image production, power of retention and the transmuting of impressions, takes
precedence in the early modern period, especially in the Cartesian doctrine that ideas
must have a cause. We find in an introspective inventory of our minds an
overwhelming concern with the sources of our ideas. Unlike the ancients and
Medievals, who commonly understand the source of ideas to be the material,
physical, world, one part of the early moderns‟ project will be to prove the “outer”
world is the source for many of our ideas rather than taking such a presupposition for
granted. As a summary and transitional figure, Pico‟s account of the imagination still
obtains the purchase of a given natural world, but indicates the transformation that is

divine illumination. By dismissing divine emanation Pico may have been jailed for heresy. Cf.
Cocking, p. 170.
199
Summary provided by John Sallis in The Force of the Imagination (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 2000) p. 63.

114

to take place in the modern period. However, it is Pico‟s invective against the
imagination that is his true legacy to much of the modern period.
In addition to summarizing the views of his predecessors, Pico admonishes
caution against trust in the imagination. That the imagination is necessary for the
efficacy of all the other powers of the soul is without doubt, Pico affirms, stating;
“nor could the soul, fettered as it is to the body, opine, know, or comprehend at all, if
phantasy were not constantly to supply it with the images themselves.”200 But the
imagination is also the great distorter and is at the origin of most sins and the source
of heresies. To this invective against the imagination Pico devotes an entire chapter
of his work.201 To the origin of sin and heresy Pico adds further condemnation by
identifying imagination as the mother and nurse of ambition. The imagination
nourishes wrath, cruelty and passion, and it encourages the insatiable thirst for gold
and the ardor of lust.202 The imagination is even responsible for “all monstrous
opinions and the defects of all judgment.” This caution against sin, illusions and
deceptions in judgment are ultimately cautions against the imagination.
For Pico, like much of the ancients and medievals, there is a strong sense of
the necessity of imagination in cognition, yet also the mistrust of image-making.
“Since the imagination itself is midway between incorporeal and corporeal nature and
is the medium thought which they are joined,” it is essential to knowledge of human
experience. And yet, because the “imagination is for the most part vain and
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wandering”, one needs be cautious. In Pico, one gains a strong sense of both the
dependency humans have on imagination, and also the mistrust one must have if one
is to so dependant upon a single faculty. In his own words, “since the imagination is
itself midway between incorporeal and corporeal nature and is the medium through
which they are joined, it is difficult to grasp its nature.”203 Humans are both
empowered and corrupted by this curious faculty. Humans should then both embrace
and distance themselves from such, a paradoxical doctrine that seems pervasive in
Medieval and Renaissance thought.
This final thought brings into focus one central issue repeatedly mentioned by
previous authors: to what is the imagination accountable. The two responses
available at this point have been reason or the objects themselves. Despite the
difficulties, or perhaps owing to the difficulties of these two answers, Kant will be
forced to address this very issue, and prove central to the his formulation and
radicalization of the imagination found in the Transcendental Deduction. The
position of the imagination becomes transformed along the lines Pico suggests; the
imagination is necessary for cognition, but to what structures and normative
responsibilities does it respond?
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Rene Descartes

Rene Descartes and his philosophy herald a new era in the methodology and
concerns of philosophical inquiry. By distancing himself from the Scholastic
tradition of his Jesuit education, Descartes ushers in a new era of philosophical
inquiry, terminology, concerns and, subsequently, problems. As stated above,
Descartes was not an innovator who presented a radical break from the established
mode of philosophy. Descartes employs much of the vocabulary and begins with a
chief concern of Medieval philosophy, a compilation of human knowledge,
scientia.204 Descartes is a philosopher of his times and educational background.
However, once presented with difficulties of the Scholastic tradition, notable amongst
others, the miracle of the Eucharist and transubstantiation, Descartes rethinks
philosophical inquiry, according to a new, mechanical understanding of the world of
material bodies. Descartes employs the vernacular and cognitive hierarchy of the
medieval period, but reformulates these standards to accord with a material
mechanism of corporeal bodies and differentiates the essence of human thinking
activities from the theological presuppositions of his forebears. Because of the
clumsy and often untenable positions set forth by Medieval philosophy—in his own
words: “a large number of falsehoods that I had accepted as true in my childhood”—
Descartes undertakes a new project that starts “again right from the foundations,” a
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requirement necessary, he believes, if he wants to “establish anything at all in the
sciences that [is] stable and likely to last.”205 The goal of human knowledge and a
compilation of such is still the goal of Descartes‟ aspirations, which may include
knowledge of God‟s existence, but which is, more chiefly, concerned with the world
of the natural sciences. He transforms the medieval inquiry concerning scientia,
however, when he explicitly occupies himself with a methodology that he claims will
ensure the accuracy and verity of a newly grounded sciences.
In his mature writings, here typified by the Meditations on First Philosophy,
Descartes proposes a foundational approach to the claims of knowledge. This
foundational approach, and the subsequent need for an explicit methodology in order
to assure the “certificate of believability” for knowledge claims, is one that marks
Descartes foremost among the early modern philosophers. Rather than acquiring the
systems and assumptions of his predecessors, Descartes undergoes a systematic
destruction of his beliefs, knowledge and judgments, that he may acquire certainty
that will provide the bedrock for the edifice of human knowledge. Signal to
Descartes‟ project is the suggestion that anyone can and should in fact proceed
through his methodological doubt in order to obtain for themselves certain
indubitable knowledge that it can provide. Descartes recognizes the need to pursue
this radical doubt at least once in his own life, semel in vita, that he may be content
with sound judgments and be able to construct a compendium of human knowledge,
and, through the voice of the meditator, Descartes invites the reader to accompany
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him along a personal quest for certainty, to proceed through the same inquiry for
themselves.
As is well known, in order to most efficiently dispel himself from possible
illusion, Descartes reminds the reader that so-called knowledge from the senses have
deceived, sometimes too often, and will, if left unchecked, most likely deceive again.
206

The promise is that, with a proper foundation for knowledge, these can be/are

dismissed. But in order to determine this foundation, Descartes finds it incumbent, in
the meantime, to avoid making knowledge claims based upon the senses. To
supplement his argument against the standard illusions of sensation, Descartes
continues by recounting how dreams often present us with the data of waking life e.g.
sitting by a fire in a dressing gown.207 Ordinarily, we rely upon our sensation to
provide us with an account of what it is that we are doing, but in the case of dreams
and correlate activities, we are deceived, because we are in fact not sitting by a fire in
a dressing gown, but, rather, asleep in our bed, yet are presented with the lively
images typically provided veraciously by sensation. Whether awake or dreaming,
Descartes determines the deliverances of the senses, or the perceptions afforded by
such, are not to be considered the foundation for knowledge.
Descartes continues by addressing a more considerable obstacle, those mental
perceptions, that seemingly are independent of the senses in any way e.g. geometry.
Yet, Descartes can also dispense with these objects of mental perception by
presenting two possible arguments against the operations of the mind. The first
206
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amounts to an evolutionary argument against the indubitability of geometric
perceptions.208 Descartes also presents his famous malevolent demon/genie
argument, his second argument against the seeming certainty of geometric,
mathematical, knowledge. Descartes suggests that it could be the case, when one
doubts the beneficence of a creator, that humans might very well be under the
misdirected tutelage of an evil creator who has perversely misguided our thinking.209
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In short, what we conceive as necessary truths, not dependent upon sensation but
upon thinking alone, might not correspond with the truth of reality.
After such a systematic destruction of the contents of thought Descartes is left
to ask: “So what remains? Perhaps just the one fact that nothing is certain.”
However, from this existential performance of doubt, Descartes does find solace.
Despite the content of his knowledge and the inability to determine truth and falsity,
illusion from reality, Descartes‟ process can admit of one thing: that thinking is taking
place. Regardless of truth or falsity concerning reliability of senses or a priori
geometry; regardless of whether he is awake, mad, dreaming or under the influence of
a deceiving power, Descartes can in this moment of radical doubt affirm that
some(thing) must indeed be performing this activity. From this immediate
understanding Descartes “must conclude that that this proposition, I am, I exist, is
necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind.”210 This
certain, essential declaration, cogito sum, provides Descartes the key to continue his
project. In short, what Descartes believes himself to be at the foundation of his
experience, his thinking Cogito, is a thinking subject, a mind.
To elaborate what a thinking thing, a mind, is, Descartes pauses to take
inventory of the possible modes of thinking, of which doubt is but one. Descartes
concludes that a thinking thing is “a thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is
willing, is unwilling, and also imagines and has sensory perceptions.”211 The
enumeration of the first six modes of thinking are all attributable to Descartes‟
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methodology of doubt. In doubting all that he has previously thought to exist,
Descartes has denied, and has been unwilling to affirm anything as true that he does
not know with certainty. Upon the arrival of the certainty of the cogito, Descartes can
then make an affirmation of understanding and is willing to affirm the indubitable
truth of his existence. Early in his meditations, Descartes has provided examples of
the first three-quarters of his list. But, whence the last two, imagining and sensing, on
his list of characteristics of a thinking thing?
To answer this question Descartes turns to the contents of thought. He
discovers a variety of ideas that are the objects of his thinking. Concisely
summarizing these various thoughts, Descartes discovers three species of ideas; 1)
ideas not sponsored by himself, and seemingly coming from outside of himself,
adventitious ideas e.g. heat and cold, 2) ideas sponsored by himself by a
recombination of other ideas, with varying permutations of the contents already
found, factitious ideas e.g. sirens and hippogriffs, and 3) ideas that he could not
himself created, but that are not found in the world of sensation outside of himself,
innate ideas e.g. infinity, the nature of the soul, extension and, perhaps, triangles.212
These types of thought are reminiscent of the modes enumerated by earlier
philosophers, sense perception and thinking. Of course, at this point of his meditative
process, Descartes has no “outside” world from which to infer that some of his ideas
are caused by external relations, and this problem has been duly noted in the
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literature.213 Nevertheless, Descartes postulates that he cannot be the source of innate
ideas, the single most important of these ideas being the idea of infinity/perfection214
The idea of infinity, Descartes claims, cannot be caused or created by a finite
subject.215 Thus, Descartes concludes, God must exist, apart from finite beings and is
the cause of the idea of infinity/perfection the meditator finds within herself.216 Just
what these ideas are and what is responsible for these representations is still in
question.
Employing the idea of God, infinity and perfection, Descartes then begins to
rehabilitate the world of the senses and provide exacting measure for the avoidance of
error in judgments. Because God is an infinite, perfect being, to which no privation
can be predicated, Descartes concludes that, as the creator of the universe, God‟s
beneficence assures that the object of creation itself is indeed a perfect creation. As
one of these objects of creation, the meditator concludes the capacities with which she
has been endowed by the creator must themselves be perfect abilities. And yet,
Descartes is faced with his original problem—humans make errors in judgment. To
explain the ability to err, Descartes continues his survey of the mind and its abilities,
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and must separate indubitable ideas from the more specious representations, most of
which involve some indistinct idea/imagery.
In addition to ideas and understanding, humans possess the capacity to make
judgments. Hence Descartes continues to affirm his original position that affirmation
and denial, judgments themselves, are essential capacities of human beings. To this
capacity Descartes gives the name willing. At this point Descartes now has in place
explanatory mechanisms that will allow him to affirm the reliability of the faculties,
yet provide an explanation for error production. “It is only the will, or freedom of
choice,” Descartes writes, “which I experience within me to be so great that the idea
of any greater faculty is beyond my grasp...”217 Through introspection, Descartes
finds that humans possess the ability to affirm or deny, an inexhaustible expression of
volition that contains no boundaries. Problems in judgment arise whenever this
boundless capacity affirms or denies without the guidance of understanding. Judging
rampantly without reason or methodological considerations proves the greatest source
of error.
To correct for error and/or avoid error production, Descartes prescribes that
one “refrain from making a judgment in cases where [one] does not perceive the truth
with sufficient clarity and distinctness.”218 In order to understand clarity and
distinctness of perception, Descartes returns to the first step in his methodological
consideration. Clarity and distinctness are exemplified in the indubitable presentation
that if doubting occurs, thinking occurs and one must exist. Likewise, Descartes cites
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the immediacy with which one realizes, upon introspection, a definitive idea of
perfection not caused by oneself. To avoid error in judgment, Descartes concludes,
one must withhold judgment until one can see the simple nature of the object of
judgment to such a degree that no ambiguity remains. For this inquiry the
corresponding question appears to be: must one abstain from judgment provided one
does not possess a clear and distinct image?
It is here that Descartes philosophical ingenuity and methodological
innovation become manifest. By employing the term “perception” ambiguously,
Descartes can affirm the traditional model that holds intellection as the arbiter of
truth, while rehabilitating and emending the physical sciences, delivered by the
senses, to conform with his mechanical model of the universe. The ambiguity
permits Descartes to discuss deliverances of the senses without providing detailed
exegesis on the connection between them and ideas available to inspection by the
mind—a question for which he will inevitably be forced to provide some account.
Perception, properly speaking is under the auspices of mental activity and the
guidance of understanding. In other words, the mind is locus proper of perception,
and thus Descartes continues the dialogue of inner and outer. That is, he must explain
how objects of the senses are translated to the mental realm of perception. To begin
such an explanation and to describe the proper way to eliminate error, Descartes
observes that it is only through reflection that one can divest perception from the
detritus of ordinary experience and determine judgments based upon his criteria of
clarity and distinctness. However, Descartes maintains, humans also receive

125

perceptions from the deliverances of the senses. It would seem that Descartes has
introduced two concerns of perceptions that need elaboration. The first concern is the
issue regarding what a perception is, a metaphysical question. The second, concerns
the origins of perceptions, a question of causal source. For Descartes, the answer to
the first question lends a partial answer to the second and the remainder of the second
actually derives from the methodological order and determinations conducted thus far
in his Meditations.
Perceptions, as Descartes perceives them, are truly in the domain of the
intellect/understanding. The mind, according to Descartes, deals only with ideas, and
yet, in reflective deliberation, the mind represents first order ideas, the content of
those ideas being recognized albeit the ideas themselves not being so. In the
reflective process Descartes entitles the presentation of ideas to the mind as
perceptions. The mind may thus clearly and distinctly perceive the ideas,
representations, that constitute its objects. Inspection of the content of the mind,
perceiving ideas, leads Descartes to determine several different types of ideas e.g.
simple, complex, clear, confused, distinct etc.219 Perceptions are ultimately ideas, the
only object with which the intellect can work/operate/deal.
This answer leads to the second question, the question regarding the source of
perceptions. One half of the answer to this question is the mind itself- perceptions are
material and thus the product of reflection. According to Descartes, when we inspect
the contents of our mind, we simply find ideas already there. The function of the
understanding is to evaluate the degree of clarity and distinctness these perceptions
219
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possess, and to make judgments accordingly. This answer seems to explain factitious
ideas (those recombinant ideas/images found in earlier philosophers) we find in the
examination of the contents of reflective perception. However, this answer will
inevitably prove unsatisfactory, for ideas we have innate ideas and ideas of corporeal
objects, the source of which we can claim no credit. When Descartes simply affirms
that we have innate and adventitious ideas, it does little in the way of explaining their
source(s).
Descartes, however, does have one recourse to provide an explanation for and
the verity of other sources of our ideas; he has provided one perception, one idea, of
which he is certain. The perception of his existing and the necessity of his existence
from his ability to doubt provides the paradigm by which he can determine other
sources of ideas. Descartes will employ the criterion of clarity and distinctness to
determine the other sources of his ideas. One objection may immediately arise: the
certainty of one‟s existence, it might be claimed, appears to be generated from oneself
and the activities of one‟s own thinking. But one thing is of extreme importance
here—with this particular example, the generation of the clear and distinct idea that
we find with the Cogito is not the generation alluded to in factitious ideas, we do not
create the idea of the Cogito by recombining other ideas. The recombinant ideas we
label factitious do not have the foundational grounds attributed to the Cogito. The
point of importance Descartes finds in the perception of the Cogito, also called the
intuition of the perception of the Cogito, according to Descartes, is the source and
criterion for judging the perception, that is the self and the “natural light” of reason.
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The Cogito presents one type of perception, the certain perception which bases its
truth upon a logical, simple idea, although its criteria for truth will continue into all
forms, both simple and complex ideas. The mind as the source of the perception that
it inspects demands an answer regarding the objective validity of the judgment. But
the concern with objective validity will take us too broadly afield at this point.
Suffice it to say that the logical rigor and the objective validity attributed to the
Cogito depends upon the clarity and distinctness of the perception, and ultimately, on
a veracious God as guarantor of the clear and distinct ideas—a concern Kant will take
up while providing a different answer.
Other sources for perceptions, those that can represent both innate and
adventitious ideas, are those that come from outside ourselves. Using the criteria
established in the Cogito, Descartes can analyze the innate idea of infinity/God and
determine the truth of its content as well as the source for its idea, a God existing and
external to the meditator herself—another clear, distinct, simple idea. The final
genera of perception, adventitious ideas, is employed when the mind meditates upon
the nature of body. Perceptions, properly speaking, are the objects of minds, and
adventitious ideas, represent ideas not caused by either the self, the activity of selfreflection or by an infinite and perfect being. In order to present how the mind deals
with perception from so foreign a source, bodily substance, Descartes will have to
appeal to the mediating faculty of the imagination and its role in the conversion of
sense data into ideas that can then be perceived by the mind. It is at this juncture that
Descartes‟ theory of imagination and images becomes operative. What are we to
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make of images in relation to perception, and to what degree of veracity do they
obtain?
Throughout the Meditations, Descartes discusses perception, assuming his
audience conforms to his ideation of perception. Perceptions are after all properly the
ideas one finds in the theatre of the mind for Descartes. After determining the Cogito
to be the ground for and exemplar by which we may judge human experience,
Descartes affirms that with due conscientiousness and fastidious adherence to the
criteria asserted to arrive at indubitable truths, any further ideas that obtain clarity and
distinctness may also be affirmed as unshakeable knowledge. Coupling these criteria
with the assurance of a benevolent deity who created the universe, humans included,
and the perfection of His creation, Descartes determines, with clarity and distinctness,
the ability for humans to rely upon sense data to make knowledge claims about the
world around them.220 The deliverances of the senses, both in immediate perception
and memory, however, must still conform to the criteria of clarity and distinctness.
Without deviating from Scholastic traditions too greatly, Descartes is willing
to affirm that, when surveying the theatre of the mind, one finds not only ideas, but
also images caused by the external world via the deliverances of the senses; that is
images that are ideas that can be perceived by the mind.221 Furthermore, memory
itself is an integral function that permits cataloguing and judging the world of the
senses. To determine the role of the imagination in veritative cognition and also to
properly subordinate the imagination to intellection-reason, Descartes compares
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imagining with understanding. Descartes qualifies the imagination as a faculty “of
which I am aware when I turn my mind to material objects” and as “nothing else but
an application of the cognitive faculty to a body which is intimately present to it”222
Just what intimate presence involves and how one can ascertain intimacy as opposed
to simple familiarity, Descartes leaves to the reader‟s imagination. But Descartes
does provide examples to help discern how the imagination differs from
understanding. When imagining a triangle, Descartes claims, one literally presents a
figure bounded by three lines the mind‟s eye for inspection “as if they were present
before me.” Here we must assume the “me” to which Descartes refers is only the
mind, and presentation of images corresponds to the perception of images by the
understanding. The understanding can utilize the image of a triangle in determining
the properties of three-sided objects. Moreover, the imagination presents a specific
image, scalene, right, obtuse acute etc. for inspection by the understanding, often
presenting an image of a particular figure encountered before and recalled through
memory. The understanding, however, does not require any particular image in order
to understand clearly and distinctly the properties of geometric figures we call
triangles. To highlight the difference between employing images as a propaedeutic
for the understanding‟s clear and distinct perceptions of triangles and the
understanding‟s function itself, Descartes presents the case of the chiliagon. The
imagination cannot present a clear image of a thousand-sided figure. In this instance
the imagination presents not a clear image but, rather, a “confused representation of
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some figure.”223 It is true, Descartes continues, that we are in the habit of presenting
images to the mind for inspection, but, it would seem, image presentation has its
limitations. The understanding, on the other hand, can clearly and distinctly perceive
the properties of a chiliagon.224 This in turn leads Descartes to claim that although
the understanding very often employs images, the imagination “is not a necessary
constituent of my own essence, that is, of the essence of my mind.”225 It is rather one
mode, among many, of the intellect/understanding.
This distinction between understanding, the proper activity of mind, and
imagination, an often useful tool, but inessential to the mind, is reminiscent of the
cognitive hierarchy of the medieval period. The imagination is clearly not one of the
five basic senses as enumerated by Descartes,226 but also is not an essential part of the
mind itself. Descartes writes: “when the mind understands, it in some way turns
towards itself and inspects one of the ideas which are within it; but when it imagines,
it turns towards the body and looks at something in the body which conforms to an
idea understood by the mind or perceived by the senses.”227 The imagination is not a
part of the world of material bodies, and yet it also does not belong essentially to the
world of the mind. The mind turns to the body through the imagination when the
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mind contemplates material bodies, but the objects proper for consideration of the
mind are not the images themselves. Descartes‟ account here becomes somewhat
confused, for, while he makes assertions about the mind‟s use of the imagination to
mediate between understanding and sensible bodies, he does not properly describe the
contents of the understanding‟s contemplation/intuition other than referring to them
as “ideas”. Just what is the ontology of Descartes‟ imagination? if it is neither
material-body nor mental-mind?
In terms of Descartes‟ programmatic, his use of the imagination at such a
stage in his meditations is in fact to prove the external world, and not to delineate the
proper use of the imagination in cognition.228 In reference to the argument that the
mind understands ideas and the imagination deals with images not caused by the
mind, Descartes is led to affirm the existence of external objects that cause sensation
and collation/image production by the imagination.229 Descartes continues to argue
for the existence of an external, material world, citing the vividness and distinctness
of the images produced by the perception of sensation in imagination, claiming this
ensures that the images could not be caused the understanding alone and that the “use
of the senses had come first, while the use of my reason came only later.” In addition
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Descartes notes the “the ideas which I formed myself, were less vivid than those
which I perceived with the senses and were, for the most part, made up of elements of
sensory ideas.”230 Our natural attitude regarding the objects of sensation as real and
the images and/or ideas of them as less real led Descartes to affirm common sense,
but doing so by establishing a hierarchy of the mind employing clear and distinct
ideas as the arbiter/determiner of truth.
At this point in his argument Descartes‟ locution plays, once again, on the
ambiguity of the term „perception‟. Descartes, it would seem, employs the use of
sensory ideas without describing what a “sensory idea” is or what perception of
sensory ideas amounts to. The vividness of these ideas implies that the presentation
of these data for inspection by the mind be of such a kind that the corporeal nature of
sensation is manifest, and yet not be corporeal, as they are ideas. These “ideas” as
Descartes often calls the deliverances of the senses in their use by understanding are
precisely the images afforded by imagination. By image production and the
employment of particular figures by the mind, the extension of corporeal bodies is
mitigated to a level at which point in time the understanding can intuit the nature of
corporeal bodies, as pure extension. Descartes‟ celebrated wax example demonstrates
how the particularities of the many manifestations of a body, through physical
change, and presentation of each particular image of the changing body is used
discursively by the understanding to intuit the singular nature of physical bodies
according to Descartes. The movement from particular(s) to general understanding of
objects, say physical bodies, brings suspicion of his claim that imagination is not
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essential to the understanding. It is most certainly essential when dealing with the
presentation material objects, even if it is not required to determine the clear and
distinct perception of them to determine qualities. Thus Descartes, like the Medievals
before him, wants to present a clear separation of understanding as an activity that
needs no involvement of the senses, from understanding of the material world, the socalled sciences and human experience.
The imaginative variation employed by Descartes—to move from particular
instances and the images afforded through the imagination‟s collation of the
deliverances of the senses to clearly and distinctly intuiting by the understanding
about the nature of bodies generally and to any specific field of natural philosophy,
the physical sciences—has led to contentious debate among commentators regarding
the role, importance and use of imagination in Descartes‟ methodology. It even leads,
as Descartes himself notes, to a belief “that I had nothing at all in the intellect which I
had not previously had in sensation”231—a position assumed and vigorously argued
for by empiricists, most notably John Locke and David Hume. Certainly, Descartes
does not believe this tenet of empiricism, as it runs counter to his doctrine of innate
ideas. He merely cites this as a common conception considered plausible by the
argument he mounts to distinguish between imagination and understanding and what
is afforded by sensation, but one that needs to be dispelled.
Among commentators one divisive issue, one that cites the centrality, or lack
thereof, of the imagination in Descartes, is whether Descartes maintains a certain
mathematical project established by Descartes in his earliest writings, the Regulae,
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and whether he abandons such ambitions in his mature writings of the Meditations,
Principles and Passions. In short, this divisive issue concerns whether Descartes‟
project is inherently epistemological or metaphysical.
In the Rules for the Direction of the Mind (Regulae), an early and unpublished
work (abandoned by 1629), Descartes presents a methodology to determine the
simple truths upon which any physical science depends. This clearly epistemological
treatise concerns itself with decomposing complex ideas to the simples at which time
the mind can intuit the basic principles upon which any particular problem of physical
science deductively depends. Dennis Sepper, in his work Descartes’ Imagination,
advocates an interpretation of Descartes‟ corpus that places the Regulae at the heart
of Descartes‟ philosophical project and cites the explicit references to methodology in
the Discourse on Method and the implicit considerations of methodology in the
Meditations as proof that Descartes‟ chief concern is with the compendium of
knowledge humans can obtain, scientia. Because the physical sciences are the
concern of the Regulae and the bulk of knowledge that may obtain for humans
concerns the world of material objects, Sepper concludes that Descartes struggles
with the role the imagination plays mediating between the world of material objects
and the perception of the idea of bodies as extension, that is knowledge of the world
of material objects, and that this concern pervades his entire lifetime and published
works. Boldly, Sepper claims, the
imagination can indeed serve as an index of Descartes‟ deeper
concerns and of the transformations of his thought—not because there
are remote and obscure connections between them, but rather, because
imagination was at the heart of his earliest philosophizing, and because
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his prolonged effort to establish the practical relevance and cognitive
importance of imagination led him into a network of problems that
defeated his initial hopes.232
What Sepper concedes in this affirmation is that Descartes‟ philosophical
considerations do seem to change over the course of his writings. The explicit
methodological considerations of the Regulae, one in which the “primacy of
imaginative techniques in the process of knowing” is apparent, are abbreviated in
Discourse in Method and only implicit in the metaphysical treatise Meditations, in
which Descartes appears “to teach the near-irrelevance of the imagination to the most
profound philosophical tasks.”233 In his estimation, Sepper is even willing to concede
the general consensus among Descartes scholars, that imagination plays little role in
the Meditations. The imagination is necessary for the translation of the deliverances
of the senses into perceptions, but insufficient to provide any judgment regarding
those objects of the senses. Sepper‟s claim amounts to an emphasis on the early (and
unpublished)234 writings of Descartes and an insistence that Descartes‟ main project is
a compendium of human knowledge, knowledge of the natural sciences.
While Sepper‟s claim appears plausible—Descartes himself discusses the
limitations and proper topics of human knowledge—his thesis oversimplifies
Descartes‟ growing awareness that even his system of intuition and deduction, as laid
out in the Regulae, and continued in attenuated form through the Discourse,
Meditations, and even into Principles of Philosophy and On the Passions of the Soul,
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itself needs a metaphysical justification, the one Descartes provides in the
Meditations and continues restating in all the subsequent works. In short, Sepper
relies too much attributing a single project to Descartes‟ corpus—the compilation of
empirical knowledge. Certainly, Descartes is an early modern philosopher concerned
with supplanting Aristotelian metaphysics with one that emphasizes matter and
motion, thus eliminating final causality, and the subsequent reworking of natural
sciences according to this model, but this is just what Sepper misses in his analysis.
Descartes must provide a metaphysical justification for his new system before work
in the physical sciences can begin properly. This metaphysical justification places
priority on the nature and workings of the mind and the veracity one can claim of
clear and distinct ideas assured of truth by a veracious God. The imagination, as a
faculty that presents confused and obscure images for scrutiny by a thinking
substance that demands clarity and distinctness in order to affirm with certainty any
science, will inevitably prove insufficient as the motivating force behind Descartes‟
philosophizing. Descartes is concerned with the physical sciences and implicitly the
faculties that attend to corporeal bodies and images, but this consideration is only
secondary to establishing a firm foundation, one devoid of imagistic thinking, in order
to ensure that investigations of these sciences are secure.
The standard interpretation of Descartes‟ corpus, represented by Dan Garber
and Martial Gueroult, approaches the issue historically and developmentally. Garber
references the importance of Descartes‟ concern with physical sciences, notably
physics, optics and harmonics, but emphasizes the possibility of such sciences upon a
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firm metaphysical basis. Garber determines that the methodology of the Reguale is
not present in the Meditations because the epistemic instruction provided in the early
work needed a metaphysical foundation. In fact, while clear and distinct ideas may
appear to be the same as intuitions found in the Regulae, this is where the
methodological similarities cease. In the Meditations, Descartes is looking for simple
ideas known immediately by the mind, much like Descartes affirms the truth of
simple intuitions of the Regulae, but the difference is that the work of the Meditations
does not apply itself to the concrete problems of physics or optics, but to the
foundation from which the solution to concrete, that is, material, problems can be
resolved.
Martial Gueroult, in his work Descartes’ Philosophy Interpreted According to
the Order of Reasons, is unapologetic in affirming the lack of a role of imagination in
the first five meditations. The concern in this portion of the Meditations focuses on
answering basic questions; that something is (quod) and what it might be (quid).
These questions are limited in the first five meditations, Gueroult claims, to the nature
of the self, both body and mind, and the existence of God. Existence of any external
object of meditation is secondary to these central questions and is only properly
addressed in the last, the sixth, meditation. Without determining that the mind is and
what the nature of the mind amounts to along with the distinction between mind and
body, discussion of material objects is moot. Once Descartes determines that he is a
thinking thing, and what the essence of this thinking thing is, he can determine the
difference between mind and body to determine the essence of body. Determination
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of the existence of material bodies can only obtain with the guarantee of faithful
faculties achieved by a veracious God. Hence the questions concerning imagination
as the mediator between existing, external, material bodies and the inner world of
ideas can only be addressed after the metaphysical foundations are in place. How the
imagination transforms the deliverances of the senses into images that can then be
perceived, thus enabling natural sciences, is merely the last consideration in
Descartes‟ order of reasoning. In his final analysis, Gueroult determines that the
imagination is, by and large, a faculty that presents confused and obscure images for
inspection (perception) by the mind.
Gueroult continues, claiming that when dealing the specific treatment of the
imagination in Descartes‟ Meditations one needs to remember that
Descartes understands two very different things by imagination:
imagination as mental faculty, which is the soul exercising an action
on the brain, and corporeal imagination, which consists of the capacity
of the body to preserve the traces of actions exercised on it, either from
within or without. This capacity resides in the pineal gland, but also in
each organ of the body, and finally in the body as a whole.235
Thus it would seem that there are two imaginations at work in the Meditations, one
which is operative in the translation of sensibility into perception, and a second
species that concerns itself with the manipulation of ideas themselves. This two-fold
imagination parallels the ambiguous use of perception found in Descartes, one which
applies to the objects of sensation in translation to ideas, the other which applies to
the ideas themselves.
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Moreover, with this dual split of imagination, the passage betrays that there
are not only two types of imagination, but rather five. The first four imaginations,
merely reproductive in their functions, are present as either intellectual or sensible,
not residing in the body, or residing therein. Thus there is an 1) intellectual
imagination responsible for memory of the activities of the mind located nowhere in
the body, 2) a sensible memory that catalogues the traces of sense perception, but also
not located in the body (what we might call images proper) 3) a corporeal imagination
that is responsible for memory located in the brain, and 4) a corporeal imagination
that provides for the memory of muscle. The fifth species of imagination is presented
as the creative force that is responsible for the recombinant productions, given to the
interplay of any of these memories, which produces factitious, or better yet fictitious,
ideas. This last species of imagination is simply a mental faculty, one that provides
for the allowances of imaginative interplay with ideas, either mental or
representations of the sensible, found in speculative or creative thinking. The first
four species enumerated here, highlight the role the imagination inherently plays in
memory production and storage.
By reconnoitering the Scholastic tradition, it becomes apparent that, while
Descartes‟ epistemologically oriented methodology and concluding metaphysics of
substance deviates from his medieval predecessors, when it comes to the imagination,
Descartes closely inherits the cognitive hierarchy found in Aquinas. Descartes‟
corporeal imaginations are reminiscent of the image collation and production found in
the “common sense” of Aquinas. Just as Aquinas had before him, Descartes locates
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this faculty in the brain. Descartes does, however, provide and emendation to the
Scholastic tradition by allowing for a “memory” of muscle not located in the brain,
but, rather, as some residual trace found in the body at large. Also, Descartes‟ mental
images, and the storehouse of these images coincides with Aquinas doctrine of the
intentional shift, from sensation to intellection, found in his explication of the
imagination proper, both imagination formalis and thesaurus. Even the creative
power of the recombinant imagination has precedence in Aquinas‟ phantasy.
Also inherited from his scholastic upbringing is Descartes‟ clear mistrust for
the imagination. The imagination provides not only confused and obscure images
from sensation for inspection by the intellect, thus privileging the intellect,
understanding, over either imagination or sensation. But, also, Descartes‟ entire
metaphysical foundation, as he presents it in the Meditations, bespeaks the priority
given to the pure intellect, untrammeled by traces of sensation given through images.
The imagination is still subordinate to the single faculty, pure intellect, that can
determine the foundation for subsequent claims pertaining to images delivered from
sensation.
There are, however, two major innovations concerning the imagination
intertwined in Descartes‟ foundationalist enterprise. The first concerns a need to
prove the external world and its relation to the ideas humans may possess of it, which
follows from the inherently imaginative enterprise of Descartes‟ methodology.
Descartes‟ method of radical doubt solicits a need to prove the existence of the
external world, a concern with which Scholastic philosophy did not need to deal
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directly. Because of the hypothesis of the evil demon, and its employment to discard
both sensible objects as well as the a priori truths of mathematics in order to ground
knowledge claims, Descartes believes that once the groundwork of the Cogito is
accomplished there is still an outstanding debt to prove the existence of an external
world, the one which sensations delivers. In the course of his proof, Descartes will
argue for the existence of a veracious creator, one who cannot deceive, thus refuting
the evil demon hypothesis. In order to prove the existence of the external world,
Descartes cannot rely exclusively on the contents of pure thinking. In order to prove
the external world, Descartes has recourse to both the imagination, which only proves
the external world‟s possibility, and finally and definitively to the deliverances of the
senses. There is, however, one obstacle to Descartes‟ argument for the existence of
the external world by proof of the perceptions of sensation, and that obstacle is how
the deliverances of the senses, explicitly bodily, can be transformed to an object of
thought, explicitly and exclusively mental. Descartes‟ only recourse is to employ the
imagination as the faculty that produces images and which, in the production of
images, transforms the bodily nature of sensation into the mental nature of ideas.
Unfortunately, however, Descartes provides no clear explanation of how this process
unfolds.
In summary, the use and nature of imagination is subtly transformed in
Descartes‟ philosophy: the imagination is an organ for use in creative, speculative and
scientific thinking, and, moreover, the imagination is slowly conceded a place in the
process of world generation/constitution, or for Descartes, proof of the world. The
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change in theories of imagination does not extend explicitly to the function of
imagination itself; after all, the imagination is still a mediating faculty between the
“outer” world of the senses and the “inner” world of understanding. But the use of
the imagination in justifying an external world and the subsequent orientation we as
humans find in relation to the world is transformed into a quasi-creative mould. In
Descartes‟ philosophy, much like in antiquity and the medieval period, the
imagination is found to be a real and necessary faculty for
coordination/comprehension of an external world. We also find that the veracity of
the images presented by imagination is ultimately under the auspices of the
understanding. The metaphysical question concerning whether the products of the
imagination are real, is still answered in the affirmative, provided the epistemological
caveat concerning its veracity still emends the process. Images produced by the
imagination from the deliverances of the senses are indeed real, but the truth
contained in them is still under the guidance of image free understanding, a function
which can determine the veracity of the image based upon Descartes newfound
criteria.
With this step into modernity one gains a clearer picture of the issues and
concerns Kant will have about the imagination. At first glance, Descartes appears to
affirm the Platonic doctrine that imagination is not required for knowledge—only the
powers of the mind ensured by God‟s benevolence. One also finds Descartes‟
prescription for reason, in his words clarity and distinctness, to govern any
presentation of empirical knowledge. However, Descartes‟ ambiguity concerning
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perception and just what faculties are at work in perceiving empirical objects also
belies his dependence upon a faculty to mediate between sensation and thought. The
question concerning where perception belongs, and just what role the imagination
plays in perception will become a pressing matter for Kant. Descartes appears to
leave the question open, something Kant will find inherently unsatisfying, thus he
will attempt to provide an explanation for this Cartesian aporia. Just as Descartes
does with perception, Kant will find an ambiguous tension of the imagination, being
unable to definitively locate just where the imagination belongs, in sensibility or
understanding. Kant will begin to unravel this question by distinguishing between a
pure and applied imagination, just as commentators have for Descartes‟ use of
perception.

John Locke/David Hume

I would like to treat in this last historical section the philosophies of John
Locke and David Hume together. These two thinkers can justifiably be treated
together, I believe, as representative of the empiricist development of modern
philosophy following Descartes‟ innovations. These empiricist philosophers continue
the modern programmatic and concern themselves with the nature of ideas and
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cognitive faculty psychology, despite presenting refutations of specific doctrines of
Descartes. Because of their focus on subjective conditions of perception and
knowledge, both Locke and Hume are considered Cartesian in their outlook and
approach, despite the British/Scottish distancing from the tenets advanced by
Descartes himself. Locke presents a concerted effort to refute the doctrine of innate
ideas found in Descartes, and Hume assumes the empiricist framework, punctuating it
with his skeptical philosophy, thereby undermining Descartes‟ promotion of
foundational epistemology and metaphysics.
John Locke begins his work, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, by
drawing an analogy between the “seeing eye” and the functioning understanding.
Both, he suggests, allow us to “see and perceive all other things” while taking “no
notice of itself.”236 Locke‟s proposed project is to pursue the “art and pains” required
“to set it [the understanding] at a distance and make it its own object” of inquiry.237
In doing so, Locke hopes to discover the contents of the mind and determine whether
the Cartesian legacy of innate ideas obtains by inquiring about the “original of those
ideas, notions or whatever else you please to call them, which a man observes, and is
conscious of to himself he has in his mind; and the ways whereby the understanding
comes to be furnished with them.”238 In addition, Locke wishes to determine the
veracity with which one can know the contents of the mind, “to shew what
knowledge the understanding hath by those ideas, and the certainty, evidence, and
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extent of it.”239 Locke endeavors to enumerate the contents of the human mind, its
source(s) and the role they place in knowledge claims. By pursuing such an inquiry,
Locke proposes to delimit the bounds of human knowledge, that we can “discover the
powers thereof; how far they reach and… to be more cautious in meddling with
things exceeding its comprehension; to stop when it is at the utmost extent of its
tether; and to sit down in a quiet ignorance of those things which, upon examination,
are found beyond the reach of our capacities.”240 This critical enterprise delimiting
the scope of human knowledge and placing limitations on those ideas of inquiry to be
found outside the parameter of human cognition, a tradition begun by Descartes, will
find its apogee in Kant‟s “critical” philosophy. Such an enterprise is beneficial to the
conduct of human action because, as Locke states, “we can find those measures,
whereby a rational creature, put in that state in which man is in this world, may and
ought to govern his opinions, and actions depending thereon” and “we need not to be
troubled that some other things escape our knowledge.”241 By discovering the
contents, source(s) and justification of the contents of the mind, humans can govern
their thoughts and actions effectively to the improvement of themselves and
humankind.
Locke continues in the Cartesian tradition by suggesting that we should avoid
judgment about those items in the index of human ideas that are not clear or distinct
perceptions. By idea, Locke means, “whatever is meant by phantasms (Aristotle),
notions, species (Aquinas) or whatever it is which can be employed about in
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thinking.”242 Upon reviewing the contents of mental perceptions, ideas, Locke decries
the theory of innate ideas stating “men, barely by the use of their natural faculties,
may attain to all the knowledge they have, without the help of any innate ideas” and
declaring how “unreasonable would it be to attribute several truths the impressions of
nature,243 and innate ideas, when we may observe in ourselves faculties, fit to attain
as easy and certain knowledge of them, as if they were originally imprinted on the
mind” by experience. 244
Developmentally, Locke speculates the mind to be entirely void of content at
the moment of birth. In his words, if we consider “the mind to be, as we say, white
paper, void of all characters, without any ideas” we must entertain the question;
“Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge?”245 To this Locke answers
“in one word, from experience.”246 Elaborating this one word answer, Locke
continues noting “our observation employed either about external sensible objects, or
about the internal operations of our minds, perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is
that which supplies our understanding with all the materials of thinking.”247 From the
tabula rasa state of infancy, we have only two sources to account for our ideas,
sensible perceptions and the operations of the mind, and these two alone, account for
all the material from which we draw when surveying the content of our minds.
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The source for “most of the ideas we have” depend on the deliverances of the
senses and by this Locke names sensation as the chief source of our ideas.248 The
second source Locke names under the appellation of internal senses, elaborated as
“perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing, and all the
different acts of our own minds.”249 Summarizing his account, Locke writes;
The understanding seems to me not to have the least glimmer of any
ideas, which it doth not receive from one of these two. External
objects furnish the mind with the ideas of sensible qualities, which are
different from perceptions they produce in us: And the mind furnishes
the understanding with ideas of its own operations.250
Unfortunately, this is where Locke‟s analysis ends. Certainly, he does
continue to discuss memory and “images” lodged in the “great mass of knowledge”
humans report. However, his analysis of memory merely repeats the earlier claim
that the material of one of the two sources “imprint” themselves on the mind, some to
such an extent that they remain as memories. Also conspicuously lacking is any
explanation about the process by which either source of knowledge is transformed
into ideas available by inspection of the mind. At this point in his analysis Locke
turns to a developmental narrative to explain how memory is often not the object of
explicit awareness and he employs this heuristic to aid in arguing against the innate
ideas of Descartes. But just how sensation, or even the operations of our own mind,
can become ideas for employment by the mind is unaccounted. This conspicuous
lack of explanation Kant will find an egregious error in the empirical position, and
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will work to explain the means by which the deliverances of the senses are first
collated and then transformed for application with the concepts of the understanding.
Locke is not, however without a successor, who defends the empirical model. To
assist in determining how the empiricist position explains this process we must turn to
the philosophy of Hume.
David Hume assumes the mantle of empiricist philosophy, elaborating and
narrowing the role of experience in concept/idea formation, while carrying the
empiricists‟ doctrine of experience as the sole sponsor of concepts to its logical and
skeptical conclusion.251 In An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding and
Treatise on Human Nature, Hume, following Locke, concedes the ordinary
distinction between awareness of X in perception (sensation) and awareness of Y in
thought, but denies any actual difference between the two. The difference between
these two representations is a matter of degree and not of kind. Both forms of
representation are attending to the objects of consciousness, thus sense perception is
really no immediate sensation, but, rather, attending to the representation presented
by sensation for scrutiny by the mind. Hume‟s concession to the perceived difference
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regards the force and vivacity that typifies either kind of perception.252 “The less
forcible and lively are commonly denominated Thoughts or Ideas.”253 The more
forceful and lively representations want for a name, but Hume proposes we call them
impressions. “By the term impression, then, I mean all our more lively perceptions,
when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, will.”254 According to his
groupings, Hume affords both “internal” as well as “external” perceptions, objects of
consciousness like emotion and pain, or sensations, respectively, to the status of
perception. But, moreover, ideas, presumably the objects of “internal” perceptions,
must also be included in the set of objects designated as perception, as humans can
attend to either lively internal/external states as well as insensible ideas. Hume agrees
with Locke‟s affirmation that: “To ask at what time a man first has any ideas is to ask
when he begins to perceive; having ideas and perception being the same thing.”255
The unification of these two seemingly different objects of consciousness,
however, is not limited to merely the difference of degree. In his opening discussion
of impressions and ideas, Hume remarks that, “there is another division of our
perceptions which it will be convenient to observe,” the division is into simple and
complex [perceptions].256 Explaining this distinction, Hume continues stating;
“Simple perceptions or impressions and ideas are such that admit of no distinction or
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separation. The complex are contrary to these, and may be distinguished into
parts.”257 Historically, we have already experienced this distinction with the
medieval doctrine of discreet sensibles and common sensibles. If one where to focus
on only the color of sugar, one encounters a simple impression—the white of refined,
the brown of unrefined sugar. But if one attends to the various qualities that make up
sugar, color, granularity, sweetness—sugar with its multivarious qualities attributed
to such—one receives a complex impression. Simple impressions are the
deliverances of a single sense datum through the medium of a particular sense faculty,
complex impressions are the combination/collation of multiple sense data through
multiple sense faculties. Ideas, will likewise follow this characterization. When one
is aware of one‟s perception of the color of sugar (especially if sugar is not
immediately present) one will attend to a simple idea, and so for the combination of
qualities that one attributes to the idea of sugar, a complex idea. Furthermore, Hume
claims that “all simple ideas and impressions resemble each other.”258 Complex ideas
and impressions, however, seem to vary considerably in resemblance. While it is
possible for impressions and ideas to resemble one another, often other faculties
intercede to prevent perfect correspondence. Faculties such as memory, imagination,
attentiveness and abstract conceptualization (discursive thinking) may prevent the
translation of complex impressions into representative ideas with the veracity found
at the level of simples. This observation leads Hume to consider the connection
between the two.
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Because every impression, simple or complex, has a correspondent idea, and
not every idea has a correspondent impression e.g. gold mountains, Hume concludes
that “impressions are the causes of our ideas, not our ideas of our impressions.”259 In
another formulation, Hume states: Ideas are “derived either from our outward or
inward sentiment.”260 And the source for these outward or inward sentiments is
experience.261 The terminological difference allows Hume to discuss not merely ideas
of “outer” objects, but, also, passions and moral sentiments one may experience. The
work Hume‟s distinctions, a difference of degree yet similarity in kind, perform is to
note the similarity and connection as well as the source for all impressions and ideas.
Regardless of the force or vivacity found in any impression or idea, experience is the
true source, foundation in Hume‟s words, for either species of representation. If one
gains impressions from sense experience and then form ideas based upon
impressions, Hume must consider the difference between impressions and ideas, and
elaborate just what he means by the term idea. Moreover, because “all our ideas or
more feeble perceptions are copies of our impressions or more lively ones,”262 Hume
must be able to explain the process by which ideas are generated, as well as the way
by which one can distinguish between faithful and unreliable copies of impressions.
These two questions intertwine, and, as it turns out, his answer to the first question
renders any answer to the second impotent.
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Hume‟s answer to the first question resembles the empiricist approach found
in Aristotle. The suggestion of that the deliverances of the senses impress upon the
mind some particular, employable through modified means, results from the
metaphorical sense of impression found in Hume. Mary Warnock observes that
“perhaps, in Hume‟s case, the word „impression‟ itself, with its metaphorical sense of
pressing one seal onto one piece of wax, made it easier to overlook all such possible
ambiguities.” 263 Following Aristotle and empiricist philosophy, Hume‟s answer
appears to be the imagination. The deliverances of the senses are taken up by the
imagination which impresses the form/shape of the deliverances of the senses in the
form of an image, thus founding a storehouse of impressions, memory, by which
these impressions are then susceptible to evaluation by human intellect as image-idea.
Warnock continues with the metaphor of impressions in wax, stating that, at this
initial stage of explanation, Hume “defines ideas as images. From the outset, then,
[Hume] regards imagination, the image-making faculty, as playing a crucial role in
our thinking.”264
One perceives, Hume suggests, the representations of these immediate
deliverances, impressions, and moreover, humans have the ability to recall
impressions of deliverances past by means of memory. Thus Hume replies to
questions regarding impressions and ideas, the representation of impressions and the
source of ideas by citing the imagination as the mediator between the deliverances of
the senses and the impressions subsequently formed, and also originator of the ideas
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which we recall through the use of memory; thereby affirming his original argument
that impressions cause ideas and ideas are mere copies. These ideas stored as
memories, however, are not the forceful and lively impressions delivered by the
senses, thus affirming Hume‟s claim of difference in degree. They are, rather, ideas
stored in the memory, less forceful and less lively owing to the debt of time and the
copied nature of ideas no longer immediately present for evaluation.
This response, however, presents an ambiguity between the impressions made
upon/by the imagination and the ideas generated by the mimetic function of the
imagination in the translation of impressions to ideas. If it is the case that the
impressions are transformed by the imagination into a form susceptible to evaluation
of the mind, are these impressions ideas or still merely impressions? Hume would
have the deliverances of the senses be impressions available for inspection of the
mind in all their immediate force and violence. Whereas this copying process,
necessary to support his argument for ideas, would suggest that all transformation,
copying, of impressions immediately alter the impression into an idea. It would seem
that all we have are ideas available for evaluation by the mind, and that the
representations afforded by impressions can never be accessed directly by thinking. 265
This answer, should it prove tenable, may in fact be mitigated somewhat by citing the
differences in immediacy and also difference between particular and abstract ideas.
Indeed, that is what Hume‟s distinction between impressions and ideas implies.
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Impressions are the immediate presentation of the deliverances of the senses, and
ideas are removed, although “caused”, from immediate experience. Impressions of
sensation are always particular and immediate; ideas of sensation are always the
presentation of the absent object. But impressions and ideas of sensible objects do not
exhaust Hume‟s inventory of the human mind. Beyond impressions and ideas of
sensation, Hume also delineates impressions and ideas of reflection from those of
sense experience. The latter describe the connection of the “outer” with the “inner”,
the former describe the operations of the inner life of the mind.
Regarding the connection between ideas and imagination in reflection, Hume
observes that that “nothing, at first view, may seem more unbounded than the thought
of man. To form monsters, and join incongruous shapes and appearances, costs the
imagination no more trouble than to conceive the most natural and familiar
objects.”266 The imagination, in this pejorative sense, may provide enumerable ideas
which may have their basis in experience, yet have no corresponding impression.
And yet, Hume continues, the imagination in its ordinary, non-fantastic, employment
“is really confined within very narrow limits, and that all this creative power of the
mind amounts to no more than the faculty of compounding, transposing, augmenting,
or diminishing the materials afforded us by the senses and experience.”267 The
imagination, according to Hume, even in the activity of idea generation, is merely
reproductive, employing the materials afforded by experience and sensation. At
times the imagination may combine simple ideas to produce monstrosities, but, more
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often, the imagination is employed in the generation of ideas that appear to serve
faithfully the process of translating impressions into ideas.
Ideas are copies of impressions, losing the force and vivacity of immediate
representation, and stored in memory for later use. But Hume is not satisfied with
merely observing the nature of ideas and their connection with impressions. To
determine how human understanding operates, he also elaborates the use of ideas and
the trends we find when observing how ideas are connected. To determine these
operations, Hume will rely, once again, on the imagination.
Hume begins Book 1, Part 1, Section 4of his Treatise with the declaration:
As all simple ideas may be separated by the imagination, and may be
united again in what form it pleases, nothing would be more
unaccountable than the operations of that faculty, were it not guided by
some universal principles, which render it in some measure, uniform
with itself in all times and places.268
Because of the imagination‟s ability to unify, separate, add, and delete simple ideas
from complex ideas, Hume finds it necessary to determine the rules by which the
imagination associates ideas. If the production of complex ideas were left to chance,
the imagination is an unruly faculty that produces monstrosities. But, Hume
contends, we seem to find regularity with the associations of ideas found in reflection.
Simply stated, there are three manners by which one idea is conveyed from one to
another; resemblance, contiguity in time of place, and cause and effect.269 Hume does
not deem it necessary to prove these three manners, believing them to be evident in
what amounts to a de facto explanation of human psychology. He cites common
268
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examples demonstrating that if one idea resembles another it will bring forward from
memory a similar idea, or that when thinking of a particular image from an event at a
specific time and place one will naturally summon other images from a proximal
period. Hume does not even deem controversial that humans reason according to
cause and effect. What he does, however, is to call into question the metaphysical
claims of cause and effect, thereby showing that even the associations of ideas are
governed by beliefs, feelings and custom, which themselves are founded on creative
attachments afforded by the imagination. To determine actual necessary connection
between any two ideas representing events is impossible. According to Hume, “every
effect is a distinct event from its cause”270 and as such it is impossible to determine a
priori, by necessity, the cause of any effect. “In vain, therefore should we pretend to
determine any single event, or infer any cause from any effect, without the assistance
of observation and experience.”271 But, it turns out, humans do think according to
cause and effect, even when considering the other ways ideas relate272 to one another;
that is, we often believe the resemblance of one idea to another to be the cause of its
recollection. The ways ideas relate together are in some way connected to the idea of
cause and effect. But, because we cannot determine the causes of effects, we are left
with no stable principle by which to determine how we associate ideas. Hume‟s
dissatisfaction with this state of affairs is apparent, and he proceeds to describe the
assignation of causal relations based upon belief and feeling.
270
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That we make causal connections, Hume takes as phenomenologically
evident. What happens in the process of causal ascription is fundamentally connected
with the projection of the belief that the regularity we find in experience is causal.
Belief “is produced by a number of past impressions and conjunctions.”273 Repetition
and the attendant feeling of regularity are the sources for belief, and to this operation,
Hume gives the name custom.274 Custom, it turns out, is the source for our ascription
for the associations of ideas, impressions and the so-called knowledge that is
subsequent on these operations. But just how beliefs and attendant feelings are
attributed to regularity falls upon the imagination. The imagination, broadly
construed, is the means by which we project causal connections onto either a series of
impressions or ideas, in the absence of any proof for a connection between antecedent
and consequent. We are led to believe in a connection of the two by resemblance and
contiguity and determine the connection to be causal. Connecting two events
causally, is the product of the imaginative connection based on these two basic
principles of idea relations.
At this point it is pertinent to separate Hume‟s narrow definition of
imagination from the imaginative process involved in the projection of causal
relations. Hume chiefly describes the imagination and it products as fancy, that
unreliable and dubious faculty that provides ideas with only the slightest force and
vivacity, which we characteristically stigmatize with epistemic doubt. Objects of
fancy, those monstrosities the blatantly recombinant imagination can conjure, have
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little bearing on our impressions, other than their derivative and creative nature
dependant upon those original data of experience. Hume will grant that one can
“experience” ideas of fancy as reflective ideas, but they do not carry the epistemic
weight of simple impressions, those supposedly connecting the “inner” mental realm
with the “external” world of objects in sensible experience. Imagination in the larger
sense I am indicating here is the way we draw connections between any ideas or
impressions. In one of his most classic examples, Hume addresses the epistemic
problem such dependency on the imagination elicits, the question of personal identity.
Hume expends some energy in describing the difficulties of attributing
identity to a single impression experienced successively. Simple sense impression
may have a simple idea corresponding, one which is then available to flights of fancy.
The connection of impression to idea is, for Hume, imagistic, and thus imaginative.
But, more importantly, the connection of one impression, translated to an idea, with
another impression, even of the same object, then translated into another idea, and the
determination that the object of these impressions is the same—that is, the judgment
in the realm of ideas, of identity—must also be imaginative. The association of ideas,
even as identical, is a process of resemblance, contiguity and causal connection, and
is immanently under the auspices of imaginative connections. All the functions of
associations are products of imaginative projection. Hume is unwilling to concede
the identity of an external object given discreet impressions, no matter how alike they
may seem in resemblance and contiguity. This being the case, he should be and also
is unwilling to determine identity even in the mental sphere alone. The tenuous

159

connections of ideas leads Hume to the radical skepticism that marks his philosophy
as the logical conclusion of the empirical tradition. Interesting to note here is that,
according to Hume, all the determinations humans make, all judgments we pass, are
the product of an uncritical feeling, from which arises a belief, and thus the custom or
habit we have of making inferences.275 All human knowledge it would seem, is the
product of imaginative connections being drawn between discreet sense impressions
and their subsequent translation, manipulation and association in the activities of
human mental life. Ideas themselves it would seem, while real, may have little
connection with the world, and we are left with little epistemic verity and the specter
of idealism. We have only what we project onto the world, and this is little
consolation for the Scottish empiricist.
Kant, on the other hand, will accept this conceptualization of human
projection onto the world. In fact, human projection of ideas provided by the
understanding will characterize his philosophy. Kant, however, will attempt to
distance himself from the charges of a vicious idealism, citing the difference between
empirical and transcendental idealism. Moreover, the thought conceived by Hume,
that causal connections are the product of human imagination and the projection of
uncritical belief onto the world of objects, will have resonance in Kant as well. Kant
acknowledges the difficulty in determining causal connections between empirical
objects, but he will affirm the power of human projection concerning beliefs about
purposiveness found in nature. This Kantian formulation of causal connections with
purposes found in nature takes the form of teleological ideas, projected from the
275
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creative purposiveness found in human conceptualization. What we find in Hume‟s
associationist psychology is a prelude to the dependence of human thinking on
imagination found in Kant philosophy. Hume proposes and fails to provide the rules
of the imagination, opting to explain such a mechanism according to the de facto
explanations of contiguity, constant conjunction and cause and effect found in
associationist psychology. Kant will push the question further, looking for a de jure
explanation for the powers, rules, and application of the categories. He inevitably
answers these questions in terms of the imagination, while noting and approving of
the reproductive capacity of the imagination found in Hume.
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Chapter 5: Imagination in Kant‟s Architectonic

Kantian Concerns

As I stated at the opening of this work, the chief topic for discussion is the
imagination in the works of Immanuel Kant, and it is to this topic I now wish to turn.
The programmatic at this point is to draw several of the themes encountered in the
aforementioned history of the imagination and to trace the ways in which they inform
Kant‟s philosophy and to understand how Kant transforms the philosophical tradition
that came before him. One tenet that has underwritten and perhaps justified the
history is that Kant‟s use of the imagination is well-informed and radical. I have
chosen to introduce the imagination as the liaison between the understanding and the
sensibility, of the worlds of mental representations and the world of objects as
delivered by the senses, respectively. I have pursued this course to demonstrate the
precedence found in the history of philosophy that informs Kant‟s dualism between
sensibility and understanding. Whether or not this is representative of Kant‟s
understanding is yet to be determined, but, for now, I wish to affirm the connection.
For Kant, the connection between the two stems of human knowledge, must
be determined. How are concepts and intuitions brought together to form
knowledge? This, in turn, will elicit a discussion of the objective reality and
objective validity of Kant‟s categories, among other issues, and will demand
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justification for judgments that claim epistemic verity. This in turn will elicit
questions concerning the status, function and rules of operation by which the
imagination exercises its task. This reported intent might imply a narrow confine to
the 1st Critique, but, I believe, such an approach is short-sighted. Kant‟s employment
of the imagination is not merely limited to epistemic claims concerning the
connection of human thinking/judging to objects. The imagination figures
prominently in all aspects of connecting sensibility with the understanding in
judgments, whether of metaphysical, epistemic, moral or aesthetic. When it comes to
determining the appropriateness of applying a priori categories to the deliverances of
the senses, judgment is the central issue, and in the 3rd Critique judgment is the focus
of concern. Therefore, concern with the 3rd Critique and its explicit treatment of the
imagination is also in order. Furthermore, a look to the 2nd Critique is in store to
determine the role of imagination, if any, in moral judgments. This integrationist
approach, which focuses on the “critical” Kant while attending to the “pre-critical”
and “post-critical” works is fraught with difficulties, some of which I would like to
list and briefly explain here, in order to orient the interpretive strategy as well as
demonstrate the often protracted fight in Kant scholarship.

a) The first, and perhaps most disconcerting, problem with this proposed study is the
possibility to present an inaccurate, superficial and incomplete account of Kant‟s
imagination, thus misrepresenting what such a faculty plays in his thought. Because I
am attempting to trace the employment of imagination in Kant‟s philosophy,
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attending to the use, modification, and perhaps even, development of such a theme in
Kant‟s corpus, the materials available are numerous and often seemingly
contradictory. The purpose of this study is not to overlook, dismiss, marginalize or
explain away what might appear as conflicts or contradictions. The purpose is to
attempt a unifying theme that can ground Kant‟s philosophical use of imagination and
to see its place in the overarching issues of his work. Addressing the seeming
inconsistencies and attempting to find a grounding by which Kant can maintain his
arguments is the task I set before myself. The task is admittedly a large one, but one
which I believe attainable, if one attends to the over-riding concern of elaborating the
role of imagination in judgments, that is, in the origins of the categories of the
understanding and their connection with the deliverances of the senses in the several
types of judgments Kant enumerates.
This approach finds sympathy, not only with the pre-critical Kant and his
metaphysical inquiries, but with the post-critical period and Kant‟s concerns with
unifying his system. The former, albeit the more rationalist approach of the LeibnizWolffian school, does concern itself with the origins of the contents of the “inner”
realm. In these works, Kant explores the basic principles that govern human thinking
e.g. the principles of non-contradiction, succession and simultaneity such as those
found in the New Elucidations. The post-critical period, cited as Kant‟s works in the
years following 1792, finds an attempted summary in the Opus Postumum and this
work attempts to bring together the insight of the Critiques and scientific exploration
of the empirical world; that is, practical application of the insights found in the
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critical period and the deliverances of the senses found in scientific inquiry. The
critical period, it would seem, is book-ended by the very concerns of the Critiques
themselves. The work accomplished here is to establish a core doctrine of the
imagination in the Critiques, that further research into the connectivity of Kant‟s
works may find traction.

b) A second concern with such a study is the terminological shifts we find throughout
Kant‟s lifetime. Kant‟s use of imagination found in the pre-critical period are in
alignment with the typical use found in the history of philosophy. In Dreams of a
Spirit Seeker, Kant employs the Latinate focus imaginarius to describe the process by
which impressions of external bodies produce spatial images available to judgments
by the understanding.276 And while this process is necessary to coordinate “inner”
representations with “outer” objects, the opportunity for figments of the fantastical
imagination arises. Kant claims it is quite necessary that one “cannot, as long as
[one] is awake, fail to distinguish my imaginings, as the figments of my own
imagination, from the impressions of the senses.”277 In Kant‟s own employment of
imagination in this work, he subscribes to the general tendency in the history of
philosophy to concede the necessity of the imagination, while cautioning his audience
to the pernicious nature of fantastical imagination.278 At this point Kant does glimpse
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the necessity of imagination, without providing much detail in the role it will play in
connecting sensibility with understanding. At this early stage in his development,
Kant continues the standard historical use of the imagination, one that concedes its
employment, but condemns the imagination in its misapplied use. Kant will never
truly deviate from this basic position, hence his connection with the history of the
imagination. What Kant will develop in his mature writings, however, is insight into
the means by which the imagination will perform its role as liaison, giving the
imagination its proper due, while cautioning against its overuse, into inquiries that
human reason “is not able to ignore,” but which “it also not able to answer.”279
In the critical period Kant will discuss several different imaginations; the
reproductive imagination, the productive imagination, the transcendental imagination,
and, it has been argued, even replaces the faculty of sensibility in the 3rd Critique with
the term “imagination” itself. In this effort to discuss the imagination, these various
uses must be brought into relief, providing distinctions as Kant presents them, but
also uniting them under a general use of imagination. The insights found in the
critical period are also marked by a shift in linguistic usage. Kant does employ the
Latinate “imaginatio”, but more commonly employs the German term
“Einbildungskraft.” The shift from Latin to German in his writing coincides with a
deeper insight into the formative power of imagination. The shift to his native
language and his subsequent philosophical insights may be attributed in part to his
newfound critical programmatic, but may also be a shift from the image centered
imaginatio to a power of creating, building and culture, Einbildungskraft. While
279
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keeping the image-making function of the historical reproductive imagination, Kant
gains new respect for the formative and creative powers of imagination. And even
though Kant finds new respect for the imagination in the critical period, he still
cautions against overuse of imagination in speculative metaphysics.
Imagination does not figure into Kant‟s post-critical thought too largely. One
explanation for this is that much of his published works are re-figurations of lectures
and previously written manuscripts. The attention of these works are often to
“scientific” inquiries, notably his Anthropology and Opus Postumum. What we find
in these works is rare mention of the imagination, often in a derogatory tone.
However, what insight we find into the imagination is its application in empirical
pursuits. After the critical work is accomplished in the three Critiques, Kant finds no
need to discuss the imagination, but attends to the application of the processes
discovered earlier. Following Manfred Kuehn, I would like to argue that Kant may
develop many of his ideas, but does not deviate too greatly from his overall quest to
establish metaphysics as a secure science and to explore the appropriate realms for
human inquiry, both scientific and moral.

c) A third and deep concern for any study is the interpretation of the major thinker
the author brings to his analysis. The question of concern is: Just what Kant are you
reading? This particular issue has become one aspect of the cottage industry that is
Kant scholarship. For authors with overriding epistemic concerns, the 1st Critique is
the primary focus and support for argumentation is drawn chiefly from this text. For
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those interested in moral or aesthetic issues, the texts primarily sought are the 2nd
Critique and Groundwork, and 3rd Critique, respectively. Typically, one finds these
divisions demarcated by an ocean or channel. Anglo-American interpretations, with
their main focus on epistemology, often attempt to separate “the analytic argument”
from Kant‟s transcendental idealism.280 More European interpretations that focus on
aesthetic and moral dimensions often separate themselves from Kant‟s 1st Critique
emphasizing a development or change in Kant‟s position.281 When comparing AngloAmerican interpretations with those more European, one often finds a sharp contrast
between strict analytic approaches that attempt to reconstruct Kant‟s arguments and
evaluate them accordingly and more historical approach that attempts to contextualize
the arguments found in Kant‟s work. Recently, however, we find overtures to bridge
the gap between these two Kants, notably in the works of Beatrice Longuenesse and
Hannah Ginsborg.
These two branches of Kant scholarship, while geographically significant,
find their radical division in the immediate reaction to Kant‟s critical works. The
European group finds itself charting the historical progression of Kant‟s ideas through
German Idealism and the Southwest school of interpretation. The Anglo-American
trend follows a more logical trajectory through the works of Frege and the neoKantianism that arose in the early 20th Century through the Marburg school of
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interpretation.282 Moreover, at the heart of the division between interpretive
strategies is a conflict concerning which version of the 1st Critique is Kant‟s more
considered view. Noting Kant completely revised several sections, provided an
entirely new preface, introduction, and transcendental deduction, along with additions
to his refutation of idealism and a, perhaps, radical and contradictory reformulation of
his analogies of experience, the B-edition contains what some consider to be
considerable differences from the A-edition. The most significant of these changes,
so the debate contends, is Kant‟s rewriting of the transcendental deduction. This
question appears to have become one of the most divisive, if not the most, among
Kant scholarship. The Anglo-American tradition argues that Kant‟s considered view
is the B-edition. After its initial publication, subsequent criticism in the literature,
notably the Garve-Feder review, and reaction, Kant reformulates the heart of his
philosophical enterprise, the transcendental deduction, in order to more clearly
distinguish himself from antecedent forms of idealism. In order to distance his
transcendental idealism from the metaphysical or naïve idealism of Berkeley, Kant
rewrites the transcendental deduction and adds a refutation of idealism. The
Southwest school of interpretation, broadly the more European interpretation,
countenances this argument, but cites the originality and insightfulness found in the
A-edition transcendental deduction. Such an interpretation argues that the original
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formulation is the truer expression of Kant‟s philosophical position, and that the
reformulation is merely an attempt to allay critics who misunderstood the original,
and thus is Kantian, but not Kant‟s considered view. The B-edition, they contend, is
a reaction to criticism, and perhaps an attempt at popularization, not the advancement
of his ground-breaking philosophical insight. The protracted debate is typically
resolved by favoring one edition over the other and explaining away the discrepancies
found between the two by subsuming one under the other.
Such interpretive strategies appear to be a plausible way to resolve the
differences between the different versions. But to overlook the insight of one edition
in favor of the other is to tacitly concede that Kant changes his position between 1781
and 1787. This is not the approach I favor in my interpretation of Kant. Certainly the
A-edition of the transcendental deduction has advantages over the B-edition. The
attention to detail, the continuity of terminology and the detailed connection and
progression from the Transcendental Aesthetic is more pronounced. And yet, the Bedition appears to enlarge the scope, while omitting some of the details found in Aedition. By locating the insights and elaborating the continuity and coherence
between the two editions, one can, I believe, not only determine the role of
imagination in cognition, but also provide insight into the different ways one can
putatively employ such a faculty. In addition to the synthetic function of imagination
in apprehension, reproduction and recognition of the deliverances of the senses, as
found in the A-edition, Kant will also distinguish between intellectual and figurative
syntheses in the B-edition. Both versions of the transcendental deduction must be
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taken into account in order to elaborate the comprehensive scope of imagination in
Kant‟s philosophy. Thus, while I favor the A-edition for its insight and originality, I
also concede the advancements made in the B-edition and its attempt to bring the
radical insight from the earlier version into discussion with the philosophical
conceptualizations of Kant‟s time.
By pursuing this approach I consider myself aligned more with the Southwest
school of Kantian interpretation, highlighted and developed in philosophers such as
Martin Heidegger, George Sherover, Martin Weatherston and Dieter Henrich, but
also admit the benefit of exploring bracing examinations of Kant‟s arguments as
found in the Anglo-American tradition. Such is the spirit I find in Henry Allison‟s
work Kant’s Transcendental Idealism and Longuenesse‟s Kant and the Capacity to
Judge, a commitment to an explanation and defense of Kant‟s work, but a
commitment to examining Kant‟s arguments and a willingness to point out when they
do not achieve what he believed them have accomplished.283 Perhaps, the core of the
argument for the radical use of the imagination in Kant‟s philosophy is just such a
critique. Heidegger has pointed out (and the claim has been much discussed) that
Kant may have glimpsed the truly remarkable place the imagination occupies in
Kant‟s transcendental arguments, but that he shrank back from the abyss—and I wish
to assume just such a stance.284 But rather than accepting Heidegger‟s often
confusing analysis of imagination, I would like to offer my own: the imagination does
occupy a central place in Kant‟s critical philosophy, in fact, it can even be employed
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to provide a transcendental deduction of the pure concepts, categories, of the
understanding. Kant‟s own transcendental deduction does not provide such an
explanation for the pure concepts and, this has been argued, presents a failure of the
most critical portion of Kant‟s work. I concede that what the transcendental
deduction provides is not exactly what the name implies, but the work provided in
this section is also necessary in order to complete Kant‟s task in providing such a
more straightforward deduction of pure concepts themselves. Kant‟s deduction is not
a failure, as most Anglo-American scholarship suggests, but also does not go far
enough, as Heidegger claims.
In light of these difficulties in scope and interpretation, I propose to recognize
them here at the outset and to address such concerns as they arise. Within the
analysis of the Critique of Pure Reason alone, this last interpretive concern looms
large. In attempting to draw connections between Kant‟s works, terminological and
continuity issues arise. These concerns cannot be ameliorated at one single
insistence, but only by being faithful and charitable to Kant‟s own writings, while
attempting to critique, develop and draw the connections implicit in his works.
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Kant’s Concern: Objective Validity

As we have seen from the history, there is an overriding concern with the
nature of our objects of thought and their purported connection with the objects these
appearances claim to represent. Beginning with Plato, we find the epistemic issue,
whether representations faithfully present the objects of experience, central to
concerns regarding judgments of our experience. The question appears to be: can we
claim that the concepts employed in judgment “map on” to objects we experience
through sensation? This issue arises from concerns with the source of our concepts.
Kant himself attempts to combat rationalist speculation in the guise of idealism by
bringing this very question to light. He asks: “how subjective conditions of thought”
(read concepts, for Kant pure concepts) “can have objective validity, that is, can
furnish conditions of the possibility of all knowledge of objects.”285 In other words,
Kant wonders how it is possible that concepts, those representations found in
distinctly human-rational cognition, can provide a legitimate ground for all
judgments, especially judgments concerning objects of experience.
What is central to this question is at the very heart of traditional criticisms of
idealism and the historical concern with the legitimacy of the concepts we employ to
describe our world. This concern highlights the difficulty of claiming veracity in our
conceptualization if there are indeed subjective elements in the concepts themselves.
For Plato, the process by which we form images, representations, is derivative from
objects more real than the images themselves, thus representations lack the standing
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A89-90, emphasis in the original.

173

required to be called true judgments of objects. For the broadly empirical outlook, all
our concepts are derivative from the objects of experience, and empiricism blindly
puts faith in veritative representation, concepts, that present objects. The former
situation leaves human judgments about the world in an inferior position and the
inability to form true judgments about anything whatsoever. The latter situation
leaves no tribunal by which we can justify that the concepts are indeed faithful to the
objects of experience. Kant will point out that neither position accurately accounts
for the subjective conditions to which all human cognition must conform. Hence they
both fall short of providing a solution to the dilemma concerning objective validity.
If the rationalist approach concedes the distinctly human orientation to judgments,
Kant will object, all judgments face the prospect of being ideal constructs with no
connection to objects of experience. If the empirical approach contends that all
concepts are derived from experience, there is no guarantee that concepts are faithful
to the objects. By assuming a middle ground between the two positions, Kant
concedes the subjective conditions that determine conceptualization while affirming a
connection with objects of experience. Kant can and will claim transcendental
ideality while simultaneously affirming empirical reality. However, by pursuing
such a middle path, Kant produces for himself the added difficulty required by such a
strategy. Kant must argue for the necessity and a priori nature of the subjective
conditions of human cognition as well as provide an explanation for how the concepts
connect with objects of experience. Objective validity, for Kant, will be the source of
his greatest labor.
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To put the issue in perspective for Kant‟s philosophy, a few reminders about
certain elements of his Copernican position need to be elaborated. For Kant,
cognition is comprised of two elements, a passive and active component—the
deliverances of the senses, through the sensibility, by means of intuitions, and the
organization of the deliverances by an a priori conceptual framework found in the
understanding, the categories.286 According to Kant‟s picture, all knowledge, that is,
all judgments,287 are comprised of these two elements, subjective conditions and
objective conditions. But this distinction may lead to confusion. Subjective
conditions for Kant are not personal, perspectival concepts dependent upon the
subject‟s emotional or historical situation. They are, rather, a priori conditions, both
as forms of intuitions and as pure categories, necessary for the possibility of
knowledge or experience at all. In Kant‟s words, “they relate of necessity and a priori
to objects of experience, for the reason that only by means of them can any objects
whatsoever of experience be thought.”288 With this formulation, Kant can address the
concerns of an illusory speculative idealism; the structural framework, the pure
concepts, categories, are necessary for an object to appear (to be represented in
thinking) at all and any further concerns between the object as it appears in
experience and what the object truly is is moot. Because of the dual components that
comprise human experience, there can be no connection to the so-called truly real
object—that is, understood as a transcendental reality. What humans have is a
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phenomenal representation, not the object or thing in itself.289 By answering the
Platonic/speculative question in this way—that is, by arguing that all experience is
distinctly human-rational experience and there is no access to a transcendent reality to
which humans may aspire—Kant can settle the historical question raised by Plato,
Augustine and Aquinas concerning reality and faithful judgments of such. Reality,
for Kant, is the experience that humans have, and the answerability of epistemic
faithfulness to transcendent being is thereby nullified. The fictive nature of human
representation as presented by these historical authors is answered by delimiting what
can be called knowledge concerning our experience. In so doing, the epistemic
question about illusion and phantasy employed by conceptualization in contrast to the
ultimate nature of reality is no longer as grave an issue.
By answering this first question in such a way, Kant exposes himself to the
second, the empirical, concern. If experience is the source of human knowledge,
what guarantees do we have that the concepts employed in cognition are indeed a
priori concepts and not merely derived from experience? Kant answers this question
by asserting and subsequently arguing for the a priori nature of the categories based
upon “the conditions which the understanding requires for the synthetic unity of
thought.”290 This claim leads Kant to formulate the question in terms of a quaestio
jure, a legal question, demanding a deduction to explain by what right we can claim
the categories are a priori and how we can justify the claim that they are the necessary
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elements afforded by the understanding in all judgments.291 In other words, Kant
wishes to combat the empiricist claim that all concepts are derived from experience
by demonstrating the a priori, non-empirical, nature of the categories and proving
them necessary for all experience. Such a strategy allows Kant to concede certain
concepts we have are indeed products of experience i.e. empirical concepts, but also
to affirm the necessary building blocks out of which such empirical concepts arise.
By framing the question in this way, Kant can argue effectively against the
empiricists‟ claim that all concepts are derived from experience, as well as illustrate
the means (and constraints) by which we encounter, that is, judge, all experience.
Furthermore, Kant believes that this course of argumentation will demonstrate the
necessity of the categories and their applicability to experience, thus providing the
objective necessity, in regards to the universality of the categories for rational beings,
as well as the justification for their application to objects of experience. In other
words, this line of argumentation will provide the objective validity of the pure
concepts of the understanding, the necessity and appropriateness of the application,
objective reality, in the synthesis that is human cognition. The argument that
provides such a grounding for the necessity of the subjective conditions, the pure
concepts, and their connection with the deliverances of the senses is found in the
transcendental deduction(s).
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Chapter 6: Imagination in the Transcendental Deduction

The A-edition

Kant‟s transcendental deduction in the A-edition begins with a reminder to the
reader that all our representations “whether they are due to the influence of outer
things, or are produced by inner causes,292 whether they arise a priori, or being
appearances have an empirical origin, they must all, as modifications of the mind,
belong to inner sense.”293 Thus time, as the formal condition of inner sense, is “quite
fundamental” to all knowledge. To elaborate, Kant proceeds to provide an analysis of
the three ecstasies of time—present, past, and future—and their role in knowledge
acquisition.294 Moreover, in describing the temporal sequence necessary to acquire
any representation (pure or empirical), Kant illustrates the way in which the
deliverances of the senses are synthesized, both in themselves and with the concepts
of the understanding in order to arrive at judgment.
The most immediate ec-stase of time, the present, is found in the
instantaneous apprehension of an object as an impression “insofar as it is contained
in a single moment.”295 As it is a single moment, this impression is given as an
292
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immediate unity, an appearance. Because an appearance, according to Kant, is the
product of the two stems of knowledge, to call such an impression an appearance
might elicit some confusion. 296 What Kant ascribes to apprehension might better be
described as a first glance, or, alternatively, as the immediate presentation of a field.
Such a field most likely is comprised of distinguishable components e.g. looking out
over a classroom contains a number of students, desks, walls, floor ceiling, objects
delineable as foreground and background etc. Yet the immediate impression of any
such glance is originally presented as a unity, a whole; it is only subsequent analysis
of the scene which may provide the opportunity to distinguish discrete parts. But
such an analysis is only possible on the grounds that the scene was first given as a
unified field, which may be then be divided. This original unity Kant names the
“synthesis of apprehension, because it is directed immediately upon intuition, which
does indeed offer a manifold, but a manifold which can never be represented as a
manifold, and as contained in a single representation save through such a
synthesis.”297
Without the unity of apprehension, we can provide no representation of the
object of experience and could not even begin to analyze the whole in terms of its
constituent parts. Such analysis would be the completion of the process by which we
first receive a synthesis of apprehension and then subsequently articulate what the
296

Appearance is a term Kant employs with several seeming ambiguities. Appearance most often is
employed as a term to describe the object that is present in apprehension—quite literally, that which
appears in apprehension. In another use, Kant employs appearance to suggest a mere seeming.
297
Ibid. Kant seems to imply at A97 that the immediate givenness of apprehension is a synopsis, and
that the connection with the concept unity is the actual synthesis of apprehension. In the B-edition it
is argued for as a synopsis or sometimes a figurative synthesis. The former captures the instantaneous
nature of apprehension. The latter remains a highly contentious description of the process of
apprehension, but one Kant employs on various occasions.

179

deliverances of the senses provide. Analysis of this sort is, however, a quite
advanced stage of representation and judgment. Prior to analysis of this sort, one
must be presented with a unified field, and subsequently apply concepts to this field
and articulate, that is, represent, what is received. Kant will maintain that, in order to
have an appearance, we must unite the field of vision with our conceptual architecture
so as to judge it as an experience—that is to truly have it present as an appearance
about which we make claims. The product, an appearance, however, presupposes
receptivity of a unified field, and this is the formative process Kant is attempting to
elaborate.298 These immediate appearances, or perceptions, are the beginning element
in the process of knowledge acquisition. Once the passive, yet surprisingly synthetic,
element of apprehension obtains, categories are applied and we are able to represent
what is apprehended and to articulate it as an object of immediate apprehension.
But because the whole is comprised of parts and sensibility cannot be fixed
upon a unified field for any calculable duration; that is, because an appearance may
contain several components, because our sense perceptions are constantly shifting,
moving and exploring299 and because we possess several different means by which
we receive deliverances, the five senses, we cannot attend to the immediacy of
apprehension for longer than the instant. With the collation of several manifolds of
singular impressions, another manifold arises, a successive, more explicitly temporal,
manifold. Each immediate and successive appearance must be synthesized together,
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Kant argues. But, in order to coordinate successive appearances, “experience as such
necessarily presupposes the reproducibility of appearances” so that previous
appearances may be synthesized in the present for comparative and coordinative
purposes.300 This capacity Kant entitles the synthesis of reproduction in imagination,
and claims that “the synthesis of apprehension is thus inseparably bound up with the
synthesis of reproduction.”301 What Kant is attempting to describe here is the
possibility of connecting each successive immediate apprehension together to form a
broader notion of experience and knowledge. If left with immediate sensation and the
unified field found in the single representation, no knowledge seems likely to obtain.
From each successive moment our attention will shift and without the ability to
reproduce, recall, the previous apprehensions, there could be no compilation and
comparison, no knowledge other than that of each immediate unity and such
knowledge would be evanescent and fleeting upon a following apprehension—a
problem recognized by Hume. Kant demonstrates the necessity of reproduction in the
example of drawing a line:
When I seek to draw a line in thought… obviously the various
manifold representations that are involved must be apprehended by me
in thought one after another. But if I were always to drop out of
thought the preceding representations (the first parts of the line…), and
did not reproduce them while advancing to those that follow, a
complete representation would never be obtained…not even the purest
and most elementary representations of space and time could arise.302
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This reproductive capacity of the imagination is the ability to represent an appearance
of apprehension when the object is no longer present, one from which the moment of
apprehension has passed. The synthesis of reproduction in imagination is thus an
orientation to and synthesis of both past and present. That we must reproduce and
synthesize past apprehensions in the present or with a present apprehension is the a
priori principle that governs this fundamental aspect of experience. Without
performing this act of synthesis in such a way, no experience and no knowledge is
possible. Important to note here is the use Kant makes of the imagination. In this
formulation, Kant does not deviate from the use we find of the imagination in the
historical record. The reproduction of intuitions no longer present, we might say
through memory, finds its precedent in the figures like Aristotle, Aquinas and Hume.
This function of imagination is not yet the radical formulation, but stays within the
parameters of the well-defined history, a role that permits the recollection of past
intuitions for use in the present.
And yet, with these two ec-stasies and faculties Kant‟s account of experience
is not complete. One further aspect, the synthesis of recognition in a concept, must be
delineated. Without recognition of the synthesis of apprehension in intuition and
synthesis of reproduction in imagination, that is, without an explicit formulation and
articulation from the understanding, these acts would pass unknown. In Kant‟s
words:
If we were not conscious that what we think is the same as what we
thought a moment before, all reproduction in the series of
representations would be useless. For it would in its present state be a
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new representation which would not in any way belong to the act
whereby it was to be gradually generalized. The manifold of the
representation would never, therefore, form a whole, since it would
lack that unity which only consciousness can impart to it.303
Without the consciousness of this unity of synthesis, no concept is available by which
we can represent experience, and experience would not obtain. And yet,
consciousness itself is not the goal, but is merely the transcendental requirement, of
this third synthesis. This third synthesis is the combining and articulation of the
former two syntheses—a syntheses of syntheses, if you will—one which is brought
under the heading of a single concept. Synthesizing the apprehensions and
reproductions under a single concept, that is, bringing the various elements at work in
apprehension together in the awareness that they belong together, is precisely the
recognition Kant is attempting to demonstrate as the third elemental requirement in
cognition.304 In a rare moment, Kant offers a promising example to explain what he
means by recognition of a concept. He suggests that when perceiving a house, unless
one stands at a perfect distance that enables you to see the entirety of the house in
detail, one could, and most likely does “begin with the apprehension of the roof and
end with the basement.”305 The limited scope of our perceptions cannot yield the
single entity „house‟ without a synthesis that brings the discrete perceptions together.
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But, even should we have a synthesis that brings them together, we still stand in need
of a concept that can represent this collocation. By synthesizing the reproduced past
apprehensions together with present apprehension under the aegis of a single,
articulable concept, Kant believes we now have the ability to represent objects of
experience.306 However, in order to articulate a single concept by which we name the
phenomenon appearing, we must employ certain conceptual building blocks that
establish the concept we are naming. Such building blocks are the pure concepts of
the understanding. Kant‟s argument about recognition in a concept remains the final
stage in the temporal development of empirical concepts and leads him to claim that
without this final synthesis and its product, concepts (typically empirical), the process
would be incomplete, for consciousness would not be able to represent, judge, what
intuition is supplying. Moreover, once the concept has been articulated in
consciousness, it is then available for future use. When one receives similar
intuitions, one must run through the synthetic processes again, but, more importantly,
one can articulate the deliverances of the senses again as „house‟ and explore further
comparisons between the present and former occurrences. This comparison, essential
for empirical, scientific knowledge, is afforded by the ability to cognize and recognize different particular experiences under general concepts. This recognition in
concepts is one futural orientation that the synthesis of recognition permits. Kant,
however, will pursue the futural orientation of this final act of synthesis through
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another, a transcendental, argument concerning the consciousness in which these
processes obtain.
Kant presents the articulation of an object by means of concepts in
consciousness as the final requirement of the syntheses that are the processes that
combine intuitions of sensibility and categories of the understanding. What Kant fails
to provide his audience here is the means by which the categories are actually joined
to the intuitions. For this Kant will add another section entitled the Schematism. For
Kant‟s purposes at this point, he does not wish to describe how pure concepts are
combined with intuitions, but, rather, to describe the fundamental processes necessary
in order for judgments to obtain. With the delineation of the three types of syntheses,
and the three ecstasies, Kant believes himself to have exhaustively described the
possible modes of experiencing an object through immediate intuition, the collating
of intuitions through memory, and the articulation of the experience as a concept, and
these processes are universal and necessary for any knowledge whatsoever (either
pure or empirical). But Kant is not satisfied with merely describing these processes.
Such a strategy would only present a de facto explanation based on psychological
principles, but would not provide an answer to the quaestio jure with which he begins
the deduction. His critical programmatic demands that he ask: what must necessarily
be in place for these processes to occur? For Kant, a transcendental deduction must
look further, into the conditions for the possibility of representation at all, rather than
merely describe the temporal conditions necessary to join concepts with intuitions.
According to Kant, only consciousness can impart the unity needed to bring together
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past and present as a representation under a single concept.307 And so Kant must turn
his attention to consciousness as the ground that provides the possibility of these
syntheses in the first place.
Kant admits that these syntheses often occur rather quickly and faintly, so
much so that we do not realize the processes at work. For Kant, the consciousness
necessary for these activities is not an explicit or transparent theatre of the mind. It is,
rather, a unified consciousness through which these several elements and processes
are unified. Boldly, Kant claims that “without it [consciousness], concepts, and
therewith knowledge of objects, are altogether impossible.” Moreover all concepts,
“even the purest objective unity, namely, that of the a priori concepts (space and
time), [are] possible through relation of the intuitions to such a unity of
consciousness.”308 This is to say, all judgments require this transcendental necessity.
In order to justify this claim, Kant seeks “a transcendental ground of the unity of
consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions, and consequently
also of the concepts of objects in general, and so of all objects of experience, a ground
without which it would be impossible to think any object for our intuitions.”309 The a
priori ground that permits such syntheses is “no other than transcendental
apperception” or, as Kant sometimes formulates it, the transcendental unity of
apperception.310 Because any empirical awareness of our inner states must run
through the syntheses described above, empirical consciousness cannot satisfy the
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requirement for a single, universal ground. It is only an a priori, that is,
transcendental, apperception, that will do. That this consciousness must be a single
entity is obvious, for if there were several consciousnesses, or conscious states, a
synthesis must be effected in order for the processes above to obtain. “The numerical
unity of this apperception is thus the a priori ground of all concepts.”311 Because of
the quaestio juris mode of interrogation for objective validity, posited at the
beginning of the transcendental deduction, a question concerning the legitimacy and
origins of these categories, Kant can claim to have satisfied at least part of the
inquiry. It is because consciousness is a unity, through which all the ec-stasies of
time are brought to bear that Kant can claim by what right we conjoin intuitions and
concepts—the right belongs to the very being that employs the three-fold synthesis.
This is to say, having achieved this fundamental ground, Kant believes that the
programmatic set out at the beginning of the deduction, the search for objective
validity, is complete.

The necessity of the transcendental unity of apperception is a

priori and can establish the ground from which all syntheses are possible. Important
to note here is that Kant has not established the a priority of the categories, and so his
deduction seems incomplete. What he has established is the a priori nature of human
cognition, and he will employ this precedent to provide further rules by which the
categories are employed i.e. the schemata.
Furthermore, apart from providing a transcendental argument for a unified
consciousness, which is enough to argue against Hume‟s skepticism regarding
personal identity, the theme of the transcendental unity of apperception, and its
311
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necessity in order to perform the syntheses of apprehension, reproduction and
recognition, permits Kant to discuss the ability to cognize, according to rules, in order
to produce knowledge claims, judgments. “The transcendental unity of apperception
forms out of all possible appearances, which can stand alongside one another in one
experience, a connection of all these representations according to laws.”312 Because
the “original and necessary consciousness of the identity of the self” is a necessary
and antecedent condition for the determination of any object, it provides a singular
requirement to establish the precedent of rule governed cognition. In order for
objects to appear, there must necessarily be a unity of consciousness.313 Furthermore,
in order for objects to appear, there must be “an equally necessary unity of the
synthesis of all appearances according to concepts, that is according to rule, which
not only make them necessarily reproducible but also in so doing determine an object
for their intuition, that is the concept of something wherein they are necessarily
interconnected.”314 What Kant achieves is a formalized sense of self and the broadest
prescriptions by which manifolds are connected together to form an appearance, that
is by apprehension, reproduction and recognition in a single consciousness. That
these appearances must be connected in this way in order for knowledge to obtain are
the rules to which Kant refers at this time. Moreover, if the appearances are
connected by these rules time and again, the potential for duplication of experience,
that is, the possibility for replication and comparison of concepts is possible. But
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even if duplication, replication and comparison are not available just yet for empirical
concepts, we are, according to Kant, “in a position to determine more adequately our
concept of an object in general.”315
The phrase “object in general” cannot be taken too lightly at this point in
Kant‟s argument. Kant is trying to establish the validity of his pure concepts—by his
claim, he is trying to “furnish conditions of the possibility of all knowledge of
objects”—and he has done so by describing the necessary processes by which any
object must be thought. The lack of particularity in these processes guarantees Kant
that he has only described the processes for objects in general and thus for any
possible judgment. Because Kant has determined the question of the deduction in
terms of the conditions by which pure concepts can “serve solely as a priori
conditions of a possible experience,” he needs to keep the discussion in his deduction
at the level of general objects and not the particularities of applying pure concepts to
any particular intuition, but, rather, to any possible intuition. Kant continues to argue
that because of the necessity of the processes described, they are rules that govern
thought and this rule can be formulated as a principle, “the transcendental principle of
the unity of all that is manifold in our representations, and consequently also in
intuition.”316
But, for Kant, arguing for this transcendental ground and subsequent principle
is not the final task of his deduction. In order to complete his exegesis of the unity of
apperception, he explores how it is that such a consciousness is actually unified. That
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it is a requirement has been established, but Kant wishes to elaborate the means by
which such a transcendental requirement is unified. It is at this point that Kant‟s
radical use of the imagination, and the futural orientation of the synthesis of
recognition in concepts comes to the fore. A faculty and principle to govern the unity
of apperception is the final step Kant explicates in order to complete his deduction
and demonstrate how all the syntheses described may transpire and are
interconnected. As the unity of apperception is required for the various syntheses
enumerated above to obtain, Kant finds a transcendental principle and faculty that
produces the very grounds from which all other syntheses arise. In Kant‟s words:
“this synthetic unity [apperception] presupposes or includes a synthesis, and if the
former is to be a priori necessary, the synthesis [the fundamental synthesis] must also
be a priori.”317 Because an a priori synthesis—that is, a transcendental synthesis—is
necessary in order to have a unified subject that performs the specialized, temporal
syntheses of representation, the principle that governs the synthesis of apperception
into a singular unity must also be a priori. To this “blind but indispensable function
of the soul,” Kant gives the name the transcendental synthesis of imagination.318
For Kant, this imagination cannot be the reproductive faculty described earlier
during his exposition of successive appearances, for the reproductive imagination
rests upon empirical conditions, the presentation of intuition or manifolds of
intuitions. This fundamental imagination is the pure, productive imagination that
enables a synthesis that is necessary for cognition. This productive capacity of the
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imagination explains the possibility of the unity of apperception. The reproductive
imagination which is dependent upon empirical conditions, although necessary,
accords itself to the connection of intuitions along associationist lines delineated by
Hume‟s psychology. The productive imagination, on the other hand, does not
concern itself with the connection of given intuitions, but, rather, with providing an
explanation for a unified self that is necessary for any experience whatsoever, not the
particular experiences found in the reproduction and association of empirical
representations. The productive imagination‟s function is merely to explain the
means by which apperception can be unified. “Thus the principle of the necessary
unity of pure (productive) synthesis of imagination, prior to apperception, is the
ground of the possibility of all knowledge, especially of experience.”319
This formulation of imagination explains the earlier, rather cryptic, phrase
Kant writes during his discussion and enumeration of the table of categories. At this
point in the Critique he writes: “Synthesis in general, as we shall hereafter see, is the
mere result of the power of imagination, a blind but indispensable function of the
soul, without which we should have no knowledge whatsoever, but of which we are
scarcely ever conscious.”320 During the discussion of synthesis in the table of
categories, Kant is attempting to express how the synthesis between intuitions of
sensibility and the concepts of the understanding obtain. After the deduction, we can
see that Kant is not merely suggesting the historical imagination as the image-making
faculty that translates intuitions into representations via image-making, thereby

319
320

A118.
A78.

191

connecting objects of sensibility with the ideas we find in thought. Rather, Kant
advances the imagination beyond the established historical record by noting the
function that the imagination plays in reproduction of intuitions or manifolds of
intuitions in order to collate experiences, by arguing further for the conditions that are
necessary for such a reproductive imagination to perform such a function. The
productive imagination is responsible for the very grounds that permit such a
reproductive capacity. In order for reproduced representations to inhere in a single
being, an explanation for a single consciousness within which we find these
representations is necessary. In order to have a unity of apperception that guarantees
the numerical identity of thinker/representor, the imagination must synthesize
possible apperception, necessarily and transcendentally. Moreover, for all possible
experiences of objects (perceptions) there must be this unity of consciousness. In
order to conceive of possible future perceptions, we must posit ourselves as the
perceiver in the future.321 And to do so, one must have a sense of the unity of the self
required to imagine future states. The productive imagination provides the
explanation for this sense of self as well as the projection of ourselves into the future
to enable further cognition and any system of knowledge. Although this function of
the productive imagination goes unnoticed, it must be the case that in order to have
any cognition, past, present or future, there must be a sense of the self provided by the
productive imagination as well as a projection into the future of the self that will be
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the future experiencer of objects. “Since this unity of apperception underlies the
possibility of all knowledge, the transcendental unity of the synthesis of imagination
is the pure form of all possible knowledge, and by means of it all objects of possible
experience must be represented a priori.”322 The a priori principle found in such a
synthesis will inform and guide all other modes of synthesis. Hence the synthesis that
we find in the productive imagination enables all other forms of syntheses found in
Kant‟s A-deduction. In short, synthesis in general and in its various instantiations is
the activity and product of the imagination but seen in different uses. This places
imagination at the level of apprehension, reproduction and recognition. The
productive imagination, which produces a self through which the world is cognized,
as well as a future self through which the world may be cognized, is the sine qua non
for all human experience—the function may be blind, but is certainly indispensable
for all judgment.
To recapitulate and to demonstrate the connection “in which understanding,
by means of the categories, stands to appearances,” and the fundamentality of the
imagination, Kant provides a summary and bottom-up model to demonstrate that
either approach finds the same conclusion. In the so-called objective deduction, Kant
writes:
What is first given to us is appearance. When combined with
consciousness, it is called perception. Now since every appearance
contains a manifold, and since different perceptions therefore occur in
the mind separately and singly, a combination of them, such as they
cannot have in sense itself is demanded. There must therefore exist in
us an active faculty for the synthesis of this manifold. To this faculty I
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give the title, imagination. Its action, when immediately directed upon
perceptions, I entitle apprehension. Since imagination has to bring the
manifold of intuition into the form of an image, it must previously
have taken the impressions up into its activity, that is, have
apprehended them.323
In this formulation, Kant is explicitly identifying the imagination as the faculty that is
responsible for synthesis in apprehension. But, importantly, it is activity following
the precedence of the productive imagination. Presupposed by this passage is the
continuity and unity of consciousness that must be a priori, in order for a being to
have perception. This original subjective synthesis is then transferred to
apprehension in order to execute another original synthesis, but this time on behalf of
perception(s). This transferred power of imagination is to have profound and lasting
ramifications for our understanding of receptivity and perception.324
Because appearances come to us through the various senses and because any
given field is comprised of distinct parts, an original synthesis on behalf of
appearance that occurs in immediate apprehension is necessary. The imagination thus
produces a single image in an original objective synthesis, one that allows for a single
representation of the manifold of perception as an appearance. This original
production of an object oriented and objective synthesis employs the same faculty as
that which provides the unity of consciousness. Roughly, in order for a perceiving
consciousness to obtain, there are two fundamental components, both brought about
by the transcendental power of the imagination. The unity of consciousness is
necessary on behalf of the perceiving subject; the unity of perception is required on
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behalf of the object intuited. The productive imagination synthesizes the manifold of
consciousness, even to the degree of synthesizing outstanding conscious states in the
projection of self into the future, to present a single being in which experience of an
object takes place. For the object, the productive imagination affects a synthesis that
enables apprehension to receive a given field as an image, that is, as a unified
representation. It might be tempting to say that this image-making capacity is a
reproduction of deliverances of the senses, but the issue Kant raises is that this
presentation of a field in apprehension is a necessary synthesis that allows for objects
to appear in apprehension, it is an original, creative synthesis that allows for objects
to appear at all. It is the original unification of a field found in immediate
apprehension prior to conceptual application. Moreover, there is no transcendent
object that this imagination is copying, rather, the imagination is creating the very
object about which we can make judgments. Without such a synthesis one of the two
necessary elements of cognition, receptivity, has no object.
Continuing, from this original apprehension, Kant notes that there must be a
“subjective ground which leads the mind to reinstate a preceding perception alongside
the subsequent perception to which it has passed, and so to form whole series of
perceptions.”325 These reproductions, or memories,326 are the product of the
reproductive imagination. This empirical imagination is precisely the association of
representations that follows the established patterns that Hume so diligently describes
in his associations of ideas through the use of the imagination in the Treatise.
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The final step in recapitulating the conditions for the possibility of experience
is the formation of the multiplicity of apprehensions and memories in a unified
consciousness. “For even though we should have the power of associating
perceptions, it would remain entirely undetermined and accidental whether they
would themselves be associable; and should they not be associable, there might exist
a multitude of perceptions, and indeed an entire sensibility, in which much empirical
consciousness would arise in my mind, but in a state of separation, and without
belonging to a consciousness of myself.”327 Without some objective ground our
associations would be separate and accidental. This ground is the unity of
apperception, and all appearances “must so enter the mind or be apprehended, that
they conform to the unity of apperception.”328
According to Kant‟s analysis, “the two extremes, namely sensibility and
understanding, must stand in necessary connection with each other through the
mediation of this transcendental function of imagination, because otherwise the
former, though yielding appearances, would supply no objects of empirical
knowledge, and consequently no experience.”329 This is to say, that although we may
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A124. Kant‟s formulation for the imagination here, as the mediator between the two faculties of
sensibility and understanding, has elicited a debate concerning the overall status of the imagination, an
issue I will take up later. Briefly, there are roughly two camps within Kant scholarship, those that
argue for the imagination as a discrete faculty independent of the understanding and with its own
capacity, and those that argue the imagination as a sub-process of the understanding. Sarah Gibbons,
Rudolph Makkreel, Martin Heidegger, and John Llewelyn all seem to agree that the imagination is a
separate and discrete faculty. The typical strategy to argue this point is to draw a distinction between a
narrow and broad understanding of “understanding” an issue I shall take up later. It is often noted that
in his own copy of the 1st Critique, Kant emended the quoted line from A77/B103. Kant crossed out
the term soul and replaced it with understanding. Opponents of the separatist thesis, as I call it, people
like Henry Allison, P.F. Strawson and Paul Guyer, cite this as incontrovertible proof that the
imagination is merely a function of the understanding. The “separatists”, however, suggest that Kant,
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have qualitative experience, some appearance, there would be no cognizing agent to
which we could attribute this experience, nor could we articulate through concepts
what this experience is. The latter needs a unified being which can receive the
deliverances of the senses and the conceptual framework that accompanies such a
unity, in order for articulation and, subsequently, compilation of these concepts as
judgments in a corpus of knowledge.
From this line of argumentation several questions seem to arise. If Kant‟s
purpose in the deduction is to prove objective validity and objective validity concerns
only those conditions which furnish the possibility of objects of experience, Kant
does not seem to have proven that his list of categories can be deemed objectively
valid. Apprehension in intuition, reproduction in imagination, and recognition in a
concept, along with the transcendental unity of apperception and the transcendental
power of the imagination, appear to be the conditions that permit cognition and thus
may be esteemed as objectively valid. But where are the categories in all this
discussion? Are there any a priori rules or conditions that will permit their
application to intuition, either empirical or pure? This portion of a deduction, one
that seems requisite in order to complete the enterprise is wholly missing, but is one
which might possibly be duplicated. Kant himself suggests this, but recuses himself
from performing this work by suggesting that doing so will merely detract and
distract from the general purposes of a critique of pure reason.330

in this personal emendation, employs “understanding” to mean something like the “mind”, and
understanding in its broadest sense. For further discussion of passage A77/B103 see Llewelyn,
Hypocritical Imagination, pp. 33-34.
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Reactions to the Deduction

The reactions to Kant‟s table of categories and his purported deduction of
them are as variable as they are numerous. An exhaustive account here might take us
too far afield from the discussion of the imagination in Kant, but we can elucidate
general trends and objections authors have noted over the years. The most general
trend we find in these authors is a harsh critique leveled at what Kant has claimed to
achieve in the transcendental deduction. Commonly, Kant is charged with having
provided a faculty psychology that explains what processes are in play in judgments,
even the a priori grounds by which cognition obtains, but a faculty psychology does
not account for the list of the categories Kant has seen fit to provide as the pure
concepts of the understanding nor does it answer the quaestio jure of category
application. Briefly, the suggestion is that Kant‟s work in the deduction is good, but
falls short of proving what is necessary about the categories themselves and their
application. The following are a few responses and criticisms regarding Kant‟s
deduction.
Hermann Cohen331 rejects the deduction of the table of categories, instead
preferring to read the Transcendental Analytic in reverse order. Cohen begins with
the Analytic of Principles and interprets them as an epistemology of Newtonian
physics. By claiming Newtonian physics as an a priori science of the principles of
experience, Cohen argues that the Kant‟s elucidation of the Analytic of Principles
331

Founder of the Marburg school of neo-Kantianism circa 1902, whose adherents include Paul
Natorp, Ernst Cassirer, and eventually many logical positivists through the influence of Rudolph
Carnap. For further discussion see Michael Friedman‟s The Parting of the Ways pp. 25-26.
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provides the principles applied in cognition and believes the table of categories can be
deduced therefrom.332 By demonstrating how knowledge is possible, i.e. the
principles applied in judgment, Cohen believes we can deduce the categories. In
brief, Cohen argues that by knowing what it is that we call knowledge and how we
come to these claims, we can deduce the constituent half of knowledge found in the
understanding. This strategy may be the way Kant actually conceived his critique of
reason. It is plausible that Kant presupposed Euclidean geometry as an a priori
science, and proceeded to provide a faculty psychology and the principles necessary
to affirm this assumption. His presentation, however, proceeds in a very different
manner. What Cohen fails to realize is that Newtonian physics cannot be an a priori
natural science, because the principles found in Newton are derived from experience,
hence have an empirical condition and cannot be pure a priori, although they may be
a priori.333 Laws of gravitation and momentum may seem to be universal and
necessary for the objects of experience, but the legitimacy they boast always has its
sources in abstraction from empirical examples. Indeed, they may govern empirical
objects as far as we have seen them demonstrated, but they are proven inductively
and hence do not possess the a priority necessary to be a pure natural science.
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Cf. Cohen, Erfahrung, pp. 345-346.
In the introduction to CPR Kant makes a distinction between pure a priori and a priori. The former
indicates the universality and necessity required prior to any experience. The latter can be construed as
universal and necessary, but are dependent upon empirical conditions. As an example of the latter,
Kant cites that with proper understanding of structural engineering, one need not undermine the
foundations of a house to know that if one does, the roof collapses. One can know a priori that what
will happen, but this a priori knowledge is dependent upon the empirical conditions set forward by
engineering. The former indicates knowledge prior to any empirical conditions. Cf A8/B12 Cp.
A21/B35
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P.F. Strawson continues in the neo-Kantian, analytic tradition by arguing for a
failure of the transcendental deduction.334 Strawson interprets the purpose of the
deduction to be a more modern use of the term “deduction”, a deduction of the
categories in a sense that Kant does not himself seem to endorse. For Strawson a
deduction needs to provide a genesis for the categories themselves from axiomatic
principles. According to
Strawwon, objective validity is not uncovering the necessary conditions for cognition
in the manner pursued by Kant. Strawson argues that objective validity can only be
achieved if the very conceptual architecture, the categories themselves, can be
demonstrated in their universality and necessity and their employment illustrated.
This most certainly is not what Kant provides, and Strawson deems Kant‟s exercise as
a complete failure.
In a more sympathetic vein, Henry Allison attempts to redress Strawson‟s
accusations and to defend Kant against undue interpretation.335 He points out what
Kant means by objective validity, noting Strawson‟s misunderstanding, and he
attempts to ward off the pronouncement of complete failure. However, Allison
himself admits Kant‟s lack when it comes to an explanation of the table of
categories.336 And while Allison admits the conspicuous lack of a deduction in terms
of the origin and genesis of the categories, he mitigates Strawson‟s critique further by
citing the Schematism as the illustration of the application of the categories to
334

Strawson, p. 117.
Strawson here exemplifies the mid-20th century analytic approach to the deduction. Other authors
include H.A. Prichard, Jonathan Bennett and might be characterized as trying to purge the idealism
from Kant in an effort to uphold the Copernican insight Kant displayed, but to save Kant from himself.
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intuition. While Allison attempts to present a defense of Kant‟s transcendental
idealism, he continues the tradition of reading the 1st Critique primarily as a treatise
on epistemology. The defense of transcendental idealism is made by distinguishing
between empirical and transcendental idealisms and focuses on the epistemic
conditions that Kant offers to argue for the latter.
Martin Heidegger will oppose the trend to read Kant‟s work exclusively as
epistemology, claiming Kant has performed an invaluable service explicating the
regional ontology of human knowledge.337 He interprets the doctrine of the
transcendental power of imagination as an illustration of Dasein‟s finitude and
fundamental orientation to time. The source of pure concepts of human cognition are
to be found in this very orientation to time. Yet, a Heideggerian reading of Kant
presents its own difficulties. His analysis of Kant‟s use of time in structuring the
categories and their application remains faithful to Kant‟s intended explicit
statements, but space appears to have been lost in Heidegger‟s analysis. Furthermore,
Heidegger accuses Kant of not having gone far enough. According to this reading,
Kant may have seen the ontological implications of his own work, implications
Heidegger will make explicit in terms of his own fundamental ontology; but,
Heidegger accuses, Kant failed to move beyond delimitations of human cognition,
and by not doing so failed to draw the philosophical connection between his
epistemology and fundamental ontology. Yet Kant was neither concerned with nor
337

Heidegger represents the competing school of neo-Kantianism in early 20th Century Germany. In
contrast to the logico-epistemic reading found in Cohen‟s Marburg school, Heidegger and the so-called
Southwest school, founded by Wilhelm Windelband in Heidelberg and continued by Heinrich Rickert
in Freiburg, insist on the distinction between math, logic and the table of categories. Within the
Southwest school, Heidegger‟s particular approach is to interpret Kant‟s work as a pre-formulation of
Heidegger‟s own project of fundamental ontology. Cf. Friedman, p. 26-33.
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familiar with this subsequent development of fundamental ontology and thus
Heidegger has been accused of reading too much into Kant‟s employment of time.
That is to say, Heidegger reads too much of his own philosophy into that of Kant.
Recently, Beatrice Longuenesse attempts to reformulate the question of the
source of the categories. Rather than looking exclusively to the Deduction of the
Principles, she follows Kant‟s own suggestion that the table of categories finds its
sources in the transcendental table of logical judgments.338 In the so-called
metaphysical deduction of the categories, Kant himself makes explicit the connection
between the table of judgments and the table of categories, but what he fails to
provide is what this connection might be. By exploring the table of judgments and the
arrived body of logic during Kant‟s time, namely Aristotelian syllogistic logic,
Longuenesse attempts 1) to recreate how logic and subsumption work in this logical
system, in order to demonstrate the a priority of the categories, 2) to demonstrate their
necessity in order to make judgments and 3) their origin itself. What remains unclear
is the origin of the categories. Her line of argumentation achieves the first and second
of the three stated goals, but remains questionable whether she achieves the final task.
Longuenesse demonstrates how syllogistic judgments work, and even illustrates how
the categories are employed in the categorical premises of syllogisms, thus
connecting major and minor premises and showing how universal concepts are
necessary in order to make particular judgments. The categories can be proven
necessary for judgments and their role in doing so can even be illustrated, but what
Longuenesse does not seem to describe is how the categories are supposed to arise
338
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from the judgments themselves. One suggestion is that the table of logical judgments
themselves represent the necessary means by which any judgment can be made. And
if we must judge according to these forms, there must be some concept employed in
order to make the possibility of general predication possible in a categorical,
hypothetical or disjunctive statement. Thus she believes that from the necessity of
judgments arise the need and list of the categories Kant has provided. One difficulty
with the interpretation centers around what Kant considers to be the origin of the
categories. Such an explanation may indeed demonstrate how they are employed in
judgment and the necessity of them in use, but it speaks very little toward the source
from which categories arise, that is, prior to application in use.
Common to all these interpretations, except Heidegger‟s, is a focus on the Bedition deduction. In contrast, my own interpretation of the deduction focuses on the
A-edition and attempts to show that Kant achieves what he purportedly sets out to in
his deduction. To his critics that deem the deduction a failure, I wish to suggest a
misinterpretation of the goals he has set out for himself. Kant has shown the
conditions for the possibility of human cognition, typical to his style, not by asking
how judgments occur per se, but what judgment is and what elements are necessary in
order to achieve them. His demonstration of the conditions presupposed by cognition
are indeed a priori. And yet, I also agree with the general consensus that Kant fails to
provide any in depth description of the categories and their origin—in either A or B
editions. Faculties, principles, and schemata are all important for a coherent account
of cognition, but without explaining the origin of the categories themselves, Kant
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leaves open the question about the basic concepts employed in his enumerated
processes in the deduction. Without providing a deduction of the categories that
demonstrates the completeness and a priority of Kant‟s enumerated list, his work
seems incomplete. It is just such a task that I would now like to pursue and would
like to do so along similar lines of Longuenesse‟s main contention—that the
metaphysical deduction provides the clue (or guiding thread) to a satisfactory
deduction of the categories and the subsequent sections i.e. the transcendental
deduction and the system of principles cannot be understood unless a metaphysical
deduction of the categories is provided. Unlike Longuenesse‟s approach that centers
around the table of logical judgments to the exclusion of the transcendental aesthetic,
I pursue a deduction according to Kant‟s suggestion:
The same function which gives unity to the various representations in
a judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various
representations in an intuition; and this unity, in its most general
expression, we entitle the pure concepts of the understanding. The
same understanding, through the same operations by which in
concepts, by means of analytic unity, it produced a logical form of a
judgment, also introduces a transcendental content into its
representation, by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold in
intuition in general.339
By introducing a transcendental content to the forms of judgment, I hope to
demonstrate how the categories arise and the completeness of Kant‟s list. Likewise, I
believe that in providing a deduction that will satisfy the general clamor for origins,
we will see, once again, the imagination at work in the very deepest recesses of
Kant‟s philosophy. The function of the understanding that provides the a priority of
339
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the categories by connecting logical judgments with the transcendental content of the
forms of intuition is the imagination.
If a deduction of the categories, a search about their origins, is to be found in
Kant, it must be sought from a different section than the transcendental deduction. In
the Analytic of Concepts and the Clue to the Discovery of all Pure Concepts of the
Understanding we find an abbreviated attempt by Kant to attempt a metaphysical
deduction of the categories. Opposed to the transcendental deduction, which reports
to demonstrate the conditions for the possibility of cognition, in the metaphysical
deduction Kant purports to show the origins of the table of logical judgments and
consequently the categories as well. As with the transcendental deduction, the
reported success of the metaphysical deduction has as many variations as it does
interpretations. For the time being, I would like to follow Longuenesse in affirming
the success of the metaphysical deduction, but through different means than she
herself provides.
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Chapter Seven: An Integrative Proposal for a New Deduction

A New Deduction: objective validity

A new metaphysical deduction is in order to assist Kant in satisfying the
quaestio jure with which he concerns himself at the heart of the Critique of Pure
Reason. This new deduction is intended to present a supplementary to Kant‟s own,
by addressing the origins of the categories themselves. Kant does provide an answer
to this question, citing the transcendental unity of apperception as the necessary
origin of any cognition. But this sense of origin does not provide his reader with a
satisfying deduction of the categories. What Kant‟s critics have pointed out is the
need for a more explicit description of the transcendental table of judgments and its
connection to the table of categories. It is now to this task I wish to turn.
Before beginning this new deduction, one must be reminded again of the
distinction between sensibility and understanding. Kant claims that the division
between the two is that “[c]oncepts are based upon the spontaneity of thought,
sensible intuitions on the receptivity of impressions.”340 According to Kant, the realm
of the understanding is concepts and thinking (judgment), that of sensibility is
receptivity and intuitions. By this juxtaposition, Kant delineates the understanding as
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an active faculty and sensibility as passive. This is of primary importance in tracing
the origin of both the tables of judgments and the categories, for with these
transcendental tables Kant is dealing here not with empirical judgments or objects
(although we will find them in connection with empirical objects) but with a priori
modes of thinking, the modes and concepts that are necessary for rational beings.
Kant is dealing exclusively with the forms of thinking, the forms by which thinking
occurs and the rules that thinking obeys. It is my contention, and Kant‟s I believe,
that the table of logical judgments leads directly to the table of categories, but not
merely through analysis of syllogisms, as Longuenesse pursues, but through the
delineation of rules of judgment through an exhaustive account of a priori intuition.
As the transcendental table of logical judgments is the product of the logical
employment of the understanding, a brief examination of Kant‟s logic will prove
insightful regarding the origins of such a table. Kant‟s own words are helpful:
General logic… abstracts from all content of knowledge, that is, from
all relation of knowledge to the objects and considers only the logical
form in relation of any knowledge to other knowledge, that is, it treats
of the form of thought in general.341
The domain of logic, as Kant formulates it, is the form of thinking—the ways by
which we order information and concepts. Kant, in his thoroughness, allows for two
applications of this logic, as it is employed with empirical objects but also removed
from empirical content, that is, in pure thought. In this discussion, Kant excludes
logic as it is applied to empirical objects in order to ensure empirical skeptics that the
judgments and concepts he provides are not mere abstractions from experience.
341
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According to Kant, pure, or general, logic has nothing to do with empirical objects.
The application of general logic can only follow upon having demonstrated the a
priority of the rules of thinking. According to Kant, the rules of thought with which
we are dealing should “contain solely the rules of the pure thought of an object.”342
Furthermore, a pure logic which determines “the origin, the scope and the objective
validity of such knowledge [of the pure understanding], would have to be called
transcendental logic.”343 This pure, transcendental logic “concerns itself with the
laws of the understanding and reason.”344 By separating this transcendental logic
from general logic, Kant can emphasize the rules that govern thinking itself and
maintain that the list he provides remains free from any empirical content. The laws
will thus be universal, as they pertain to no particular objects of experience. Rather,
they will govern how objects of experience can be judged. The transcendental table
of logical judgments concerns itself with the rules by which the understanding orders
its concepts, and thus will govern how an object can make an appearance at all. At
this point, it is clear what the table of logical judgment concerns, but the question of
its origins is not so.
The origin of the table, I would like to suggest, is the interplay of the
imagination with the forms of pure intuition. This seemingly odd declaration is the
final product of exposing presuppositions about judgments themselves and the
requirements Kant holds to maintain their transcendental status. As transcendental
logic is not empirical, no experiential content, that is, no objects of empirical
342
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experience can be permitted. As this is Kant‟s position, about what then is such a
logic forming laws? In order of his analysis, Kant has not even admitted the pure
concepts of the understanding, thus they cannot be the content of transcendental logic.
Yet, Kant has permitted the pure forms of intuitions as the content of meditation. As
pure intuitions are merely the form of sensibility, devoid of particular content, they
meet the requirement of general logic, that is, they are abstract and not of particular
objects. It now remains to be seen how he can employ the forms of sensibility in a
transcendental logic.
Following Kant, there are two forms of pure intuition, space and time. Time, as
the form of inner sense, manifests itself in the form of simultaneity and succession.
Space, as the form of outer sense, manifests itself in terms of proximal location,
position. Understanding space and time in this abstract, formal, sense, the
imagination employs these universal, formal “concepts” in a discursive manner. That
this is merely formal thought allows Kant to maintain that any logical determinations
employing these “concepts” will be able to provide a table of judgments, one that
regulates all judgments generally, but in its first formulation as purely transcendental.
The table of logical judgments is the product of an exhaustive projection of the pure
forms of intuition by a power well used but little documented in the history of
philosophy, imaginative variation.345 Using the power of imagination, the possible
permutations of space and time can be elaborated as follows:
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An interesting and important question is whether such imagining is extra-conceptual, prediscursive,
and the presentation that enables discursivity or whether such a presentation is already discursive. As
it is given here I wish to leave the question open, certainly the elaboration is provided in conceptual
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1) one „object‟ in one place at one time; local identity and temporal simultaneity
2) one „object‟ in one place at two different times; local identity and temporal
succession
3) one „object‟ in two different places at one time; local proximity and temporal
simultaneity*
4) one „object‟ in two different places at two different times; local proximity and
temporal succession
5) two „objects‟ in one place at one time; local identity and temporal
simultaneity*
6) two „objects‟ in one place at two different times; local identity and temporal
succession
7) two „objects‟ in two different places at one time; local proximity and temporal
simultaneity
8) two „objects‟ in two different places at two different times; local proximity
and temporal succession346
The imagination, working with the pure intuitions of space and time, devoid of any
content,347 generates these permutations to create this list of possible scenarios.
Furthermore, this task can be done repeatedly and the same list of eight will be
produced—these are the only possible combinations of two variables with two
possibilities- any further elaboration will fall under one of these headings. The list is
exhaustive of the possible permutations of the concepts of space and time. Thus
imagination will enforce a rule in ascribing any permutation to one of the above
listed, that is the imagination will synthesize any further elaboration into one of the

apparatus, but this need not imply the elaboration is already under the conceptual constraint of the
categories.
* logical impossibilities
346
The list could continue indefinitely, but the fundamental relationships of objects to one another and
the judgments to be drawn do not increase. Hence the addition of further „objects‟ will not increase the
possible judgments to be determined.
347
It is important here to note that Kant never prohibits “material for the concepts of the
understanding.” Rather, he cites a specific kind of material, a “manifold of a priori sensibility,
presented by the transcendental aesthetic” as the proper content for pure concepts. He suggests that “in
the absence of this material the concepts would be without any content, therefore entirely empty.”
A77/B102.

210

already listed possibilities.348 Hence, this table can be considered complete. This list
of possibilities of the combinations of space and time, is not yet the transcendental
table of logical judgments Kant provides. But with further exploration of the
imagination‟s use of this list, the table of judgments can be derived.349
Stipulating one „object‟ as the entirety of the domain and imagining one
„object‟ in one place at one time yields the judgments; universal, affirmative,
categorical and assertoric—this one „object‟ is, it is all that exists in the domain, for
all things in the domain it holds. Stipulating two „objects‟ in a domain and imagining
two „objects‟ in one place at one time yields the judgments; universal, negative,
categorical and apodeictic—for all things in the domain, it is necessary that two
„objects‟ cannot occupy the same space. Stipulating two „objects‟ in a domain and
imagining two „objects‟ in two places at one time yields the judgments; particular,
hypothetical, disjunctive, affirmative, assertoric and apodeictic—it is, and is
necessarily so, if two, individual „objects‟ occupy two separate spaces at the same
time, they bear some relation to each other in proximal location. As separate and
distinct objects in the domain, one must attend to one or the other. Moreover, Kant
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The understanding will recognize by the content of the imaginative permutation that it is a
reproduction of a former, original permutation.
349
In his exegesis of the transcendental table of categories, Kant suggests that we also rely upon
“general logical concepts” and the “technical distinctions ordinarily recognized by logicians.”
A71/B96. I interpret this to mean that we rely upon the general forms of syllogisms including the
AEIO propositions of Aristotelian logic i.e. universal, particular, affirmative and negative propositions.
Schwyzer and Longuenesse argue for the necessity of this more formalized system, but without
realizing the source for the basic propositions of the syllogistic system. Cf. Schwyzer p.12. Reinhard
Brandt, in his work The Table of Judgments, suggests Kant also presupposes other logical principles;
the principle of non-contradiction, the principle of sufficient reason and the law of excluded middle.
Cf. Brandt, p. 96. What I am attempting to demonstrate is the origin for these additional principles, at
least for identity and excluded middle.
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insists that provided we have the first two judgments in any heading, we can deduce
the third, hence all the judgments he lists may obtain from this simple list.
The transcendental table of logical judgments is hereby shown to be drawn
directly from the power of imagination and its variations on pure intuitions. What is
of special significance here is that, while administering the permutations of
imaginative play, the imagination itself is producing the possible forms of judgments.
This productive function of the imagination is creating the rule by which all syntheses
must operate; every act of judgment, that is, all conjoining—whether empirical or
transcendental—must operate according to the specified rule of synthesis that the
productive imagination lays out in this earliest enterprise of joining pure intuitions of
space and time.350 The completeness of the permutations and the corresponding rules
allow for all possible forms of synthesis, that is, all judgments.
By undergoing this labored analysis of the content of logical judgments, I
hope to have shown the direct deduction of the table of judgments from the only
possible content available at this point in Kant‟s analysis, the pure intuitions, by
means of the imagination. Additionally, I have shown how Kant can maintain that all
knowledge does begin with experience, the experience of thinking through pure
intuitions, but it does not necessarily arise from experience. The fundamental
judgments by which we judge experience begins with the experience of the pure
forms of intuition, but arises through the productive imagination‟s use of them.
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Another important note here, one that Kant makes explicit in the A-deduction, is that whenever we
have multiple „objects‟ in the domain or multiple times, the syntheses of apprehension and, more
specifically, reproduction are at work according to the principles Kant lays out only later in 1st
Critique.
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Knowledge, logical and pure at this stage, does begin with experience, the activity
and exercise of the imagination, but its origin is elsewhere—in the power of the
imagination to synthesize experience in such a way that provides the rules for the
understanding. In Kant‟s words, this originative synthesis occurs simultaneously at
the levels of “apprehension of representations as modifications of the mind in
intuition, their reproduction in imagination and recognition in a concept.”351 Kant
here suggests, as we have seen, that the above permutations require the immediate
apprehension of pure intuitions, variability and reproduction of these intuitions
according to the play of reproductive imagination, and are codified, conceptualized,
as an exhaustive list of possible judgments. The judgments, as immediate acts of
joining, are thus the first employment of such rules, and the enumeration of a table of
judgments provides Kant occasion to demonstrate just such synthesizing.
While the transcendental table of logical judgments affords the opportunity to
see the employment of the imagination in an originary way, the content of such
judgments does not yield any scientific knowledge—it does not directly relate us to
the world of possible (empirical) experience; it only creates a barren world of
syllogistic rules. The next step in Kant‟s illustration of cognition, the categories, does
not provide us with the rich world of possible experience either, but it does provide us
with the fundamental categories employed by the imagination352 to create the venue
for possible application of concepts with empirical intuitions. Little further work
needs be done to show the deduction of the table of categories from the table of
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judgments. Like the judgments, the categories employ the manifold of pure intuition
and the imagination to synthesize this manifold. But, unlike the judgments, which
employ general logical concepts, the categories are available by use of the judgments
themselves. Again, the statement from A97/B105 provides us with insight into how
categories may be formed by the power of the imagination; Kant writes:
The same function which gives unity to the representations in a
judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various
representations in an intuition, and this unity, in its most general
expression, we entitle the pure concepts of understanding. The same
understanding, through the same operations by which in concepts, by
means of analytical unity, it produced the logical form of judgment,
also introduces a transcendental content into its representation, by
means of the synthetic unity of the manifold of intuition in general.
On this account we are entitled to call these representations pure
concepts of the understanding…”353
Unlike the acts of judging by which we enact syntheses, the categories are
representations of these syntheses, representations of the logical judgments. Kant
claims a “given category is the corresponding logical function, conceived now as
ranging over whatever might be presented as an object of thought.”354 By
representing the act of judging as categories, the understanding provides itself with
the conceptual architecture by means of which it can begin to evaluate possible
experience. Following Kant‟s suggestion, the activity creating the categories is, once
again, left to the power of the imagination.
Analogously to the imaginative variation involved in deducing the judgments,
the categories can be deduced by following the imaginative variations of the possible
353
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permutations of space and time listed above. Imagining one „object‟ in one place at
one time in conjunction with imagining two „objects‟ in one place at one time yields
the category of unity—two objects cannot occupy the same space at the same time,
unless they are one; imagining two „objects‟ in two places at one time yields the
category of plurality; imagining one object, whether in two places or one, at two
different times yields the category of inherence and subsistence, provided we
represent them as identical „objects‟; imagining two „objects‟ in two places at one
time yields the category of community, etc. According to this account, the categories
are a combination of the pure intuitions and judgments brought to representation by
the power of the imagination. The categories are thus deduced from the table of
judgments according to the same activity by which the table of judgments was
deduced, the productive power of imagination. Such a deduction adds the missing
exegesis that permits Kant to answer the quaestio jure he sets out as the question to
answer regarding the legitimacy of the categories. The right by which Kant can claim
objective validity is the exhaustive account of the forms of intuition and the
complementary judgments determined. That this exercise is pure a priori satisfies
Kant‟s prerequisite that such a deduction is not merely the exercise of empirical
concept acquisition, but neither is it solely a rational logico-discursive presentation.
By employing formal judgment and forms of intuitions, Kant can claim the a priority,
universality, necessity and exhaustiveness required to affirm objective validity of the
categories. The categories can thus be seen as the necessary rules by which human
cognition obtains.
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This deduction of the categories is not, however, elaborated as a replacement
of the transcendental deduction as found in the Critique of Pure Reason. What I hope
to have shown is how the faculty of the imagination makes possible both judgments
and categories, as well as the explicit deduction of the categories themselves. In so
doing, we can deem Kant‟s list of categories as a priori, universal and necessary.
Furthermore, it is an exhaustive list, and these categories must necessarily be
employed in order for a rational being to represent any object of experience, that is,
they must be operative in making judgments concerning actual objects of experience.
Of course, this deduction will not be successful unless there is some
“vestibule” to which this compilation of pure, a priori judgments and categories
adheres. Yet this is precisely what Kant does provide in his transcendental deduction.
The synthetic unity of apperception is the single consciousness in which these
operations of imagination transpire. As Kant states, representation “and consequently
all objects with which we can occupy ourselves, are one and all in me.”355 This much
Kant has shown successful in his argument from the transcendental deduction. It is
my contention that the above examination is an attempt to elaborate the activities that
transpire in what Kant so circumspectly describes as necessary for “the transcendental
principle of the unity that is manifold in our representation, and consequently also in
intuition,” that is, apperception. The power of the imagination, described above in
deducing the judgments and categories, is the same productive power that Kant
employs in his deduction to prove, de jure, the self required for cognition and the
basic synthetic functions of apprehension, reproduction and recognition.
355
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Furthermore, we can now see the lawfulness of judgments Kant mentions in the
processes of pure cognition and the connection between the categories one employs in
cognition, both pure and empirical. The allusions to principles in the transcendental
deduction are indeed the necessary requisites of apprehension, reproduction and
recognition, but it is now possible to see the full extent to which all experience is
governed by such. Pure cognition, like those many imaginative permutations listed
above, must also obey these enumerated processes in the transcendental deduction.
But now we can justify the recognition process, for the concepts used in recognizing
have been properly deduced. As the program listed above shows the act of judging
and the representation of such an act as a conceptual primitive for the understanding,
so too does the imagination by providing the originative synthesis, apperception,
show “the inner ground of this connection for the representations to the point upon
which they all have to converge.”356 By performing its productive function, by
producing judgments and representations of judgments, the categories, the
imagination creates a consciousness “which must be capable of accompanying all
other representations, and which in all consciousness in one and the same.”357 Thus
Kant‟s deduction and my own are not exclusive enterprises, but, rather, my own
deduction is supplementary and assists in discovering the constituents of elemental
representation.
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Schematism: Objective Reality

Having sketched such a deduction and coupling it with the one Kant himself
provided, we are in position to respond to several of the complaints leveled at Kant
and his claims to objective validity. Contra Cohen and Strawson, Kant can now claim
to have provided not only a transcendental deduction of the necessary conditions for
the possibility of cognition (Kant‟s stated purpose), but he can also claim to have
provided a metaphysical deduction of judgments and categories themselves. The
chief complaint regarding Kant‟s transcendental deduction is that it rarely mentions
the categories and when doing so presupposes a metaphysical deduction, which Kant
does not provide. And while Kant does not provide a compendium of the possible
judgments available to human cognition by thinking through the permutations of
space and time, Kant does provide the insight and the overture to such a metaphysical
deduction. Thus when Kant references the categories in the transcendental deduction,
he does so with assurance that the pure concepts are indeed exhaustive and a priori.
However, a second objection still applies. Given the accomplishments of both
the metaphysical and transcendental deductions, Kant still is not in a position to boast
that the listed categories are indeed the ones employed in empirical experience. One
facile objection could question how often we really use the category of limitation in
judging an object of empirical experience. An equally quick response is that even
though we are not explicitly aware of doing so, we still may employ the category of
limitation when organizing the deliverances of the senses. However, instead of taking
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this approach Kant will provide an illustration of how the categories are actually
connected with the deliverances of the senses. The chief difficulty for Kant arises in
the act of joining categories to empirical intuitions. What has been deduced so far are
pure, a priori, categories that bear little resemblance to empirical intuitions of
sensibility. The categories, as we have them now, are not fit for direct application to
intuitions of possible experience. Recognizing this difficulty, Kant provides the
Schematism to explain how these pure, a priori concepts may be related to empirical
intuition. In other words, he will pursue the mechanism(s) by which the categories
may actually be and are applied to objects of experience.
To elaborate the difficulty of this task, Kant admits that “in all subsumptions
of an object under a concept the representation of the object must be homogenous
with the concept.”358 This is to say, in order to bridge the gap between the active,
organizing architecture of the understanding and the passive, receptive deliverances
of sensibility, for Kant, there must be some common denominator, or else any
synthesis would be impossible. Yet, the pure concepts of understanding, categories,
are “quite heterogeneous from empirical intuitions.”359 It would appear that Kant is at
an impasse; having argued for the completeness, necessity, universality and a priority
of the categories has left him with little recourse to demonstrate how such concepts
can be joined with contingent, particular deliverances of the senses. Kant is left to
358
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ask “how, then, is the subsumption of intuitions under pure concepts, the application
of a category to appearance, possible?” Provided we examine the exegesis of the
Transcendental Aesthetic, the admonition Kant delivers at the beginning of the
transcendental deduction and the deduction I have provided above, the answer will
become apparent.
Kant‟s admonition at the beginning of his transcendental deduction was to
remember that all our representations (either pure or empirical) must all, as
modifications of the mind, belong to inner sense. All our knowledge is thus finally
subject to time, the formal condition of inner sense.”360 In the Transcendental
Aesthetic, Kant asserts that space and time are the “forms of intuition.” Every
empirical intuition comes to the understanding through the forms of space and time.
Moreover, even the pure intuitions used above to deduce the categories, being pure as
such, were merely the permutations of objects in general as conceived through the
forms of space and time. Empirical or pure, intuitions necessarily are delivered by
sensibility through the forms of space and time.361 Furthermore, in the
Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant argues that, of the two forms of intuition, time is the
“a priori condition of all appearance whatsoever.”362 In brief, Kant‟s argument is that
objects of outer intuition, or intuitions we perceive as coming from the outside, those
that present shape, form and proximal relation are limited. All intuitions, either
considered as coming from outer sources or those from inner, all must be represented
as inner intuitions. Because time is the condition of inner appearances, and all outer
360
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intuitions must be represented through inner sense, time is the form of sensibility that
informs all appearances. Since the metaphysical deduction of judgments and
categories also relies upon the form of time as conceived as a pure form of intuition,
an answer to Kant‟s demand for homogeneity now presents itself. Time is the one
constituent factor inherently involved with all aspects of cognition—time as the
condition of all intuition, pure intuitions as integral to the process of deducing
judgments, and the categories themselves. Kant argues that schemata, defined in
terms of time, will present “the third thing, which homogeneous one the one hand
with the category, and on the other hand with the appearance.”363 Thus, Kant
suggests, schemata make “the application of the former to the latter” possible.364 In
his exegesis of the schemata, one for each category, Kant explains each in terms of
time. Time it would seem is the homogeneous element that can bridge the gap
between the seemingly disparate elements of cognition. Time, Kant reports, is the
common ground for categories, intuitions and schemata.
One need only glance briefly at Kant‟s listed schemata themselves to
understand how time figures in his listing e.g. the schema of substance is permanence
of the real in time, the schema of actuality is existence in some determinate time.
Kant‟s account is, I believe, clear and to the point. On the empirical side, the
reproductive imagination incorporates the manifold of intuition, given in
apprehension, and thereby creates an image to represent that which sensation has
given, utilizing the features it finds outstanding and salient to represent the
363
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intuition.365 This is to say, the reproductive imagination creates an image out of the
manifold of empirical experience. Kant leaves open the question as to whether this is
entirely adequate—indeed it is ordered by the sense organs we, as humans, have.
Undoubtedly, this is not a flawless enterprise; if our sense faculties were any
different, the image produced would vary accordingly. Indeed we need only to look
to the errors and mistakes made in everyday judgment to realize misgivings in our
own ordinarily working sense apparatus. Yet, regardless of whether our sense organs
are functioning under normal operating parameters, or whether we are producing an
image that accounts for all salient features, we organize the image under the auspices
of space and time. On the pure side, the productive imagination has generated the
categories under which we subsume the particular image as it is delineated according
to time. On the empirical side, images are formed according to time from the
deliverances of the senses. The final act of the productive imagination is to create the
schema by which images are made possible.
Kant states that the productive imagination “produces schemata that make
images possible, but cannot themselves be images or be drawn from images.”366
Because, the synthesis of imagination aims at no special intuition, but only at a unity
in the determination of sensibility, the schema has to be distinguished from the
image.”367 The schemata do provide this unity by representing what an image can be
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according to the possible permutations of the pure intuition of time.368 Admittedly,
“[the schema] are never entirely congruent with the concept, and yet somehow they
fit into the category.”369 The schemata are not a perfect fit, for the categories are a
representation of both space and time, as the representation of a judgment, whereas
the schemata are depicted solely in temporal terms. Hence schemata are neither
categories nor intuitions, but, rather, a mediation between the two. The combination
of empirical intuitions and categories is executed by the power of imagination by
matching correlating images to schema and the schema to correlating concepts. Kant
sums up this explanation by saying that any schema “is simply the pure synthesis,
determined by a rule of that unity, in accordance to the concepts, to which the
category gives expression.”370
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This mediating function of the schemata is attributed exclusively to the
imagination. According to Kant, “the schema itself is always a product of
imagination.”371 It is in the formulation of the schematism that we find the standard
interpretation of Kant‟s imagination at it clearest. Synthesis, as the product of the
imagination, comes to fruition. By creating schema and images, and by incorporating
the temporal aspect of intuitions and categories via judgments, the imagination is the
general liaison between sensibility and understanding. And while correct, the
standard interpretation overlooks the fundamental role of the imagination in all
aspects of the processes whereby we find categories given a priori, intuitions as
representations, often images, and the schema that connect the two. This new
elaboration demonstrates the fundamentality of what is typically considered an
obscure faculty.

From A to B

The above analysis is based upon an interpretation of Kant‟s 1st Critique from
the perspective of the A-edition deduction, the Transcendental Aesthetic, Analytic of
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Concepts, the Clue to the Discovery of all Pure Concepts of the Understanding372 and
the Schematism. Kant further complicates the matter by rewriting the entirety of the
transcendental deduction for the second publication of his book in 1787. The Bedition deduction varies considerably from the original edition of 1781, but in doing
so it proves illustrative of the major themes found in the A-edition. Before
addressing Kant‟s critics, defenders and their particular interpretations of objective
validity and reality in the Critique of Pure Reason, I propose to examine the
significant differences between the two versions.
One of the most startling differences from the A-deduction to the B version is
a shift of vocabulary and focus, almost to the complete exclusion of the imagination.
Imagination only makes an appearance towards the end of the B-version, but in a
pivotal passage. Rather than beginning with an enumeration and description of the
three ec-stasies of time and the associative processes involved to represent objects
through them, Kant instead takes up a description of the transcendental unity of
apperception that underlies all representation. Kant glosses these seminal passages by
reminding his audience that combination of a manifold in general can never come to
us through the senses, for combination is an act of spontaneity, and spontaneity
belongs not to the faculty of sensibility, but to the understanding.373 In fact, “all
combination—be we conscious of it or not, be it a combination of the manifold of
intuition, empirical or non-empirical, or of various concepts—is an act of the
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understanding.”374 Kant rarely makes his position more clear than in this passage.
But also provocative, and perhaps supporting my thesis from the A-edition, is the
suggestion that we may possess combination of a manifold of intuition in some way
that is not empirical. From this, albeit brief, passage delineating the faculty
responsible for synthesis, Kant seems willing to allow for some synthesis of a
manifold of pure intuition, for Kant implies that we can have a combination of a nonempirical manifold. For Kant, the larger issue remains the one central to his first
deduction, demonstrating how several such syntheses can obtain coherency and can
be further employed to create a corpus of knowledge.
Once again, Kant points out that the synthesizing activity of the understanding
(in this version of the deduction) presents a manifold as a single representation, a
unity. But, for Kant, there remains another unity, a unity “which precedes a priori all
concepts of combination” and which itself
is not the category of unity, for all categories are grounded in logical
functions of judgment, and in these functions combination, and
therefore unity of given concepts, is already thought. Thus the
category presupposes combination.375
Therefore, Kant determines, we must
look yet higher for this unity, namely in that which itself contains the
ground of the unity of diverse concepts in judgment, and therefore of
the possibility of the understanding, even as regards its logical
employment.376
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With these two compact phrases, Kant achieves several things. Kant has established,
more concisely, several positions from the A-edition, namely that need for a
transcendental deduction to elaborate the personal-individualizing condition for the
possibility of cognition, the unity of apperception; but Kant has also made explicit the
connection between judgments and categories.
Kant discharges the first task, of elaborating the transcendental unity of
apperception, in much the same fashion as he does in the A-edition. He does,
however, contribute new insight into the relationship between synthesis, analysis and
the identity of apperception. Along with the transcendental need for a unified
consciousness that ensures a subject in which representation inheres, Kant points out
that this identity comes about “not simply through my accompanying each
representation with a consciousness, but only in so far as I conjoin one representation
with another, and am conscious of the synthesis of them.”377 It is only by uniting a
“manifold of given representations in one consciousness” that it is “possible for me to
represent to myself the identity of the consciousness in these representations.”378
Kant continues by suggesting that “the analytic unity of apperception is possible only
under the presupposition of a certain synthetic unity.” The transcendental unity of
consciousness is not only a formal requirement, as argued in the A-deduction, but is
also a performative act necessary in order to provide the analysis of such a necessary
unity. At the bottom of all representation, both in transcendental argument and the
performance thereof, a unity of consciousness must obtain. But, importantly, a
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reciprocity between the unity of apperception and the synthesis of a manifold of
intuition arises; in order for one to know the necessity of the unity of apperception,
one must be synthesizing a manifold. In Kant‟s words, the “principle of the necessary
unity of apperception is itself, indeed, an identical, and therefore analytic,
proposition; nevertheless it reveals the necessity of a synthesis of the manifold given
in intuition, without which the thoroughgoing identity of self-consciousness cannot be
thought.”379 Curious to note here is that Kant does not draw a connection between the
productive power of imagination and the transcendental unity of apperception.
Conspicuously lacking in this B-deduction is any explanation concerning the means
by which this originative synthesis occurs. According to Kant, this original synthesis
takes place in the understanding, to the exclusion of imagination in this foundational
process.
As to the second task, connecting the categories to logical judgments, Kant is
more explicit in his second deduction. In order to do so, Kant must revisit the idea of
judgment and of what such a process consists. Kant states; “a judgment is nothing
but the manner in which given modes of knowledge are brought to the objective unity
of apperception.”380 This cryptic phrase presents difficulties when trying to expound
Kant‟s understanding. According to Kant, whether or not any given judgment
possesses objective validity is not the issue. What a judgment does is to present a
proposition, typically by employing the copula „is‟, to the unity of apperception. The
content of the judgment at this point is irrelevant; the necessary presentation to the
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unity of apperception is what grounds judgment and prescribes its objective
validity.381 This process of presentation is necessarily at work in all judgment, and as
such Kant deems the process of judging itself objectively valid, not in the necessity of
its content, but in the necessity of such a presentation.
At this point Kant wishes to make a distinction between two types of
judgments, the same distinction between judgments of perception and judgments of
experience found in his Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics. He does so to
illustrate the difference between objective and subjective validity in regard to
judgments. If one were to state „If I support a body, I feel an impression of weight‟
one is merely making a judgment of perception. Kant determines that when one
states, „It, the body, is heavy,” one is making a judgment of experience. The former
is a representation that has always been conjoined in my perception; in the latter
“what we are asserting is combined in the object, no matter what the state of the
subject may be.”382 In the former, we are relating the state of an object to an
empirical consciousness, the presentation of ourselves to ourselves as undergoing
experience. In the latter the proposition is connected with the fundamental unity of
apperception, and hence is not dependent upon the state of the subject. The use of the
copular verb determines the presentation of a possible empirical fact to apperception
in the case of judgments of experience. In the case of judgments of perception, a
hypothetical is employed to determine reference to a particular subject asserting the
claim. Empirical apperceptions possess only subjective validity owing to its
381
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presentation of a self in a manifold of intuition, and this self is only another such
presentation, that is an empirical representation. Because the representation of an
empirical self and the content rich activities of such a being, such judgments in
themselves are objects of empirical knowledge and hence are not about the object
perceived but the experience the subject undergoes when interacting with objects.
The judgment concerns our states, not the states of the objects. Transcendental
apperception, as the a priori condition of all experience, is no such presentation, and
eludes the subjectivity of self-presentation. A judgment such as „Bodies are heavy‟ is
never presented in reference to the self, although it is grounded in the unity and
identity of the self. Rather, the judgment is made in reference to the object, which is
only possible by means of the synthetic unity of consciousness (even as it is
unreferenced). A reminder of objective validity may be in order to clarify these
puzzling remarks. Objective validity is not the absolute confidence in the truth of the
content of any given proposition. It is, rather, disclosing the conditions for the
possibility of experience. By keeping to Kant‟s stated purpose in the deduction,
judgments of experience demonstrate the necessary connection between presentations
of intuition and judgments through the unity of apperception in order for an object to
appear at all. Thus Kant believes that when he describes, “bodies are heavy,” he is
describing a judgment concerning the appearance of an object as such, and not the
appearance of an object in reference to any specific subject, rather to any subjectivity
whatsoever. Understandably, one might object that all judgments of perception must
also be related to the transcendental unity of apperception, thus connecting it with the
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fundamental grounds for objective validity. But this is where Kant makes the
differentiation between the actual objects about which the judgments are being made.
In a judgment of perception, the judgment actually regards the being that perceives
e.g. I feel weight when supporting a body, and although this might then be considered
a judgment of experience, one that suggests that all perceiving agents supporting
bodies must feel weight when doing so, this is not the reported judgment in a
judgment of experience. It is, rather, a qualitative, hypothetical description of an
individual‟s experience. Judgments of experience, on the other hand, are not about
the perceiving being‟s states, but are, rather, predications about the object of
experience e.g. Bodies are heavy. This distinction allows Kant to delve more deeply
in to possible types of judgments and to differentiate between the so-called subjective
judgments from objective ones. Kant‟s chief concern in the B-deduction, as it was in
the A version, is to focus on objective judgments and to qualify how such judgments
may be deemed truly objective, and by making this distinction, he believes he might
more easily delineate how such judgments are possible.
It is by narrowing his focus to logical functions of judgment that Kant will
able to clarify more readily how judgments can be objective, and, Kant believes,
demonstrate how categories necessarily factor into making judgments of experience.
The means by which “a manifold of given representations (be they intuitions or
concepts) is brought under one apperception” is the act of the understanding Kant
describes as “the logical function of judgment.”383 A logical function of judgment is
the determination of a manifold as a single representation and the presentation of such
383
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to apperception. The means by which these representations are presented to
apperception is through the categories, which “are just these functions of judgment in
so far as they are employed in determination of the manifold of given intuition.”384
Unfortunately, this is Kant at his clearest regarding the relationship between the
categories and judgments in the B-deduction. Of note here is that Kant‟s explanation
reinforces the A-deduction and the need for a deduction of the table of judgments as
well as the table of categories in relation to judgments. Simply describing categories
as representations of judgment to apperception still allows Kant‟s critics to demand
some explanation of the completeness and a priority of both tables. Kant promises to
give more in the observation for §20, but only manages to recapitulate what the Adeduction already informed us, namely, that one “must abstract from the mode in
which the manifold for an empirical intuition is given, and must direct attention solely
to the unity which, in terms of the category, and by means of the understanding,
enters into the intuition… its unity is no other than that which the category prescribes
to the manifold of a given intuition in general.”385 Even in the B-edition, Kant still
seems in need of an explanation of what these general unities consist and from
whence they are drawn.
The B-deduction, despite its lack of demonstrating the connection between the
table of judgments and table of categories—precisely the same lack we find in the Adeduction, and markedly pointed out by Kant‟s critics—continues the need for a
metaphysical deduction of the categories. Moreover, Kant‟s revision presents some
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disturbing differences, differences that might appear as inconsistent with his original
position. Two such differences between the A and B editions are 1) the change in
Kant‟s terminology regarding the imagination, which involves glossing over
seemingly pivotal remarks from the A-edition and 2) the addition of further roles e.g.
figurative and intellectual syntheses. And yet, I would like to contend that the
editions are complementary. Both editions admit and argue the need for a
transcendental unity of apperception and the correlation between experience and this
signal requirement. Having entered his revised deduction by different means, and
establishing this key doctrine, Kant revisits the three-fold synthesis enumerated in the
A-deduction, but in abbreviated form. Rather than recount the three associative
processes necessary for cognition, Kant summarizes them under the heading of
figurative synthesis (synthesis speciosa). Figurative synthesis is the “synthesis of the
manifold of sensible intuition, which is possible and a priori.”386
To put into relief this newly dubbed synthesis, Kant contraposes figurative
synthesis with intellectual synthesis. The latter “is thought in the mere category in
respect of the manifold of an intuition in general, and which is entitled combination
through the understanding alone.”387 Prima facie, figurative synthesis appears to be
the combinatory process responsible for the liaison between concepts and intuitions,
of the sort that Kant described in the three processes listed at the opening of the Adeduction. Additionally, intellectual synthesis appears to be the power of judgment
as it concerns merely the forms of thought i.e. the logical forms of judgment. The
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former concerns itself with knowledge, the latter with thinking. This distinction
between knowability and thinkability is one sometimes overlooked in this discussion,
but for the purposes of drawing distinctions between these two forms of synthesis it
proves helpful (and it will have profound implications for the transcendental
dialectic). For knowledge to obtain, Kant is adamant, two factors are involved, “first,
the concept, through which an object in general is thought (the category); and
secondly, the intuition, through which it is given.”388 Yet, if no intuition can be given
that corresponds to the concept, “the concept would still indeed be a thought.”389
Figurative synthesis is the process(es) by which intuition(s) are given to the
understanding, which has its own synthesis responsible for the production of the
categories, which can be thought, but never given as an intuition. Figurative
synthesis corresponds to the production of a synthetically unified manifold in the
form of an image for representation to the understanding from the A-edition through
associative processes and hence is a modified explanation of various uses of
imagination.
Kant concedes that both species of synthesis are transcendental, that is,
necessary in order for knowledge to obtain, figurative synthesis responsible for
providing the content of knowledge, intellectual synthesis responsible for providing
the forms necessary to organize the content of knowledge claims. We could
approximate the functions of figurative synthesis as providing a presentation of
intuition and intellectual synthesis as providing the logical forms of judgment as we
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have found the imagination described in the A-edition. “Both are transcendental, not
merely as taking place a priori (as we found in his principled argument of the Adeduction of the necessity of the three syntheses in determination of the three
ecstasies of time and the necessity of logical forms of judgment provided by the
original deduction provided above), but also as conditioning the possibility of other a
priori knowledge.”390

And yet, Kant interposes between these two syntheses a third,

one in which “the figurative synthesis is directed merely to the synthetic unity of
apperception.”391 Such attentiveness Kant describes as the “transcendental synthesis
of imagination.” In this capacity, “imagination is the faculty of representing in
intuition an object that is not itself present.”392 Just what the figurative synthesis as
imagination is representing that is not present is entirely unclear. According to my
interpretation, it is precisely the novel deduction above and by providing an
explanation for how the categories are presented, although no object of experience is
present, the imagination takes center stage as a necessary, productive process for
cognition. Such an interpretation finds support in Kant‟s next claim that the
imagination, owing to the subjective condition under which alone it
can give to the concepts (read logical judgments) of understanding a
corresponding intuition belongs to sensibility. But inasmuch as its
synthesis is an expression of spontaneity, which is determinative and
not, like sense, determinable merely, and which is therefore able to
determine sense a priori in respect of its form (read categories) in
accordance with the unity of apperception, imagination is to that extent
a faculty which determines the sensibility a priori; and its synthesis of
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intuitions, conforming as it does to the categories, must be the
transcendental synthesis of imagination.393
This dense passage isolates imagination in many of its roles as well as develops the
fundamentality in all aspects of cognition. In its ability to present intuitions, the
imagination must synthesize the deliverances of the senses; in its ability to present the
logical forms of judgment by means of intellectual synthesis (only suggested by Kant,
but shown by my own deduction) the imagination must synthesize the possible forms
of thinking; in its ability to produce the categories, the imagination synthesizes the
judgments with the forms of intuition; and in its role of joining intuitions and
categories, the imagination produces schemata394 by which intuition can be brought
into homogeneity with the categories. As the faculty responsible for synthesis in
general, the imagination proves to be a vital function in cognition. Thus, while Kant
explicitly drops the three-fold synthesis and much of the imagination in favor of
figurative and intellectual synthesis and emphasizes the transcendental unity of
apperception in the B-edition, he does not emend his work in a way that removes the
imagination from any part of his analysis. What Kant presents is a less developed but
more reader friendly version of the deduction, one that can clarify the grounds
argument of the transcendental deduction, but this version must necessarily involve
the imagination.
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Critics and Defenders

After such work, Kant is now in position to answer some of his harshest
critics. The success of his deduction, we may even conjecture the project of the
Transcendental Doctrine of Elements seems to be plausible, and is based upon an
exegesis of the imagination as a discrete faculty, but one functionally connected with
both sensibility and understanding. At this point in time we may defend Kant from
his accusers and note interesting parallels between my interpretation and others
sympathetic to defending Kant.
Of authors that attend to the Transcendental Deduction, Peter Strawson is
rather harsh in his evaluation of the success and importance of Kant‟s arguments in
either edition. Strawson concludes that Kant‟s Transcendental Deduction is a failure
in determining the objective validity of the categories. This evaluation is precipitate
upon two important interpretations Strawson attributes to the 1st Critique. In The
Bounds of Sense, Strawson in careful to provide a guide of his interpretation of Kant,
arguing for “two faces” of the Critique, only one of which he wishes to promote and
defend. Strawson wishes to separate Kant‟s doctrine of transcendental idealism—
which amounts to attributing, according to Strawson, to our own cognitive
constitution the limiting or necessary features of experience395—from a metaphysics
of science that is available in Kant so long as one adheres to an austerer
interpretation. This latter task, the one proper to Kant studies according to Strawson,
permits the reader to embrace the Copernican revolution without slipping into what
395
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Strawson believes is the speculative realm of transcendental idealism. An austere
reading of Kant argues that “there can be no legitimate, or even meaningful,
employment of ideas or concepts which does not relate them to empirical or
experiential conditions of their application.”396 Upon such a reading, the notion of
forms of intuition, having no empirical referent, becomes meaningless and thus
should be abandoned in favor of concepts to which we can make direct reference. In
addition, the second important consideration when discussing Strawson‟s
interpretation of Kant‟s philosophy lies in the advancement of the function and use of
logic to which Strawson has access by the time of his writing. Strawson will
elaborate not Kant‟s understanding, but his own, which he believes finds application
in the logic advanced and employed by the middle of the 20th Century. Strawson
identifies two principles of logic that will govern his evaluation of the transcendental
table of logical judgments and arguments based upon its establishment. The two,
basic ideas of logic Strawson cites are 1) truth-functionality and 2) quantification.
While these notions were available to Kant, at least the second of these two, they are
not the principles Kant cites directly and, consequently, will color the evaluation and
interpretation of Kant‟s doctrines. The overall evaluation Strawson attributes to the
success of Kant‟s philosophy will take us too far afield at this point, and yet his
evaluation of Kant‟s deductions will prove helpful in uncovering difficulties and
ambiguities found in the text.
To quote the Oxford professor in full:
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Such analytical argument as we can find is conducted at dizzying
heights of abstractness and generality; it is intertwined with the
elaboration of the subjectivity thesis, the transcendental psychology of
faculties; for anything detailed of specific by way of conclusion, it
depends entirely on the derivation of a list of categories from the forms
of judgment... the Deduction leaves us favorably entertaining rather
than wholly possessed or persuaded of [the argument for the objective
validity of the categories].397
What Strawson indicates in these concluding remarks is Kant‟s reliance on the
categories on judgment and the nebulous connection between the table of judgments
and the table of categories. That a derivation of the categories depends on the table of
judgments has been noted above. Also as noted above, should such a derivation of
the categories from the table of judgments prove tenable, the a priori nature of
categories as well as the necessity of them for cognition will be established. Thus
Strawson‟s critique is really one not concerning the Transcendental Deduction, but,
rather, a critique of the Metaphysical Deduction, wherein Kant putatively indicates
the reliance of the categories on the table of judgments. And having provided such a
deduction, the sting of Strawson‟s critique will be ameliorated. Strawson himself
notes that if the Metaphysical Deduction is successful, the objective validity of the
categories is established. He continues to suggest that should such a derivation
obtain, the Transcendental Deduction becomes redundant, unless the argument arrives
at the same conclusion, but from a different set of premises.398 Such a second
argument is proper and necessary, according to Strawson, because “the appeal to
formal logic produced virtually no result… the attempt to derive categories from the
397
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notion of objective judgment was a failure.”399 That is, a Transcendental Deduction
is necessary because of Kant‟s failure in the Metaphysical Deduction.
And yet, for Strawson, the Transcendental Deduction fares little better than
Kant‟s Metaphysical Deduction. In part this critique stems from Strawson‟s
interpretation regarding the aims and sufficiency of a demonstration of objective
validity. According to Strawson, objective validity is “the necessary applicability of
categories to appearances, to the objects of experience.”400 This definition of
objective validity will come to be challenged by figures like Henry Allison, who
argue that demonstration of the applicability of categories is the second half of a two
part argument in the Transcendental Deduction. The first half is to demonstrate the
necessity of the categories “with respect to objects of sensible intuition in general.”401
The second half, Allison argues, is the task cited by Strawson, to demonstrate the “the
necessity of the categories with respect to human sensibility and its data.”402 This
second task is what Allison describes as the objective reality of the categories, one
with which Kant is concerned, but a different argument than that of objective reality.
Much of the contention relies upon interpretations of Kant‟s stated task; to “prove
that by their [the categories] means alone an object can be thought.”403 Allison‟s
argument amounts to dividing the Transcendental Deduction into two parts, the first
of which is to demonstrate the a priori necessity, and hence validity, of the categories
in order to think any object in general, the second to demonstrate the application of
399
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the categories to human intuitions and the objects found therein. By limiting himself
to the second of these two tasks, Strawson concedes Kant‟s argument for the
transcendental unity of apperception,404 but overlooks the importance of this unity in
grounding and demonstrating the necessity of the categories.
One might go even further and suggest that Strawson‟s demands for objective
validity of categories is actually a misplaced demonstration, one which Kant will
provide in part in the Schematism and then fully in the Analytic of Principles.
Strawson‟s definition of objective validity draws from Cohen‟s reverse reading of the
Transcendental Analytic and presupposes applicability before demonstrating the a
priori nature of the categories and the objective validity that obtains at the most
general and abstract levels, that is, prior to application. What Kant is demanding in
the Transcendental Deduction is not concrete examples of the application of the
categories, but the necessity of the categories, demonstrated priori to any empirical
experience. Strawson, it would seem, has placed the cart before the horse.
This tacit strategic approach, along with Strawson‟s stipulations of formal
logic, also informs his evaluation of the metaphysical deduction. According to
Strawson‟s austere reading of Kant‟s doctrines, a metaphysical deduction must be one
that is devoid of spatio-temporal considerations.405 To argue for this seemingly
implausible analysis of the metaphysical deduction, Strawson cites the relevant
passage at A76/B102 between general and transcendental logic. At this point
Strawson stresses the doctrine that transcendental logic contains the notion of “the
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synthetic unity of the manifold in an intuition in general.”406 Strawson continues by
pointing out that the categories as presented in the metaphysical deduction are not
schematized categories and thus have no temporal conditions.
But what Strawson fails to note, thereby preventing him from seeing the
original presentation of deduction of the categories and table of judgments, is the
differentiation between the unity of the manifold in general, as presented in the
metaphysical deduction, and the narrowing of categories in the schematism to attend
to the temporal structures necessary to provide rules for application to particular
objects. In the metaphysical deduction, the role of time and space is the general and a
priori presentation of any possible manifold, in the schematism the role of time is the
structural rules of temporality that provide the possibility for the generalized (read
universal) categories of the understanding to be applied to particular objects.
Moreover, Strawson‟s emphasis on the unity of the manifold quoted above appears to
disregard, or at least fails to fully comprehend, Kant‟s own discussion of
transcendental logic when Kant states transcendental logic “has lying before it a
manifold of a priori sensibility, presented by the transcendental aesthetic… Space
and time contain a manifold of pure, a priori intuition.”407 To exclude time and space
from consideration in the metaphysical deduction overlooks the role of formal
intuitions as presented by the imagination in the derivation and elaboration of both
the table of logic and categories. Thus by providing the complete list of possible
“objects” according to the parameters of space and time by the productive
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imagination, we can provide a metaphysical deduction to which Strawson will
disagree, but on specious interpretive grounds. By employing the logical principles
available to Kant, and eliding the logical notions Strawson wishes to replace them
with in his reconstruction and evaluation of failure, Strawson‟s evaluation of the
metaphysical deduction can be refuted.
Even with such a refutation, the charge of redundancy must be addressed.
Strawson has charged that if the metaphysical deduction was a success, in terms of
proving the necessity of the categories in cognition, the transcendental deduction
would have been redundant. This charge is dependent upon Strawson‟s peculiar,
austere, interpretation of the task set out by Kant in the Transcendental Deduction. If
the task demanded by the deductions is to prove the application of the categories to
objects of experience, it would appear Strawson is still correct in denying the success
of the deduction. When the task is divided into the two part system provided by
Allison, Strawson himself provides a way out of his own charge of redundancy. By
affirming the necessity of the transcendental unity of apperception, and by forcing
him to concede the original metaphysical deduction provided here, Strawson‟s own
evaluation of starting at new premises to arrive at the necessity of the categories is
imminent. The starting point of the metaphysical deduction is the forms of space and
time, the imagination and the logical table of judgments. What Kant‟s transcendental
deduction provides is a missing premise regarding the individual in which the
cognitive processes inhere. The Transcendental Deduction, therefore, provides not a
new deduction of the categories, but, rather, argues for the missing premise that
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permits the universality of the deduction of the categories for all rational beings that
are subject to the conditions of sensibility with which we find ourselves equipped.
Such an approach strengthens the necessity of the Transcendental Deduction and
illustrates that, rather than a redundancy, it is integral to Kant‟s transcendental
argumentation to delimit the conditions of cognition.
One further point that does not permit Strawson to understand the importance
and mechanism behind both the Transcendental and Metaphysical Deductions is his
relegation of the imagination to a second-class faculty rather than one in its own
right.408 This interpretation appears to be the natural consequence of Strawson‟s
reliance upon the B-edition deduction. Because of the emphasis Kant places on the
transcendental unity of apperception and its subsequent revision in the B-edition,
which downplays the role of the imagination, Strawson interprets the imagination to
be a function of the understanding. Because Kant deletes the exposition of the three
temporal ec-stasies with their emphasis on synthesis of manifold, memories and
recognition, the second edition of the 1st Critique lends itself to such an interpretation.
But careful attention to the heart of the B-edition deduction, §24, does not warrant the
demotion of the imagination to an auxiliary of understanding. It is in this section,
entitled The Application of the Categories to Objects of the Senses in General, that
Strawson‟s chief concern lay, and his treatment of the imagination overlooks the
fundamentality of imagination in the process(es) of synthesis. It is to be noted that
the imagination is responsible for the synthesis of categories and the deliverances of
the senses—the very formulation Strawson describes as the goal of the deduction,
408
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objective validity. If we recall, Kant indicates that it is the function of the
imagination to effect the figurative synthesis necessary to combine categories with
the object presented in the sensibility in order for cognition to obtain, first by
synthesizing the deliverances of the senses into a unity, then by presenting such a
unity for subsumption under the categories as an image and finally as the act of
synthesis connecting the appropriate schemata to the image. If Strawson‟s concern is
with the application of the categories, such an oversight appears to undermine any
sympathy to the text.
But perhaps Strawson is concerned in his austere interpretation to connect the
categories, albeit dubious in his mind, with the givenness of the objects in
appearance. In point of fact, the bulk of Strawson‟s analysis appears to be a defense
of this very Kantian precept in the face of sense-data theorists and their claim that all
concepts are the product of abstraction from empirical data. He argues that the
deliverances of the senses are “discrete, single, separate, without complexity.”409
Any complexity is the product of synthesis, performed by the understanding with the
help of its “lieutenant, imagination.” And yet, it is at this point that Strawson‟s
strategy exposes its interpretive weakness again. Rather than focusing on the
production of the categories, and the role of imagination in doing so, Strawson
overlooks the process of pure synthesis in favor of the syntheses involved in
empirical judgment. He is willing to concede Kant‟s doctrine that “‟pure‟ synthesis is
involved also in the generation of the unity of the „pure manifold‟ of space and time,”
but fails to appreciate this doctrine in terms of a derivation of the categories. This is,
409
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in part, because of Strawson‟s rejection of transcendental idealism in favor of his
austere interpretation that attempts to confine Kant to an emender of sense-data
theories of concepts and author of bloated faculty psychologies. In doing so,
Strawson will reject any discussion of pure, a priori syntheses and subsequently any
employment of the imagination in its pure form. By relegating the imagination to a
sub-faculty of the understanding, employed only in the figurative syntheses of
empirical judgments, Strawson overlooks the most critical insight of the Copernican
revolution and the point behind Kant‟s treatment of intellectual syntheses in
illustration of the deduction of categories from the form of intuitions in general from
the Metaphysical Deduction.
With Henry Allison‟s interpretation and defense of Kant‟s transcendental
idealism, we find a more sympathetic read of Kant‟s Metaphysical and
Transcendental Deductions, but one which suffers from problems similar to
Strawson‟s. By distinguishing the two different steps in the argument of Kant‟s
Transcendental Deduction, Allison is able to differentiate himself from Strawson‟s
position and errors, but by emphasizing the B-deduction, Allison himself overlooks
the role of imagination in intellectual synthesis, and hence does not perceive the
fundamentality of the imagination in a deduction of the categories.
Allison interprets Kant‟s stated goal of the Transcendental Deduction in a
much more sympathetic light, granting to Kant the claim that the goal of the
deduction is to demonstrate the conditions for the possibility for cognition, and by
what right we have to claim them as necessary. But to do so, Allison makes the
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distinction between the a priori right to claim the transcendental unity of apperception
as a condition for cognition and the a priori right to claim the application of the
categories to the deliverances of the senses in human cognition. Allison affirms the
success of the former, the objective validity of the categories in conjunction with
apperception, but not the latter, the objective reality of the categories. In doing so,
Allison makes an important and interesting observation about objective validity and
objective reality, which in turn has consequences regarding the objects to which the
categories apply. In an attempt to make clear this difficult distinction I will quote the
rather lengthy passage from Allison.
Using the legalistic metaphor suggested by the notion of validity
(Gultigkeit), we can also say that a judgment is objectively valid if the
synthesis of representations which it contains is “grounded” or
“legitimate.” The objective validity of the categories is to be
explained in terms of their role in judgment. Thus to say that the
categories are objectively valid is to claim that they make possible,
“ground,” or “legitimate” an objectively valid synthesis of
representations.410 But since it is only in and through judgments that
we represent objects, the objective validity of the categories can also
be said to consist in the fact that they are necessary conditions for the
representation of objects.
By contrast, the notion of objective reality has an ontological sense.
To claim a concept has objective reality is to claim that it refers or is
applicable to an object. Thus a fictional concept, such as a „unicorn,‟
would not have objective reality, although it could very well function
as a predicate in an objectively valid judgment, such as „unicorns do
not exist.‟ In the case of the categories, which alone concern us here,
the claim of objective reality is equivalent to the claim that they have a
reference or applicability to whatever objects are given to us in
intuition (objects of possible experience). 411
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One important point to note here is the connection Allison draws between the
objective validity of the categories with their employment in valid judgments
(arguments). In order to draw this connection, Allison relies upon the judgments
found in the table of logical judgments, much as we have for the original deduction
presented above. Important to notice here is Allison‟s contention that the categories
must be legitimated or grounded in order to be objectively valid in judgment, but
Allison fails to provide any grounding other than the necessary, unified consciousness
in which such judgments may obtain. Allison argues the categories are employed
in/by such a consciousness, but whence the categories is still left in question.
Furthermore, because the objective reality of the categories, the actual use of the
categories in empirical experience, depends upon the objective validity and the
legitimacy of the categories, by failing to provide a transcendental deduction
determining whence the categories, the second half of Allison‟s distinction will
obviously fail. Without demonstrating the source(s) and necessity of the categories in
connection with the possibility of receptivity, Kant‟s conceptual and sensible stems of
knowledge will fail to be aligned. Allison‟s proof strategy falls short of providing
this connection, while the one I have provided attempts to bridge this connection.
objective reality and objective validity, and then, in his conclusion, deems that the categories are
objectively valid in a “judgmental or logical sense” but “fails to demonstrate that the categories make
experience possible.” This shift in goals obscures Allison‟s analysis; objective reality cannot be
equated with the reportedly failed second task of Kant‟s deduction. The legitimacy or grounding of
categories in apperception Allison argues for convincingly. What Allison‟s strategy lacks however is
the proper understanding of the connection of apperception and the forms of intuition. The arguments
for apperception are similar to those for the forms of intuition; both are transcendental arguments, but
neither of which we directly experience. We never experience the transcendental unity of
apperception, although we may experience the synthetic unity of apperception as a representation in
cognition through the unification of ec-stasies of time. Likewise, we never experience the form of
intuition, although Kant does seem to make allowances for a formal intuition. Cf. §24 B160-161.
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The true difficulty in Allison‟s interpretation and judgment concerning Kant‟s
Transcendental Deduction is the shortcoming that we find in Kant. Allison‟s
faithfulness to the transcendental deduction precludes him from discovering the
logical forms of formal intuition. And without doing so, Allison is beholden to a
doctrine that the categories govern apperception, apprehension and empirical
intuition. He is correct to specify that judgments concerning these facets of cognition
are governed by the conceptual apparatus necessary to make synthetic, empirical
judgments, but mistaken in his assessment that all synthesis is governed by the
categories. In one respect, prior to explicitation of the categories Kant provides, we
find the forms of intuition synthesized in formal intuitions that may obtain prior to the
categories Kant provides. Recognizing these formal intuitions conceptually appears
to be the difficult task at hand if there are no categories to govern such recognition.
Thus Allison argues that any recognition of formal intuition must be category
governed. And yet, in the table of judgments, Kant is not employing the categories
per se, but, rather, determining the concepts available to human cognition by
providing an exhaustive account of the ways in which formal intuitions may be
manifest. If the difference between the table of judgments and table of categories is
correct as I have presented it, the categories do not govern the table of judgments, but
are, rather, the temporalization and spatialization of the judgments found in formal
intuition. Certainly, the categories appear to be co-occurrent with the forms of
logical judgment, or, at least they follow immediately upon the re-spatialization and
re-temporalization of the judgments to bring them closer to objects of empirical
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experience. With this re-re-spatialization and re-temporalization, we are no longer
dealing with formal intuitions, but with the abstract concepts that necessarily follow
from the logical judgments. No longer are the judgments mere forms of logical
judgment, that is of objects in general; by introducing the forms of intuition again,
they move beyond logical form to conceptual generalities, categories.
The approach I have taken is the inverse of Allison‟s. Rather than
generatively describing the categories, Allison takes them as primitives connected
with the forms of judgment (and he is correct to emphasize the connection with the
categories). In doing so, Allison argues all syntheses are products of productive
imagination and are category-governed.412 This peculiarity forces Allison to describe
the synthesis required by the transcendental unity of apperception to be category
governed, and thereby displaces the grounding legitimacy of the categories in
transcendental apperception. Likewise, apprehension, even the unity of apprehension
in immediate object presentation, is category governed. This forces Allison to
overlook the synthesis that takes place at the level of sensibility in presenting a
unified manifold to the understanding, a synthesis operating in formal intuitions and
the logical judgments that are precipitate. In short, Allison‟s commitment to
conceptual primitives without explanation forces him into a position that suggests
conceptual organization at all levels of cognition. It would seem to be, for Allison,
concepts all the way down. My approach, on the other hand, permits synthesis of
varying sorts, at varying levels. The imaginative synthesis operating in formal
412
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intuition is not concept governed in my approach. Rather, it is the synthesis that
provides unity of a manifold considering the formal presentation of an “object” in
space and time, not any empirical object, but the formal intuition that elicit logical
judgments concerning identity and non-contradiction that can in turn be elaborated
into the list of twelve Kant provides. Formal intuitions, intellectual though they may
be, require a synthesis that is not the understanding joining concepts with the
deliverances of the senses. This intellectual synthesis is generative of the table of
judgments and, subsequently, the table of categories. If the productive imagination,
and the reproductive imagination for that matter, are operative, at times extraconceptually, at others conceptually, we can support Kant‟s many claims about
varying syntheses, but also unify the two stems of knowledge under one root.
Allison, it would seem, would have that root be the understanding.413 In doing so he
subsumes all syntheses under a single, conceptually-governed activity, that betrays
Kant‟s own descriptions (primarily from the A-edition). Rather than apperception
being the condition that accounts for the unity of time, Allison interprets the unity of
time as the sufficient condition of the unity of apperception. Furthermore, the unity
of time is the basis for the categories and Allison would also have the categories
providing the ground of apperception, a direct contradiction of Kant‟s stated purpose
in the transcendental deduction.
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At the same time, Allison is willing to concede the “doctrine that the
unification or determination of time is produced by the transcendental synthesis of
imagination.”414 But this concession does little to explain Allison‟s position that all
synthesis is category governed. In point of fact, it presents a trenchant difficulty in
trying to reconcile these two aspects of Allison‟s interpretation. If the imagination is
a sub-faculty of understanding, and the imagination is responsible for the synthesis
required for the unity of time that enables the unity of apperception, it would seem
that all syntheses are category governed. By arguing for an extra-conceptual
synthesis that provides the unity of time in an infinite given magnitude, while at the
same time maintaining synthesis is category governed, Allison appears to provide an
inconsistent position on the proper role and constraints governing synthesis in
general. By distinguishing between types of syntheses, both extra-conceptual as well
as category governed, and the distinction between imagination in its productive
capacity from that of its reproductive capacity, my interpretation can ameliorate this
difficulty in Kant‟s text and Allison‟s interpretation.
The only place Allison will rely upon the imagination is to attempt to prove
the objective reality of the categories, and he will inevitably deem this argument a
failure. And yet, in doing so, he overlooks the imagination in its original and
fundamental function, its functions both in the transcendental unity of apperception
and in the determination of judgment and categories. In short, he makes the same
interpretive error that Strawson commits by relegating the imagination to a sub-
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function of the understanding, allocating its employment in figurative synthesis alone
and failing to account for it in intellectual synthesis.
In a more recent study of the deduction and logical table of judgments,
Beatrice Longuenesse (1998) follows Allison‟s guide and interprets the pivotal
section of the 1st Critique in light of syllogistic logic, but approaches the subject in a
novel way. Longuenesse proposes that “neither the argument of the Transcendental
Deduction of the Categories… nor the System of Principles of the Pure
Understanding, can be understood unless they are related, down to the minutest
details of their proofs, to the role that Kant assigns the logical forms of our
judgments, and to the manner in which he establishes the table of categories or pure
concepts of the understanding according to the „guiding thread‟ of these logical
forms.”415 In opposition to Cohen and his intellectual heir Strawson, Longuenesse
defends Kant from their backwards reading, whereby they start with empirical
concepts and their application in the principles and subsequently work backward to
prove the validity of the categories. Rather, Longuenesse begins with the
Metaphysical Deduction and attempts to find the logical forms that inform the
production of the categories.
Longuenesse begins this process by pointing out that logic, for Kant, means
the “universal rules of discursive thought.” She asserts that, despite Kant‟s
suggestion in both the 1st Critique and the Prolegomena, the logical table of
judgments is not merely the collocation and emendation of logical forms of syllogistic
logic, although they do inform the production of the forms of discursive thought. For
415
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Longuenesse, the logical forms Kant indicates are the product of a process similar to
that of the construction of mathematical concepts. But unlike mathematical concepts
logical judgments are entirely discursive and not intuitive. This interpretation grants
Kant success, albeit too concisely/briefly stated in the metaphysical deduction, and
consequently success in the Transcendental Deduction because the legitimacy of the
categories has been demonstrated priori. This interpretation follows Allison‟s lead in
reevaluating the purpose of the Transcendental Deduction by sympathizing with
Kant‟s stated purpose. Unlike Allison, however, the argument for the universality of
the logical forms and the argument for their functional identity with the categories
permits Longuenesse to affirm the objective reality of the categories and not only
their objective validity. Because the logical forms of judgment are the means by
which all thought is organized in discursive thought, by the addition of the forms of
pure intuition, the categories become the means by which intuitions are thought in the
understanding, hence their necessary application is ensured.
One difficulty with Longuenesse‟s argument centers around the content of
discursive thought. One facile objection questions what the content of these concepts
employed in discursive might be. Certainly, so the objection runs, in the employment
of discursive thinking, we are employing concepts; but concepts of what? As the
“form of thinking in general” these concepts cannot have empirical content, lest they
be concepts of particulars and lose the very aspect Longuenesse relies upon to
determine the universal validity of the judgments and categories.

To address this

difficulty, Longuenesse characterizes the contents of discursive thought as “concepts
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in a judgment to something represented by „x‟ or „x, y, z‟.”416 By presenting
variables as the objects available to discursive thought, Longuenesse follows Kant‟s
prescription for the contents of intellectual synthesis, thus removing any empirical
content of particular objects. In so doing, Longuenesse can affirm the a priori nature
of discursive thought and the forms of transcendental logic while still retaining the
ability to provide different objects under such cognition. However, this description
highlights the difficulty in providing concepts, reportedly devoid of content, while
still stipulating the possibility of making distinctions. In order to represent “x” or “x,
y, or z”, Longuenesse must still be employing, at minimum, the concept of a
singularity and plurality, two of the very concepts she is attempting to justify. Even
in the pure realm of discursive thinking, these concepts appear to be in employment
and a deduction of them appears to be in order. Thus by relying on the logical forms
of judgment with variables designating distinctions between “objects” of
consideration, even in discursive thinking alone, neither Longuenesse nor Kant can
make the claims she tries to make of him. Rather, some content must be employed in
order to determine the forms of discursive thought. By adding the formal
requirements of space and time, as in the deduction I have provided above, we can
emend the tremendously valuable work Longuenesse researched in order to determine
how such concepts of singularity and plurality are able to be employed even in
discursive thought alone. This addition explains how one can discursively provide
distinctions between variables „x, y, z‟ in order to distinguish between “objects”
available to discursive cognition. In doing so, one can highlight the role of the
416
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imagination in its transcendental determination of logical judgments and thereby
categories.
This brings us to one further point concerning Longuenesse‟s interpretation of
Kant‟s doctrines. Despite an even-handed approach to both versions of the 1st
Critique, and thus avoiding the common critique of her predecessors, Longuenesse
still interprets the transcendental imagination along similar lines as Allison and
Strawson. Both for them and for Longuenesse, the transcendental imagination of the
A-edition becomes the synthesis speciosa, figurative synthesis, of the B-edition. And
while my interpretation above does concede the employment of imagination in
synthesis speciosa, in both its reproductive and productive uses, it does not merely
relegate imagination to this empirical employment. The transcendental imagination
also has its place in intellectual synthesis, the grounds for synthesis speciosa in the
first place, by providing the forms of discursive thinking to begin with. And while it
may seem like the imagination is an inapt word for the a process whereby no images
are actually in play (for that would still fall under the figures of figurative synthesis)
it presents an opportunity to see Kant‟s use of imagination beyond the mere image
making employment of his philosophical forebears. In fact, it highlights the radical
transformation of Kant‟s use of imagination- one by which it is in part responsible for
the ways in which we both see and think our world.
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Chapter Eight: Is the Imagination a faculty, one or two?

In exploring the role of the imagination in the 1st Critique, I have thus far
treated the imagination as an independent faculty. In fact, I have been treating the
imagination as the faculty that mediates between Kant‟s well-established dualism,
even suggesting that the imagination might be the mysterious root out of which the
sensibility and understanding emerge. However, that the imagination is independent
is far from obvious when one investigates both Kant‟s works and commentary on
such; that the imagination is the root faculty is nearly universally denied. Several
issues surround the imagination, and several reasons obscure the doctrine I have
attempted to illustrate. It is now to this presupposition I now wish to turn.
The chief reason for obscurity concerning the imagination as an independent
faculty remains Kant‟s inconsistent and confusing references to this faculty in
question. The revisions to the Critique of Pure Reason—notably the revision to the
Transcendental Deduction, wherein Kant employs the imagination—leave his reader
wondering what work if any, it performs in the A-deduction and how this use is
modified or supplemented in the B-edition. In the preceding chapters, I have
attempted to show a reconciliation and harmony between the editions, thereby
attempting to alleviate this problem. But, in addition to the revisions of the 1st
Critique, Kant employs the imagination in his two subsequent Critiques. By the time
Kant writes the 3rd Critique, he has nearly abandoned the language of sensibility and
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passivity when describing the deliverances of the senses, favoring imagination as the
faculty that presents the deliverances of the senses. This shift in locution compounds
the difficulty of discussing the imagination as a faculty in its own right, for in this
later work it appears to be allied with sensibility. The discrepancies between the A
and B editions compounded by the seeming discrepancies with the terminology of the
3rd Critique present significant challenges to a unified theory of imagination in Kant‟s
works. There is, however, a possible resolution to these difficulties, and it is only by
turning to these issues themselves that one can provide a coherent account that
demonstrates the necessity of the imagination both as an independent faculty and as
the root of the other faculties while satisfying the architectonic of Kant‟s dualism. It
is thus to the difficulties and reformulations Kant provides that I now wish to turn.
One of the most glaring changes Kant makes in his reformulation of the
Transcendental Deduction is his departure from the three-fold synthesis with which
he begins the A-edition. The speculation about Kant‟s desire to present the ground of
the categories i.e. the transcendental unity of apperception, in addition to a simpler
version of synthesis at work in such an argument presents plausible reasons why Kant
might abandon the three-fold synthesis of the A-edition in favor of two syntheses in
the B-edition. Yet another reason is the implications and perhaps confusion that
arises from such syntheses. Kant originally declares quite simply that “synthesis in
general… is the result of the power of imagination.”417 But if one examines the threefold synthesis, one finds synthesis operating at all three levels, thus presenting an
opaque doctrine that requires synthesis of the power of imagination at all three levels,
417
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but only one to which Kant explicitly attributes synthesis by the imagination.
Beginning with the first of the three-fold, the synthesis of apprehension in intuition,
the synthesis that obtains is an immediate, unified whole.418 Such a synthesis Kant
appears to attribute to the sensibility, for it is by the deliverances of the senses that
one is presented with a unified manifold of intuition(s), for it is not a synthesis
enacted by the understanding‟s ability to bring particulars to judgment. At first blush,
such a synthesis effected by apprehension is a synthesis that obtains at the level of
sensibility, hence the imagination might be associated with the faculty of sensibility.
This need for a collocation of sensations is found in the epistemic strategies of
empirical philosophies, and by declaring the synthesis required in apprehension, Kant
echoes Aristotle and Aquinas without explicitly mentioning a sensus communis. But
this is precisely the idea Kant is promoting by arguing for a unified manifold given in
apprehension that we understand to be comprised of data delivered by our discrete
sense receptors.
When turning to the second of Kant‟s three-fold synthesis, the synthesis of
reproduction in imagination, one finds explicit treatment of the imagination at work
in providing presentation of objects no longer present. One might call these
occurrences memories, for that is spirit in which Kant employs reproductive
imagination; unfortunately, Kant rarely makes use of the term. Regardless of terms,
however, we find Kant appealing to the classic definition of the imagination as the
faculty responsible for the presentation of objects not present, or if present, attendant
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parts no longer under the direct gaze of apprehension.419 Furthermore, Kant employs
this reproductive imagination as a mediating faculty whose role is to mediate between
immediately given sensation, former sensations, and their recognition as same,
different or in reciprocity. Such a use of the imagination reminds his audience of the
pivotal role the imagination has played in nearly all the historical accounts, despite
certain authors attempt to subordinate this vital function.
When turning to recognition, the third in his three-fold, one finds Kant‟s own
development of synthesis in judgment. Judgment belongs to the faculty of
understanding properly, and, as such, synthesis appears to be allied with the
understanding. In bringing the deliverances of the senses together with the
architecture of categories—that is, by subsuming the particular presentation of
apprehension under concepts—judgments are formed e.g. in identification of an
object, parts and wholes, or reciprocity.420 That such a synthesis is required for any
identification and recognition is apparent, otherwise no object of experience
obtains—literally, we would not recognize the object of experience delivered by
sensation. And yet, this proves a difficult doctrine to maintain. If synthesis in
general is the product of imagination, the imagination appears to be a function or
species of the understanding. The overriding concern in the three-fold synthesis is to
provide an account for the presentation, recognition and possible reproduction of
objects of experience for epistemic purposes, but Kant appears to have the
imagination operating differently at various points in such an explanation.
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That the vagueness of such a doctrine vexes Kant remains a plausible
suggestion for his reformulation of the Transcendental Deduction in the B-edition.
No longer will Kant recount these syntheses, but will instead argue more
straightforwardly for the transcendental unity of apperception as the main doctrine
that grounds the objective validity of the categories. And yet, in such an argument
the imagination appears again, this time in the form of another ambiguity. According
to Kant the transcendental unity of apperception must be properly delineated, but to
do so he makes recourse to the transcendental power of the imagination. Such a
function is the only a priori means by which he can argue for the unity of the “I think”
that accompanies all experience.421 Since the transcendental power of imagination
remains the function by which Kant explains the possibility of the transcendental
unity of apperception, and this latter doctrine requires a pure, a priori explanation of
any possible manifold (in this case the pure representation of the self as unified), Kant
has recourse to a power of the imagination that is only intellectual. Such a purely
intellectual synthesis, and the judgment that the argument for the transcendental unity
of apperception is successful by means of it, appears to be allied, once again with the
understanding, thereby undermining the imagination‟s claim to independence.422 In
contrast to such pure synthesis, Kant will find himself in need of an explanation of the
deliverances of the senses, or intuitions of such deliverances, and does so by
contraposing the intellectual synthesis with a figurative one. The figurative synthesis
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affords the presentation of a unified manifold in intuition.423 Accordingly, “since all
our intuition is sensible, the imagination, owing to the subjective condition under
which alone it can give to the concepts of understanding a corresponding intuition,
belongs to sensibility.”424 Kant would thus seem to align imagination of the
figurative variety with sensibility again. However, “in as much as its synthesis is an
expression of spontaneity, which is determinative and not, like sense, determinable
merely… the imagination… is an action of the understanding.”425 Because the
presentation of senses to the understanding in the act of judging is a synthesis of
spontaneity, the imagination cannot belong merely to sensibility, but appears to
belong as a function of understanding. Kant, it would appear, maintains that the
imagination belongs to both sensibility and understanding. Such a doctrine, however,
will violate the strict dualism established earlier in Kant‟s analytic of principles.
By shifting locution in the 3rd Critique, from an analysis of the passivity of
sensibility and spontaneity of understanding, to an analysis of the products of
imagination and concept formation found in the understanding, Kant will attempt to
alleviate the confusion of the 1st Critique. However, he will, once again, muddy the
waters when discussing the imagination. Such a dualism between imagination and
understanding might be construed as Kant‟s considered view, firmly placing the
imagination in the service of sensibility. But the nature of judgments discussed in the
3rd Critique suggests caution against such a strong interpretation. Because Kant
occupies himself with reflective judgments, judgments wherein the object is no longer
423

B151.
Ibid.
425
B151-152.
424

262

present or in reflection of an object of experience whereby one moves away from
direct apprehension of the object to contemplation of it, what the dualism of
imagination and understanding amounts to is only an attenuated dualism. What the
imagination presents in reflective judgment is the presentation of an object no longer
present, which is tantamount to the presentation of reproduction, memory, found in
the three-fold synthesis. The shift in locution is only precipitated by a shift in
judgments, not by any radical revision of Kant‟s terminology from the 1st Critique.
After the exercises of two deductions and a third critique, there appears to be
three possible options available for Kant. Kant can ally the imagination with
sensation, thereby explaining much of the figurative synthesis and synthesis of
apprehension; ally the imagination with understanding, thereby explaining intellectual
synthesis and the spontaneity/activity found in judgments and the synthesis of
recognition in concepts; or he may posit the imagination as a third faculty in its own
right. Each interpretation presents itself with a unique set of problems, but, I would
like to contend, while the problems of two options are insurmountable difficulties to
Kant‟s project, one option may be mitigated in such a way as to affirm Kant‟s
doctrines.
If the imagination is to be allied with sensibility or explained as a sub-process
of sensation, startling implications become apparent. Should one interpret
imagination as part of sensibility, Kant can easily explain the synthesis that obtains in
apprehension. The unified manifold that is immediate in apprehension is now easily
explained by a form of synthesis exclusive to sensibility itself. Such a manifold is

263

unified because sensations themselves are unified in the passive receptivity of the
disparate sense receptors. Furthermore, Kant gains a strong sense of the empirical
reality to which he must appeal in order to establish the possibility of veritative
judgments. Judgments of objects of experience can be deemed true by referencing
the unified object presented by the senses. To find the truth of a judgment, one would
merely need to appeal to sensation. It may be the case that the various sensations of
the object are discrete, but if this interpretation is pursued, any such syntheses of
discrete sensation obtains in the passivity of sensibility itself. As such, the objects of
experience are responsible for the syntheses and judgments concerning objects will
have recourse to the very objects themselves as given in sensation. If this
interpretation is pursued, one makes Kant into an empiricist of the Lockean-Humean
sort. All synthesis obtains in sensation itself and inspection and judgments of objects,
while properly the domain of understanding, is ultimately beholden to the passivity of
sensation for verification. All concepts thus become some translation of the object of
experience into a representation available for inspection by the mind. In doing so,
Kant will lose the ability to claim pure concepts by which we organize the world, and
hence will not be able to effect the Copernican turn. By allying imagination with
sensibility Kant gains a strong empirical reality, but loses the transcendental ideality
he so vociferously argues for.
If one allies the imagination with the understanding, however, the inverse
obtains. By making the imagination a sub-process of the understanding, Kant will be
able to account for the spontaneity of the pure categories, for pure concept formation
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and articulation will be entirely the domain of the understanding. By possessing the
power of synthesis, the activity of joining forms of intuition, empirical intuitions and
concepts will be exclusively the activity of understanding. By determining the
imagination as a function of the understanding much of the murkiness of synthesis
found in the deductions can be overcome, notably the synthesis of recognition in
concepts and intellectual synthesis. All synthesis, but most importantly, synthesis
found in judgment can be easily explained as the product of the spontaneity of
understanding. But such an approach has its costs as well. If Kant gains a strong
sense of transcendental ideality by this interpretation, he does so at the sacrifice of
empirical reality. If all synthesis is the product of understanding, there remains no
tribunal against which one can weigh the judgments being made. Judgments may
turn out to be mere figments of the imagination. Indeed, such a strategy tilts Kant in
the direction of the rationalist philosophy of the Wolffian-Leibnizian
schulphilosophen against which Kant is also struggling. Indeed, there seems to be no
justification for the objective validity of the categories.
The third option available is to account for the imagination as an independent
faculty; such a strategy, however, is also not without its difficulties. By arguing for
the imagination as an independent faculty, Kant will be able to explain memory more
easily, and can do so along the lines illustrated by Hume. Memory is a reproduction
of the deliverances of the sense, a presentation of objects no longer present. As such,
memories are susceptible to various influences e.g. resemblance, deterioration etc.
The main strategic benefit Kant can find in such an argument is the ability to maintain
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the dualism between sensibility and understanding, while finding a mediator between
the two. If the imagination is an independent faculty the passivity of sensibility can
be maintained and the spontaneity/activity of understanding can be affirmed, with the
imagination providing the liaison between two such seemingly incommensurate
capacities. The drawback of maintaining the independence of the imagination is the
loss of a principled explanation of how such a “blind but indispensible function of the
soul” works, thereby losing an account of pure reason. Since Kant‟s project is a
critique of pure reason, in all its capacities, such a loss of appears unacceptable, lest
we have at the most pivotal moment a faculty with no explanation or reason.
Furthermore, by making the imagination a third faculty, albeit a mediating faculty,
such a strategy will present difficulties in explaining the connection between the
independent faculty of imagination and the other independent faculties; 3rd man
arguments will present intractable problems for such an explanation. In the final
analysis, it would appear that no strategy can maintain Kant‟s position while
providing satisfactory explanations according to the architectonic Kant has
established.
Commentary on this issue also provides little assistance in finding a suitable
choice. Briefly, there are roughly two camps within Kant scholarship, those that
argue for the imagination as a discrete faculty independent of the understanding and
those that argue the imagination as a sub-process of the understanding. Much of the
debate centers around a historical fact. In his own copy of the Critique of Pure
Reason, Kant crossed out the word „soul‟ in the passage that attributes the
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imagination to “a blind but indispensible function of the soul,” and replaced it with
„understanding‟.
Sarah Gibbons, Rudolph Makkreel, Martin Heidegger, and John Llewelyn all
seem to agree that the imagination is a separate and discrete faculty. These authors
typically cite the A-deduction and its emphasis on processes required to have a single
presentation of the deliverances of the senses, prior to synthesis with concepts of the
understanding as proof that the imagination is operative outside the parameters of the
understanding. Integral to such a thesis is the typical strategy that points out a
distinction between a narrow and broad understanding of “understanding”. When
Kant emends his own personal copy of the 1st Critique, his ascription of imagination
to the understanding, this faction contends, is not to the specific faculty of the
understanding per se, but, rather, to „understanding‟ meant as something like the
„mind.‟ 426 What this faction fails to provide is answers to the protracted problem of
the imagination as an independent faculty.
On the other side of the debate, proponents of the sub-process thesis, people
like Henry Allison, P.F. Strawson and Paul Guyer, cite Kant‟s emendation of his own
copy of the 1st Critique as incontrovertible proof that the imagination is merely a
function of the understanding and deny the understanding possesses multiple
meanings. Kant did cross out the word „soul‟ in the quote above and replaced it with
„understanding‟. Thus some commentary is convinced that the imagination is a subprocess to the understanding. The sub-process theorists, insist that the B-deduction
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demonstrates that the imagination is only comprehensible when applied to processes
of understanding and that two distinct faculties “fails totally to explain how one could
„deduce‟ the pure concepts of the understanding from the table of logical
judgments.”427 What this faction fails to demonstrate is any resolution to the
protracted problems facing the strategy of imagination as a sub-process.
What both factions have in common is the strategic error of examining this
issue as an exclusive disjunction. The factious nature of the debate has led both
parties to set up the issue as sub-process or independent, and then, owing to
proclivities, demonstrating the difficulties with the opposing faction‟s position. With
such intractable problems enumerated above, either faction concludes the absurdity of
the other‟s position and thus affirms their own. What is conspicuously missing is any
positive resolution to the difficulties surrounding any given position.
I believe, however, that one of the three strategies listed above may find such
a positive resolution. Such an interpretation still relies on the absurd consequences of
the other two, but, with proper provisos may overcome the inherent difficulties of its
own. Arguing for the independence of the imagination is just such a strategy. As
Allison has noted, such a position has the difficulty of providing an explanation for
the categories as well as a third man argument to overcome.
While Allison‟s point concerning the difficulties of a „deduction‟ of the
categories poses problems for the standard thesis regarding the independence of the
imagination, the new deduction provided in chapter 7 not only demonstrates that the
categories can be deduced from the logical table of judgments, but also point to the
427
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need for imagination at work in a deduction of the table of judgments itself. It is only
with a separate faculty, one that is at work in exploring the possible combinations of
the a priori forms of intuition that such a deduction of either tables is possible. The
imagination in this capacity does operate within parameters, but the parameters are
not of the understanding. They are, rather, parameters established by reason and the
forms of intuition. Thus I believe the first obstacle can be overcome.
The second obstacle, the one regarding the relationships between the
understanding, sensibility and imagination can be mitigated if one adopts the position
that the imagination is not merely the liaison between the two faculties, but the
unknown and common root of them both. Kant makes just such a suggestion in the
introduction of the Critique of Pure Reason when he declares “that there are two
stems of human knowledge, namely, sensibility and understanding, which perhaps
spring from a common, but to us unknown, root.”428
Understanding the imagination as performing necessary functions in both
sensibility and understanding allows us to comprehend Kant‟s claim. When
determining judgments, that is, by joining the deliverances of the senses with the
concepts of understanding, there are two different and discrete faculties at work. But
in discovering the means through which both intuitions and pure concepts are
accounted, the imagination takes center stage. The imagination in its role in the
presentation of a unified intuition; the imagination in its role of determining the
categories of the understanding; and the role of the imagination as the faculty of
synthesis in general, now permits us to understand what the common root of these
428
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two stems of knowledge may be. Kant has demonstrated the need for a synthesis in
sensibility as well as a need to account for the synthesis found in acts of judgment.
By taking the imagination as the root of both faculties, the syntheses found in the
respective faculties becomes plausible. No longer must one argue exclusively for
synthesis in any of the faculties. If the imagination is the root from which both
sensibility and understanding spring, synthesis can plausibly be found in both. In
doing so, the obscurities found in the A-edition can be ameliorated. The syntheses
found in apprehension and the synthesis found in recognition can be viewed as the
outgrowth of the synthesis found in imagination. Thus Kant can maintain his claim
that synthesis in general is the product of the imagination, while the specific
syntheses, whether they be the immediacy of apprehension, category generation of
the understanding, figurative synthesis or intellectual synthesis; all such syntheses are
grounded upon and derivative from the transcendental power of imagination. Such
an interpretation promotes the hypothesis that the imagination finds employment in
both sensibility and understanding. Rather than describing the imagination at work in
both stems of knowledge, one can assert that synthesis occurs in both stems because
of a common root. When examined from the stem of sensibility, the imagination
finds itself at work in presenting a unified manifold, when examined from the
understanding, the imagination also performs the necessary task of providing
categories. The common root between the two, the one that actually explains the
common connection between two seemingly independent and incommensurate
faculties is the imagination itself. From a transcendental standpoint, the imagination
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is a discrete faculty, but one which finds itself employed in both stems of human
knowledge. Because it is a common source for both stems of knowledge, the role of
imagination as an independent faculty does not suffer greatly from any third man
argument.
Such a strategy does, however, bear one further relevant consideration. Since
Kant describes the imagination with such variety, the question remains whether it is a
single, unified faculty or perhaps more than one. Kant repeatedly cites the
reproductive use of the imagination, most notably in the synthesis of imagination in
reproduction. When describing the imagination at work in the Transcendental
Deduction, Kant prefers to describe the imagination as productive and even
transcendental. Such concerns, however, should trouble the reader very little. The
productive use of the imagination is the very transcendental power described in the
unity of apperception, but, furthermore, is the transcendental power at work in the
original deduction of the categories in chapter 7 section A. By means of the
transcendental use of imagination, one literally determines both the unity of the self
as well as the conceptual architecture at work in cognition. This productive and
creative power establishes the grounds from which cognition is possible. By
considering the historical use the imagination has traditionally been given, one can
see Kant „s employment of the imagination in its reproductive role as complementary
to the productive use found in Kant‟s (and my own) transcendental arguments. The
reproductive imagination represents objects no longer present. Such representation is
a presentation, hence reproduction is a production. Much as Richard of St. Victor has
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Bilhah as the handmaiden of reason, so too does the productive imagination have the
reproductive imagination as a function of its employ. The presentation of
reproduction of previous delivered senses is simultaneously a production for a new
presentation. Thus we can see the imagination is an independent faculty, one which
accounts for synthesis in varying capacities, and which unifies all syntheses under
one faculty that is the root of Kant‟s dualism.
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Chapter Nine: Imagination and Error Production

Principled Error Production

Even though Kant‟s critical reformulation finds a radical fundamentality and
priority for imagination in the processes of cognition, in roles that are necessary for
human knowledge to obtain, Kant is cognizant of the history of the imagination and
the deceptive practices often attributed to it. In uncovering and clarifying the
elements necessary for human knowledge, the imagination has its proper place. But,
Kant will also observe that the imagination is prone to “daydream” and extend itself
beyond experience.429 Despite its essential role in cognition, without proper
parameters the imagination can also lead human knowledge astray. After Kant has
performed his critical analysis is the Transcendental Analytic, he turns his attention to
mistaken judgments of cognition, and it is here also that we find the imagination at
work, at work in a way not countenanced by Kant, but, rather, as a source for illusion.
The Transcendental Dialectic is Kant‟s explanation and analysis of trenchant
errors concerning metaphysical topics. Such an exploration is a fitting discussion in
Kant‟s philosophy, for Kant is attempting to perform a critique that “must set forth
the possibility of synthetic cognition a priori through a deduction of these concepts”
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and to “set forth the principles of their use, and finally the boundaries of that use.”430
In other words, Kant attempts to ground metaphysics by determining the nature of
human knowledge both in its construction as well as its limitations. Delimiting
metaphysics as a science will combat the illusions of the established
schulphilosophen, and will determine the objects and topics about which humans may
make knowledge claims.
Metaphysics, as Kant conceives it, is “a natural predisposition of reason, but is
also of itself dialectical and deceitful.”431 Such inquiries are “indispensable” to the
vocation of reason, and human understanding gravitates towards speculation about
“the totality of all possible experience.”432 As Kant understands the history, the
discipline of metaphysics, both rationalist and empiricist, has consisted of speculation
beyond the realm of human experience or a blatant appeal to probability and common
sense. Neither approach determines what topics are fitting for knowledge claims.
The former extend too far; the latter fails to provide the necessity metaphysical
knowledge seeks. Kant sets about establishing metaphysics as a science that can
dispense with the “ill-directed and fruitless cultivation” of ideas of pure reason in
order to turn reason to a metaphysics “that will not deceive.”433 The common mistake
in all inquiries concerning metaphysics up to Kant‟s critical philosophy was to make
knowledge claims that regarded concepts and ideas concerning objects that are never
experienced. Speculation concerning notions such as God, freedom and the soul, as
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well as the principle of sufficient reason, had long been in practice, but, Kant notes,
had not made any progress since Aristotle.434 It is to just such ideas that Kant turns in
his Transcendental Dialectic.
In turning to such notions in the Dialectic, Kant does not wish to
incontrovertibly refute the contents of such claims. Rather, Kant wishes to determine
whether any such metaphysical doctrines can be asserted as propositions of human
knowledge. His answer to such an inquiry is a resounding NO. This is not to imply
that such ideas do not prove useful. Instead of asserting God, freedom and the soul as
objects of human knowledge Kant will restrict their use in human thought. He will
promote them as regulative ideas, ideas which are useful to thinking, but which can
never be the objects of determinate judgments. These ideas are the “natural” product
of reason projecting determinate ideas to their logical conclusion, community,
causality and substance respectively. Kant explains reason‟s desire to think these
knowable, determinate concepts to their logical conclusion because human reason
naturally attempts to encompass all possible topics of inquiry in its search for
completeness.435 For reason to think community (totality) causality (antecedent
conditions and consequents) and substance (that which endures through time and
predication) to their logical conclusion—to think beyond the objects of finite
cognition to their infinite conclusion—is reason‟s attempt to expand human cognition
beyond the bounds of objects known by finite human cognition. But, as Kant will
point out on each occasion, the limits of human knowledge do not permit determinate
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claims to be made of such. To make a claim concerning the knowability of these
topics, is one thing, to employ the ideas or to have faith in them is another. Faith in
the ideas of God, freedom and the soul are useful for several reasons. The first of
which is that reason (human understanding) is satisfied at having postulated what
such ideas might contain, if expanded beyond objects it can know. Human curiosity
is satisfied to a certain extent, insofar as we can projectively imagine what such ideas
are/might be. In this regard, Kant suggests, human reason can and will inevitably
tend, and, in thinking according to such ideas, the vocation of reason is satisfied.
A second benefit from thinking through to these unknowable ideas is the
possibility of regulating human behavior and thinking. Immediately apparent is
Kant‟s proposal to delimit human knowledge to allow room for faith. By declaring
God, freedom and the soul as unknowable, Kant creates space for religious
perspectives and toleration, perhaps even reclaiming the essence of religious
sentiment in terms of faith. By allowing room for faith in delimiting the objects of
human knowledge, Kant also permits such ideas to regulate human behavior. If we
determine our behavior “as if” God exists, we have freedom and hence responsibility
for our actions, and for these actions we must answer according to an eternal time
frame, and Kant believes this will encourage morality.
The third, and perhaps most important, use Kant finds in designating such
ideas as regulative is to humble the scientific claims of rationalist metaphysics. By
designating certain topics off-limits, the topics about which humans can claim
knowledge is thereby limited; by placing boundaries around human cognition, Kant
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serves to further delineate those topics that can be known. Such epistemic humility
bespeaks Kant‟s commitment to the limitations of human knowledge writ large, and
by demonstrating what lies beyond the boundaries of knowable objects, Kant believes
that it serves to put in relief what and how humans can come to know objects.
When turning to the Dialectic in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant observes
such ideas as God, freedom and the soul are indeed concepts we have in our mental
repertoire, but they are not concepts that have any real connection to experience.436
We do not, Kant claims, experience any of these concepts; that is, we never intuit an
object that corresponds with these ideas. Rather, these concepts are the product of
reason thinking itself to completion. To make a distinction between concepts of
experience and these experientially ungrounded concepts, Kant renames these
unexperienced and unexperiencable concepts as ideas of reason. It is reason‟s desire
to think infinitely about concepts that it does not experience and cannot know that
leads reason to posit such constructions e.g. when experiencing substance, human
understanding recognizes substance as that which endures through time and change;
in thinking that which endures infinitely, reason constructs the concept of soul—that
which is immortal.
To distinguish this form of error in knowledge claims from that of an
empirical sort, Kant‟s analysis in the Transcendental Dialectic is focused on
transcendental illusion not with empirical illusion. Transcendental illusion, unlike
436

It could be asserted that one does experience such concepts in thinking them. And this much may
be true. What Kant is pointing out is that even with this concession, one does not experience the object
that such a concept purports to encompass. In the case of „experiencing‟ the concept when thinking it,
all one merely does is experience the thought of the concept, not the object it intends to represent—
although there may be an exception with freedom as I shall argue later.
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that of the empirical species, is concerned with ideas or principles that “are in no wise
concerned with objects of experience.”437 One simple explanation for the illusion of
the ideas of reason is an overextension of their use. One may meaningfully discuss
the enormity contained in the ideas of God, freedom and the soul, but it is an
overextension to posit them as actual objects of possible experience. Kant‟s analysis
decries speculative metaphysicians who have taken reason‟s ability to expand
concepts of experience to the domain of infinity, and do so by the daydreams of the
imagination. Without experience of these ideas, one imagines what such concepts
contain and do so by pursuing a reasoned or logical conclusion of the extension of
concepts of experience. Kant will even concede the necessity to think to such limits,
citing again the need for reason to think totality and completeness, but invariably
Kant judges these imaginative fantasies as illusory and mistakes when posited as the
claims of knowledge. And while this simplistic and mundane explanation about the
mechanism that drives the transcendental illusions of the ideas of reason presents a
viable limitation to the ideas of reason, this line of argument does not deviate too
greatly from his philosophical forebears—on several occasions, we have been
countenanced against placing too much trust in the imagination. In addition, it is not
able to explain illusions of the empirical sort. If one does not rely upon this overly
simplistic explanation, there is, I believe, a complementary explanation that covers
illusions of both sort. A principled explanation will allow Kant to describe error
production both transcendentally and empirically. Rather than pursuing these
illusions separately, I would like argue for a single principle that can explain both
437
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sorts of error in judgment, and then demonstrate its application in illusions both
transcendental and empirical.
In the Prolegomena, we find a formulation for a single principle that can
explain error production. Kant states that “all illusion consists in taking the
subjective basis for a judgment to be objective”438 To understand the viability of this
single criterion for error production, it is essential to remind ourselves of a few the
already established Kantian doctrines. By the time Kant arrives at the Transcendental
Dialectic in the 1st Critique, he has elucidated the subjective conditions of experience.
From the Transcendental Aesthetic, we have come to understand that space and time
are transcendentally idea, subjective, aesthetic conditions necessary for the intuition
of the deliverances of the senses. From the Transcendental Analytic, Kant has
determined the necessary but subjective conditions necessary for organizing
(spontaneously) the deliverances of the senses from human-rational standpoint, the
categories. In order for intuitions to appear, they must be organized by the categories,
and, as such, Kant has established the objective validity of these basic constituents of
human perception and cognition. The single most important consequence of these
essential elements is to effect the Copernican turn and Kant‟s argument that human
knowledge amounts to a collection or system of rules that govern appearances and the
objects that appear in human cognition. We cannot, by this claim, know what an
object is in itself, we cannot know thing(s) in themselves because objects of
appearance are always intuited through the forms of intuition and organized
according to the spontaneity of the understanding. The realm of human knowledge is
438
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limited to “objects” defined as what can appear in human experience. What the ideals
of reason and speculative metaphysics presuppose is that the concepts necessary for
human knowledge are actually determinate of things in themselves. When reason
imaginatively extends (even in its natural use) its domain from the finite sphere of
human knowledge and attempts to determine what substance is as a thing in itself,
reason attempts to determine not what substance is as a subjective condition for
knowledge, but what substance entails beyond human experience. The concept of
soul— immortality of enduring being—arises. But this is the very mistake Kant has
just cautioned against. Substance, a subjective condition for experience and
knowledge thereof, is never experienced in itself. To claim that we ever experience
substance, the condition of experience, is the first mistake. One can never experience
what endures through time and change, even though one organizes their experience
according to such a concept. In fact, empirically, we are hard-pressed to find any
enduring substance in all the objects of experience. Yet we still employ the category
when organizing the deliverances of the senses. For example, when painting a wall,
the color and even texture may change, yet in order to describe the experience of
painting an enduring referent i.e. a wall is necessary in order for the activity to be
intelligible. Yet given a larger time reference, one will most likely experience the
decay of the wall. Psychologically, we therefore expand the concept of substance not
to walls themselves, but to smaller particles out of which the wall was comprised.
And yet these too will eventually decay ad infinitum. This process ad infinitum
thwarts reason, and hence reason posits the absolute reference from which an infinite
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substance, soul, cannot decay. Yet souls are never the object of human experience.
For the sake of completeness on an infinite scale, reason can think the enduring
substance, but such a substance is not an object of possible experience. And when
metaphysicians mistake this logical and natural conclusion of reason and posit it as a
necessarily existing object, Kant reminds them 1) that such an object can never be
experienced, hence it cannot be included in the corpus of knowledge and 2) that in
doing so, speculative metaphysicians have mistaken a subjective condition for an
objective one e.g. the category substance, pursued it to its logical end, soul, but since
it is not an object of experience, must posit it as the thing in itself. In doing so,
speculative metaphysicians have violated the strict prohibition concerning predication
of the thing in itself, and would be forced to deny the Copernican revolution in Kant‟s
philosophy. But by having shown the necessary conditions for the possibility of
experience, Kant believes metaphysicians cannot deny that these predications are
merely subjective conditions, and hence knowledge of soul(s) is relegated to the
realm of the thinkable, by the vocation of reason, but cannot be included in
knowledge claims. In short, it truly is a flight of fancy, or the imaginative extension
of reason to attempt such folly.
Likewise, Kant is able to argue for empirical judgments. In the already
established language, illusion in empirical judgments is nothing more than mistaking
judgments of perception, subjective judgments, for judgments of experience,
objective judgments.439 According to Kant‟s examples, the statement „When

439

The correlation of judgments of perception with the subjective conditions and judgments of
experience with objective conditions is an imperfect analogy. Allison, p. 136-142. However, in the

281

supporting a body, I feel weight.‟ is merely a judgment of perception, while the
statement „Bodies are heavy.‟ („Bodies have mass.‟) is a judgment of experience.
The chief distinction between the two propositions remains that the former only refers
to the experience of the perceiver, a reference to the perceiver‟s state, and the latter
predicates the object of experience. In the process of judging the former, reference is
to oneself and the reported affect of supporting bodies. The subsumption of a
particular object under a category, the requirement for the objective validity of the
judgment, is entirely missing. When judging the second of these two propositions, on
the other hand, one must subsume „body‟ under the concepts, unity, reality, substance
and existence. Because the categories have the objective validity illustrated from the
deductions, in making a judgment of this sort, we are not describing the states of the
perceiving subject, but are predicating the object of our experience. Anytime one
mistakes a judgment of perception, the report of subjective experience, with a
judgment of experience, the predication of an object, error results.440 This principle

Prolegomena Kant puts the subjective and objective conditions of experience in terms of judgments of
perception and judgments of experience. By extending the conditions to their employment in
judgment itself, it is easier to illustrate empirical judgments and the possibility of error.
440
One difficulty with this suggestion is that even in making judgments of perception, in order for the
object of perception to appear, Kant argues that the categories are operative. E.g. In order for me to
experience body and weight, I need to organize the manifold of experience to come up with concept
like body and weight that one may pronounce when supporting a body I feel weight. Body, weight,
support, feel and I are all concepts employed to make this statement. However, we can save the
argument by exposing the referent. While it may be the case that every documented report of
supporting bodies also leads to the assertion of feeling weight, this does not preclude the possibility
that someone may support a body and not feel weight (not just in diminishing register but actually not
feel weight). Hence the attribution of feeling is to myself and my states, not to the object itself. This is
precisely what Kant wishes to demonstrate in the distinction between judgments of perception in
opposition to judgments of experience. In the latter form, we are referencing ourselves, nor reporting
feelings we experience, but are, rather, determining a predication ascribed to the object itself. Indeed it
may be the case that most if not all our judgments of experience are extensions of judgments of
perception (thereby making knowledge constructed) but we do so by employing the a priori categories
to determine what we understand by body, weight, etc. And do so in a manner that is different from a
judgment of perception. We do so by projecting the predication onto the object of experience—by

282

applies equally to transcendental illusions as well as those empirical. When one
reports an idea one has as a knowledge claim, one has overstepped the parameters
necessary for knowledge. When one reports a subjective experience as objective, so,
too, has one made an errant knowledge claim.
While this distinction is important, it does not appear to explain the most
common form of error production, mistakes of regarding the deliverances of the
senses in terms of the object. Yet, in fact it can. Aristotle‟s classic example of wine,
honey and vinegar can serve as a good example and demonstrate exactly how the
mistaking of the two types of empirical judgments follows. When drinking wine after
having eaten honey, wine tastes bitter. When drinking wine after having tasted
vinegar, wine tastes sweet. What can be said of wine? Is wine sweet? Is it bitter? It
is exactly this sort of relativistic tendency that demands Kant distinguish between
judgments of perception and judgments of experience. Both declarations regarding
the wine are judgments of perception. Failing to understand this, one might be
tempted to transition from „The wine tastes bitter‟ to „Wine is bitter‟; thus confusing
the report of a perception with predication of the object and creating the illusion that
we have predicated the object of experience.441 But it is precisely illusion that has
arisen. Such a line of argument could lead one to ask whether one can describe
objects of experience in any meaningful way. Can we truly say anything of wine?
referencing the object and determining (although inductive and thereby defeasible) the predicate as
belonging to the object and not to ourselves.
441
This is in fact the result of the passive understanding of the standard empiricist picture. If the only
determination of the predication of an object is the passive receptivity from the deliverances of the
senses, then judgments with caveats are the only type permissible. By showing what elements human
understanding brings to judgment, Kant is attempting to show demonstrate that all judgments are of the
type that needs caveats. But rather than physiological caveats, Kant wishes to show the spontaneous
caveats, thereby humbling human knowledge even further.
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Kant‟s initial response appears to defer the question. Kant‟s concern does not seem
to apply to particular instances of objects of experience in terms of their qualitative
experiences. Kant‟s concern lays in determining the appropriate domain of natural
science (and pure natural science and metaphysics). As such, Kant is not concerned
with the taste of wine for reasons other than aesthetic, but, at this point in the
analysis, he will concern himself about the predication of objects in reference to
primary and not secondary qualities; that is to metaphysical principles and not merely
accidental qualities. Regarding the taste of wine a ceteribus paribus clause (normaloptimal operating conditions clause) seems to be in place, and the determination of a
taste of wine is made only in reference to „normal‟ operating conditions of the senses
and a prolonged process of comparison with multiple instances of tasting, wine
tasting in particular. The science of oenology is possible, but Kant will not concern
himself with the specifics of this branch. Rather, he will concern himself with the
conditions necessary for the possibility of experiencing the wine i.e. that as a body it
must have weight, that the wine causes taste receptors to experience etc.
Why we are tempted to mistake subjective conditions with objective
conditions is a question about the psychology of error production—a question with
which Kant does not overly concern himself. One possible reason is ignorance of the
distinction between judgments of perception and judgments of experience. But even
after the discovery, one might lose the rigor demanded by Kant‟s distinction and
contend that perceptions are reports of objects. Kant suggests that this may be due to
a kind of psychological darkness that precludes us from maintaining the distinction
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described. It may be the case that we find the demand for rigor and right judgment
outweighed by other concerns, and this obscures the distinction.442 But does this
imply that so long as we remain diligent and dutiful to epistemic concerns that we can
and will avoid error? Will the parallax and the mirage no longer deceive us? In a
certain sense, Kant‟s answer seems to be yes. When we report the perception of the
parallax or the mirage, we will report them as subjective states and thus avoid the
error of predicating an object falsely. Under Kant‟s conception, we will contend the
oar appears bent, and can conduct further experiments to determine whether we can
predicate the oar in any way in much the same way as was practiced prior to Kant, but
now we have another argument for the necessity of doing so (other than the pragmatic
one).
One further consideration of error, one that displays the same concerns as the
standard historical picture is that of error and illusion found in dreams and delusions.
As part of his refutation of idealism, Kant contends that “the existence of outer things
is required for the possibility of a determinate consciousness of the self.443” But this
does not imply that “every intuitive representation of outer things involves the
existence of these things, for their representation can very well be the product merely
of the imagination (as in dreams and delusion).”444 Kant‟s chief concern here is to
argue against Berkeley‟s idealism, but also Descartes‟ material idealism.445
Following his explanation of the reciprocal nature of determining a transcendental
442
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unity of apperception found in the B-deduction and the objects of intuition, in
addition to his concern to separate his own critical or transcendental idealism from
the “fanatical idealism of Berkeley,” Kant argues that the affective nature of intuition
implies an „object‟, unknowable though it may be, that is “responsible” for the
impressions of the senses. And because intuitions are the product of affectation, one
implication might be that every intuition has a corresponding transcendental object.
And while Kant will maintain that most appearances probably do have such a
corresponding object, it is not necessary that all of them do. It is possible that certain
presentations of intuition might merely be “the reproduction of previous outer
perceptions.”446
This conciliatory move to the historical record fits nicely with Kant‟s
elaboration of the reproductive function of imagination as well as the stigma so often
attached with the faculty and accompanying memories. Kant has explained how
illusion arises, but has not yet provided any resolution to the problem. One such
solution is to return to the essential formulation of error production. If, in dreaming,
one ascribes the experience of the dreamer and the representations found in dream (or
delusion) to objects, one has mistaken subjective experience for objective. One easy
correction is to withhold judgment concerning the objects of dreams, and only to
describe the experience the dreamer undergoes. And while this restriction may
indeed avoid error production based upon dreaming or delusion, one further question
arises; how do we know when we are dreaming from when we are not? If the
overriding epistemic concern demands that we never predicate objects of experience,
446
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either as existent or as having properties, based upon dream states, Kant must provide
some criterion to allow for safe predication.
Such dream considerations are the resonant response of Kant to Descartes‟ concern,
and it is in this context that we find Kant‟s response to the question concerning
dreaming and waking. He writes:
Cartesian idealism therefore distinguishes only outer experience from
dream, and lawfulness as a criterion of the truth of the former, from
the disorder and false illusion of the latter. In both cases it
presupposes space and time as conditions for the existence of objects
and merely asks whether the objects of the outer senses are actually to
be found in the space in which we put them while awake, in the way
that the object of inner sense, the soul, actually is in time, i.e., whether
experience carries with itself sure criteria to distinguish it from
imagination. Here the doubt can be easily removed, and we always
remove it in ordinary life by investigating the connection of
appearances in both space and time according to universal laws of
experience, and if the representation of outer things consistently agrees
therewith, we cannot doubt that those things should not constitute
truthful experience.447
The answer to the question concerning how one distinguishes dream and illusion from
waking experience and the truth one can predicate of objects in waking life appears to
be an appeal to the regularity and consistency that we find in waking life, in
opposition to those we find in dreaming. In short, Kant seems to answer the question
of dream illusion by declaring that truthful experience follows universal laws of
experience i.e. those logical judgments found in the original deduction above. 448 If
we find two objects existing in the same place at the same time, we may vouchsafe
that we are dreaming.
447
448
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One difficulty with this explanation is that if these logical impossibilities fail
to obtain, we still do not know whether we are dreaming or awake. In fanciful
dreams, it is not too difficult to differentiate between dreaming and waking
experience. In the absence of absurdities, it proves more difficult. For example, if
we should find pink elephants as the objects of representation that follow the logical
possibilities according to space and time, can we vouchsafe we are awake and having
truthful experience? Can we truthfully claim pink elephants exist? In a sense, Kant
does not concern himself with such questions concerning the content of empirical
investigation. Once again, his concern lays with the possibility of predicating objects
of experience according to scientific principles. Kant‟s concern is not with whether
elephants are pink or not, but with questions about whether bodies have mass or every
effect has a cause. The specifics of the domain of pachydermology or even of
particular events and their specific causes is beyond Kant‟s immediate concerns. For
the content of these specific areas of inquiry, Kant will leave these to the experts in
the fields of research that determine the laws that govern these disciplines. Kant‟s
suggestion is that these disciplines, as all waking experience, must follow universal
laws of experience, and failing to do so means we are either dreaming or delusional.
When Kant elaborates error production, his overriding concern is to provide a
principled criterion that can establish cases of misrepresentation. The specifics of any
particular empirical discipline, he can contend, must follow the parameters delineated
in the 1st Critique when affirming knowledge claims. Kant offers such principles in
the final section of the transcendental analytic, in which he continues the work found
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in the Schematism, but provides more specific elaboration of the categories according
to the received physics (Newtonian) of his day. These principles, by and large, offer
an opportunity for more elaborate extension of the general rules found in the
Schematism and a deeper exegesis on the categories in application. When Kant turns
to error production, these principles are operative as secure means by which we can
describe the world of experience. In the case of error production, Kant finds it
imperative to offer the same principled approach to explain the mechanism(s) by
which we overstep the secure principles an produce mistaken judgments. This is
inherently an overextension of the products of the imagination itself. This principle
has application in several different cases of error production, namely the
transcendental dialectic, the relativity of sense experience and cases of dreams and
delusions. And yet, there remains one principle that governs all error production.
Whether one is claiming knowledge of transcendental ideas, qualitative experiences
or dreams, the mistake is the same. In all these cases, one mistakes subjective
conditions or qualities for those objective. When we report the metaphysical truth of
God or souls; we have overextended our the ideas of reason and imagined them to be
objective; when we report the feeling of heaviness we have imagined heaviness to be
a quality of the object of experience; when we report the content of dreams or
recombinant memories as objects of experience—in all these cases one has mistaken
subjective conditions for objective truth. The source for error production is precisely
the mistake of imagining/declaring that which cannot be experienced as proper to the
realm of knowledge. Cognizance of the architecture of knowledge and diligence in
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reporting appear to be the corrective measures necessary to humble the claims of
human knowledge and the means by which we can reduce, if not entirely avoid, error.
In Kant‟s own words, “pure reason‟s knowledge of itself in its transcendent
(overreaching) use will be the only prevention against the errors into which reason
falls if it misconstrues its vocation and, in a transcendent manner, refers to the object
in itself that which concerns only its own subject.”449

Summary of 1st Critique

In Kant‟s Critique of Pure Reason we find a nuanced and fundamental
formulation of the power of the imagination. The imagination, as we have seen, is
important in the several aspects that comprise knowledge claims. Due to Kant‟s own
ambiguities and revisions discovering just what the imagination is and how it operates
in theoretical, pure, reason requires an excavation and interpretation of Kant‟s
primary text. To overcome rational idealism(s), Kant wishes to retain empirical
experience in the judgments concerning knowledge. At the same time, Kant wishes
to combat the trenchant skepticism that follows from the empirical tradition based in
Locke and Hume. Thus Kant‟s formulation of knowledge will affirm an empirical
449
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realism as well as a transcendental idealism. Such a philosophical shift elicits a
problem for Kant; if empirical data is a necessary component of knowledge in
addition to transcendental categories, how will two such disparate elements be
brought to together in judgment? In other words, how can Kant claim that pure
concepts have objective validity, objective reality and be applied to the deliverances
of the senses?
To find the “common root” from which both sensibility and the understanding
draw their radical natures and thus to bridge the gap between the two, I have appealed
to the imagination, in an effort to gain insight into the basic question of connectivity
of the two faculties, but also to shed light on this third obscure faculty. To determine
how sensibility may present a unified manifold of discrete parts, Kant presents
overtures to an original yet sensible synthesis of the components found in the
immediate deliverances of the senses. The synthesis found in immediate
apprehension amounts to the presentation of a unified field. According to Kant, all
synthesis is the product of the imagination, and hence immediate apprehension of a
sensible field must have recourse to the imagination in the presentation of a unified
manifold at a particular, instantaneous moment. To determine the pure concepts
themselves and to provide a deduction of the categories, I have argued for an
employment of the imagination to which Kant only makes suggestive allusions.
Kant‟s own deduction does not provide the legitimacy of his list of logical
judgments nor the table of categories themselves. Instead, Kant‟s deduction argues
for a synthetic and transcendental unity of apperception necessary for all judgments to
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obtain in a single consciousness. While an essential component for Kant‟s
foundational enterprise, this deduction falls short of explaining and justifying either
table of judgments or categories. To Kant‟s deduction, I have provided a derivation
of the categories from the permutations of pure space and time as explored through
imaginative variation. Such syntheses of pure intuitions and the subsequent logical
judgments afforded these exercises of the imagination provide an objective validity
for the categories that supplements Kant‟s exploration of objective validity from his
own deduction. This second deduction, my own, has one advantage over Kant‟s own
by demonstrating the origin of the table of logical judgments and categories while
proving the exhaustiveness and exclusiveness of the judgments and concepts Kant
provides. The tables of categories does indeed present a complete list of pure
categories, categories that all finite beings whose sensibility is governed by the forms
of intuition space and time. Once the legitimacy of the categories is demonstrated the
only task that remains is to illustrate their application with the deliverances of the
senses.
This final task, that of objective reality, we find in Kant‟s exposition of the
Schematism. This section illustrates the fundamental role the imagination plays in
connecting categories with sense data. Because of the dualism he establishes between
understanding and sensibility, Kant must find a liaison between the two very different
faculties. Kant already has such a faculty in place, and it is to the imagination that he
turns explicitly in this section. The imagination creates rules determined by each
categories presentation of the form of time, schemata, by which the categories can be
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connected with a corresponding presentation of sensibility in time e.g. substance is
that which endures through time, and when we intuit something enduring through
time we call it a substance. Thus the actual employment of the categories with
intuitions, the objective reality of the categories, is brought about by use of the
imagination. Since imagination is operative both in sensation and in understanding,
the imagination provides the common root that enables judgments of knowledge—
both pure, in the case of logical judgments, and empirical, in the case of judgments of
experience.
This interpretation provides two important aspects concerning knowledge
claims. Judgments of experience and knowledge claims that are dependent upon
empirical data, empirical knowledge claims, are indeed possible through this process,
but, more importantly, so too are a priori knowledge claims. Empirical judgments,
synthetic a posteriori claims, have long precedent in the empirical tradition. Kant
now has the means to explain the manner in which they are brought about. Moreover,
the deduction I have presented enables Kant to maintain and explain how a priori
synthetic judgments are possible. Provided the categories can be demonstrated and
we can employ pure intuition in the production of the categories, Kant now has the
means by which to explain how cause and effect is possible, even though empirical
examples remain only probabilistic. Importantly, Kant can refute Hume‟s argument
that cause and effect is a mere fantastic product of habit by demonstrating that the
connection between two events is necessary. Furthermore, such a demonstration aids
in explaining the conceptual conditions necessary in order to assert the inductive
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claims of empirical causality. Synthetic a priori knowledge is indeed possible, and as
such, metaphysics as a science can be rigorously pursued.
Because Kant can explain how both empirical knowledge and metaphysics
can be pursued, the final obstacle Kant must explain is error production. In this
aspect Kant also has recourse to the imagination. Any imaginative overextension of
categories will result in mere metaphysical speculation. Transcendental ideas like
God, freedom and the soul are the result of just such overextension. Such ideas are
never encountered and hence we can never possess knowledge, neither empirical nor
metaphysical of them. We can however, argue for the rational consistency of such
ideas, and hence may employ them in a regulative use, but never as determinative of
knowledge. Regarding empirical error and illusion, the same mechanism of
overextension is operative. When one imaginatively projects perspectival predication
onto objects, we mistake judgments of perception for judgments of experience.
Mistaking subjective conditions for objective conditions is readily available when one
does not constrain the projective use of imagination. By explaining all illusion,
whether in the dialectic of reason or in empirical employ, as imaginative
overextension, projection of ideas or personal states as real, Kant continues the
tradition of countenancing caution when employing such a powerful, fundamental
and ubiquitous power as the imagination.
Even so, with all the accomplishments of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant
himself finds it necessary to continue his critical enterprise, extending his analyses
beyond theoretical reason to concerns practical and aesthetic. By establishing the
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fundamentality of the imagination in theoretical reason, I would like to continue
along Kant‟s architectonic by tracing this fundamental faculty in both the Critique of
Practical Reason and the Critique of Judgment. The final two chapters of this work
begin such explorations. Continuing the development of the theory of imagination
from the 1st Critique, I will now turn to preliminary implications and integrations
found in the 2nd and 3rd Critiques.
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Chapter Ten: Implications and Integration
Imagination in The Critique of Practical Reason

In the years between the first publication of the Critique of Pure Reason
(1781) and the second (1787) Kant‟s attention to reason shifts from its theoretical use
to concerns practical and moral. Immediately following his revision, Kant continues
his programmatic of delimiting reason and publishes the Critique of Practical
Reason. To find imagination in this work requires considerable effort. Kant only
mentions the imagination in a handful of explicit references, most often in a skeptical
and critical light, and thus one might contend that the imagination finds little
application in Kant‟s moral philosophy. However, the omission of the imagination
does not indicate its absence, but rather a need to demonstrate the connection between
the 1st and 2nd Critiques and the requirements of the imagination for both theoretical
and practical philosophy.
Kant begins the Critique of Practical Reason by making reference to
suggested possible titles. 450 He muses that he could have entitled the work “The
Critique of Pure Practical Reason” thereby drawing closer connections to his first
critique. However, Kant opts for the shortened title, that he may demonstrate that
such a pure practical reason is possible. Rather than asserting pure practical reason,
450
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Kant prefers to title his second critical work “practical reason”, something he believes
all rational agents demonstrate in their everyday deliberative actions, in an effort to
clarify how one ought to pursue moral deliberations, that is, through pure practical
reason.
Also in distinction from the 1st Critique, Kant does not begin this endeavor
with an enumeration and analysis of the faculties of cognition, for either theoretical or
practical philosophy. Kant does retain the same architectonic, a doctrine of elements
followed by a doctrine of method. But because Kant wishes to establish a practical
philosophy that is pure, he seeks to eliminate any candidates for a moral philosophy
that make appeal to any empirical considerations. To ensure a practical philosophy
that is universal and necessary—that is, based on a priori reason and not any personal
or cultural interests—Kant will begin his exploration of moral philosophy by purging
it of any particulars, and hence he begins with principles followed by an enumeration
of concepts. It is only after he explores a priori, principled moral deliberation that he
will turn to the illusory dialectic to complete his analysis of moral judgment and its
possible illusions.
In such a principled approach, as is well-known, Kant determines that only a
good will can be predicated as good without qualification.451 In a quite superficial
sense, a good will is a will that makes rules, maxims, to effect some consequence or
action. Many other capacities as well as objects are considered good e.g. happiness,
wit, intelligence, but only the will can be considered good without seeking another
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object to which it applies. Kant equates a good will to a will governed by pure
reason. In contrast to intelligence that may be guided by reason to effect some end, a
good will performs its function of maxim making according to the dictates of reason
rather than the interests of other ends. Such a distinction between end-oriented rulemaking and universal rule-making is the celebrated difference between hypothetical
and categorical maxims. The will‟s function is to formulate maxims for action, and to
claim a good will, a faculty not influenced by other ends than rule-making itself, Kant
claims that reason must determine “the will by means of a priori grounds.”452 These a
priori, unconditioned, grounds are the very determination of universal and necessary
means by which to formulate rules for action. A categorical rule, or imperative, will
be the only means by which the will can ensure no ulterior motivation or ends in
formulating rules. Thus Kant believes that only a principled approach to moral action
and moral deliberation is possible to provide a pure will that can ensure universality
and necessity, and provide a moral law for all to follow. Such a formal principle is the
only approach that will not rely upon any empirical conditions, and as such provide
the unconditioned ground for moral action.
The formulation of the categorical imperative itself and such a discussion of a
priori principles by which the will can provide rules for action is, I contend, the
culmination of a rather imaginative process itself. By appealing to common sense,
Kant recognizes the multitude and variety of motives that influence action. To
remove all goal-oriented thinking, the most entrenched of which are personal or
community happiness, to find a principled manner by which to conduct all actions in
452
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a moral fashion, itself requires a deleterious thought process, often deemed
“abstraction,” that can only be executed under an imaginative framework. The
exercise amounts to asking oneself to remove all biographical information, both
personal and cultural, in order to determine what capacities are at work in finding a
truly universal morality. To escape a cultural relativism that often leads to one
ethical, Kant removes such considerations as personal interest or happiness from any
such deliberation and to posit a purely formal articulation of the moral law. This
deleterious imagination leads Kant to consider action from a common standpoint
among all so-called human beings, their possession of reason alone.453 Reason itself
has no goal or object, but can by means of imaginative restraint reign in irrelevant,
particular and goal-oriented considerations for maxim making in moral deliberations.
The principle that avoids these errors and whose form can be applied in such
deliberations is the oft quoted categorical imperative:
Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time
will that it should become a universal law.454
or, alternatively,
So act that the maxim of your will could always hold at the same time
as a principle of universal legislation.455
This purely formal formulation by which a good will determines the maxims a
rational agent is to enact is the single principle that will govern a good will and hence
all moral deliberations. By determining this as the single principle by which maxims
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This also allows Kant to extend his moral framework to all rational beings. Cf. Grounding Ak. 427,
p. 35 Grounding Ak. 421, p.30.
454
Grounding
455
CPrR Ak. 31, p. 45.

299

should be formed Kant argues for the objective validity of such a formulation. The
objectivity validity obtains from the universality Kant requires in searching for a
principle that can apply to a purely good will, one devoid of empirical ends. The
necessity of this formulation comes from the demands of reason and the demands of a
universal morality itself. There is no other way, Kant argues, by which the good will
can govern its activities and obey the dictates of reason than by following this
imaginatively deleterious, purely formal principle to govern all actions.
And yet it is this very formal articulation that provides some difficulty for the
second, major concern of Kant, the objective reality and application of such a formal
principle to particular instances in the world of empirical experience. It is here that
the imagination finds another employment, one specifically understood as a liaison
between the purely formal principle and situations as they are experienced. This
imaginative willing or willful imagination, is one that can illustrate a deep
imaginative theme in Kant‟s practical philosophy.
There is one concern however. In the 1st Critique, Kant employs the
imagination through schemata to apply pure concepts to objects of empirical
experience. Recourse to such an explanation is strictly prohibited by Kant when he
says:
the moral law has no other cognitive power to mediate its application
to objects of nature than the understanding (not the power of
imagination). What the understanding can lay at the basis—as a law
for the sake of the power of judgment—of the idea of reason is not a
schema of sensibility but a law, but yet a law that can be exhibited in
concreto in objects of the senses, and hence a law of nature, though
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only in terms of its form; therefore we call this type of law the type of
the moral law.456
It would seem that by shifting from theoretical reason to the practical, Kant has
replaced the schemata with what he terms “the typic,” to the exclusion of the
imagination in its former mediating function.457 Such a reading does apply if one
considers the imagination in its role only as the faculty for schemata and not the lawlikeness of concepts themselves. Assisting in the exclusion of the imagination is the
aforementioned reading of the understanding in the narrow sense.458 Perhaps the
inverse is in order here, that Kant can be interpreted as regarding the understanding in
its broadest sense, and the imagination in its narrowest. By inverting these
conceptualizations, a place for the imagination can be found, not only in the creation
of a categorical imperative, but also in its application. To affirm the application of
the moral law, Kant must describe and explain what a “typic” of practical reason must
be and how it applies to concrete situations; to do so will require not only the
imagination but imaginative thinking.
To understand the typic of the moral law, Kant suggests one ask a specific
question in order to grasp how the application of the categorical imperative to
concrete situations obtains. One must ask whether “you could indeed regard it [the
action proposed] as possible through your will” and whether the action you propose
were to “occur according to a law of the nature of which you yourself are a part.”459
This is the means by which one can apply the moral law through a typic to a situation
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in order to demonstrate the objective reality of the moral law. Satisfying the first of
these requirements is not difficult to accommodate. One must merely ask whether it
is possible to enact the maxim under deliberation e.g. can I do X. The second
requirement, however, proves much more difficult to achieve. This second
requirement amounts to asking “what if…” everyone permitted themselves to act
according to such a maxim and what the world would amount to under such
conditions.460 By speculating under such universalization, one must imagine what
such a world would look like and whether such a world is logically possible. In cases
that fail universalization, we cannot imagine a world (nature) where such maxims are
employed. In other words, the type of world imagined in not one that is logically
possible. Kant provides telling examples e.g. case of false promises and/or suicide
that fail such a test. Imagining what a world looks like in which people are permitted
to make false promises would be a world in which promise making becomes
impossible. To imagine such a world is a logical impossibility.461 But, importantly,
in order to execute this typic of the moral law, one must imagine what such
speculation entails. It is only by imaginatively exploring the possibility or
impossibility of such worlds that the typic can bridge the gap between the purely
formal moral law and the concrete situation in which one is tempted to enact the
maxim e.g. when one is tempted to make a false promise when she believes it to be in
her advantage.
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Instrumental in applying the moral law and establishing the possibility of such
a typic are: 1) the formal principle deduced from a pure will, 2) recognizing the
concrete situation in which one is called to act, 3) forming a maxim (a rule governing
the action under consideration) and 4) determining whether such a maxim when
tested against the formal principle can indeed produce a world that is logically
possible.462 In the case of lying, the application of the moral law is quite simple. The
formal, moral law has already been determined by Kant‟s consideration of a single
principle based upon the good will‟s guidance by reason—that is, the categorical
imperative. Examining the empirical situation within which one finds oneself
remains an estimation covered by the 1st Critique and determining objects/situations
of empirical experience. We can and do experience situations in which we find
ourselves in interaction, either causal or reciprocal, with objects of experience, and
the estimation of the objects (ourselves included) involved in a situation that elicits
action is one which the epistemic and ontological considerations pure reason have
made explicit. The third criterion amounts to introspectively understanding the action
desired in the situation and the maxim by which the object can be obtained. This
presents an opportunity for Kant to demonstrate the desire afforded by inclination and
the calculative thinking we undergo in order to bring about desired effect. However,
Kant insists that the desired effect must be brought about by moral means, not merely
any means that presents a resolution of gratification. Should the desired effect only
be achievable by immoral action, practical reason must lead the way and sublimate
inclination. In the case of lying, one wants to acquire some advantage and the means
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of attaining it can only be brought about by bearing false witness. Kant remains
adamant and cautious at this point, reminding his readers that the desired object or
advantage is not the proper motivation for morality. 463 In this case the motive is some
form of self-interest. But lest these deliberations become unclear and one be tempted
to place the object of desire or advantage before moral considerations, Kant provides
the fourth criterion. By examining what must be in place in order to bring about the
desired effect, lying in this case, one can test the means by which such advantage
obtains. By removing any personal or empirical considerations and examining the act
of lying itself and the maxim needed in order to effect such an action, we remove any
extraneous considerations or irrelevant data from the application process.464 By
examining the maxim for the act itself and determining whether such a type of law
produces a world that is possible, Kant can effectively test, a priori, whether such a
maxim is falls under the a priori auspices of the moral law. This imaginative, a priori
application of the moral is the type, or typic, of the moral law and only those that pass
the test are typics that are imaginable and thus morally permissible.
Unlike schemata as we have found it in the 1st Critique, the typic does not rely
on pure intuition, but, rather, is a conceptual abstraction that permits of a priori
analysis, and then moral judgment in the application of the determination found in the
universalization test. Bridging the gap between pure practical reason and its
formulation of the moral law is the typic that permits one to withdraw from empirical
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considerations and examine the maxim one is deliberating (for empirical action) to
ensure that the means by which we are acting in the world conform to moral
demands. According to Kant‟s analysis, this process is executed by means of the
understanding because it is the faculty responsible for conceptual articulation. This
being the case, the understanding is certainly the faculty in which this applicative
process takes place, but it cannot do so without the deleterious and projective use of
imagination. Moral judgments themselves may be the product of the understanding,
but the understanding could not execute its task without aid from the imagination in
the process of abstraction from the empirical world and projective testing required by
the universalization test.
Having determined the objective validity of the moral law and the possibility
and actuality of its application, its objective reality, Kant estimates that the
categorical imperative is the only a priori formulation for a moral law, one that holds
for all rational agents so long as actions are governed by practical reason and no other
concerns. Concluding the Analytic of practical reason, Kant can then turn his
attention to the dialectic and the possible illusions that arise from considerations of
pure practical reason. The dialectic centers around two important discussions, the
idea of freedom and its relation to other regulative ideas, and, the notion of a highest
good. During this transition, Kant has the opportunity to reconsider his philosophical
position and his epistemic humility from the 1st Critique and offers emendations to his
analysis of the regulative ideas—God, freedom, and the soul—seen from the
perspective of practical reason.
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A reminder concerning his determination of God, freedom and soul is in order
to understand Kant‟s further development of these ideas in the 2nd Critique. In the
Critique of Pure Reason, Kant concluded that such ideas are never (and can never be)
experienced, and as such cannot perform any function in determining the world of
possible experience. For a concept to be determinative of the world of possible
experience, they must actually be found in experience. We find examples of
determinative concepts in, pure concepts, categories, which are the building blocks
from which we erect a considerable repertoire of empirical concepts. These basic
concepts are actually experienced as demonstrated in the above deductions. If we are
to have determinative concepts of God, freedom and soul, one would need to employ
the categories in conjunction with data from sensation in order to produce them as
empirical concepts. However, God, freedom and the soul are not empirical concepts
that are the product of the application of categories to the deliverances of the senses.
They are, rather, the product of pure reason thinking imaginatively and exhaustively,
to completion, about such concepts as substance, causality and community-totality.
As we experience these categories in completion, Kant relegates these products of
reason to a merely regulative role that provides guidance for reason and even action,
but not ideas we can claim to have corresponding objective reality. Kant claims the
ontological status of these concepts must be left undetermined, citing their possibility
in a noumenal world, but their impossibility of being experienced phenomenally.
In the 2nd Critique, Kant wishes to return to a discussion of these regulative
ideas, to support his claims from the 1st, but also to illustrate how practical reason
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emends the pronouncements of his earlier work. Kant introduces the idea of freedom
in relation to the will and the latter‟s ability to form and act upon unconditioned
maxims. He writes:
Since the mere form of a law can be presented solely by reason and
hence is not an object of the senses and thus also does not belong
among appearances, the presentation of this form as determining basis
of the will is distinct from all determining cases of events [occurring]
in nature according to the law of causality, because in the case of these
events the determining bases must themselves be appearances. But if,
moreover, no determining basis of the will other than that universal
legislative form can serve as a law for this will, then such a will must
be thought as entirely independent of the natural law governing
appearances in reference to one another, viz., the law of causality.
Here Kant is reminding us that all appearances are governed by the category of cause
and effect. But insofar as the moral law is presented by reason alone, it is not an
appearance but a principle of reason. Since no empirical conditions will be permitted
into an a priori principle, the universal moral law is not under the auspices of
concepts that govern appearances. As the will is the faculty to effect the moral law in
application, the will may be conceived as operating outside the laws of appearances,
that is, outside the law of causality. Understanding the will as free permits Kant to
continue affirming the possibility of a legitimate, universal ethics, one that has
freedom to act according to maxims not governed by causal determinations.
Responsibility and moral worth are consequent upon denying the determinist
accusation that all actions have antecedent, determining causes. Kant can thus affirm
the truth of the determinism, of cause and effect, but in contemplating the moral law
and deciding whether the maxim under deliberation conforms to the universality of
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the moral law, the will (and the understanding) operate outside of appearances.
Causality is at work in appearances, but, as the will is outside of empirical
phenomena in its deliberation, the will need not be conceived as an absolutely
determined faculty. In short, the will is free. This doctrine, permits Kant to continue
his argument from the 1st Critique, the one that denies empirical experience of
freedom, but also permits him to argue for its actuality, an actuality that applies only
at the deliberative and intelligible level. Kant continues to affirm that freedom
regulates our behavior, because, while we cannot ever experience freedom and affirm
it from an epistemic standpoint, the transcendental argument affirms its necessity in
employment of the categorical imperative. As Kant has illustrated the application of
the moral law, he can affirm that it is both possible and actual, he can affirm freedom
is both possible and actual, while it is never experienced as an appearance. Of
importance here is theoretical reason‟s inability to affirm the actuality of freedom, as
it only resolves the antinomy of causality and freedom by determining freedom is
possible according to a noumenal/phenomenal division. It is only practical reason
that affirm its actuality, and yet still affirm that it is only understood as intelligibly
actual and never a phenomenal manifestation.
And while Kant‟s consistency with the 1st Critique is admirable, perhaps,
Kant is too modest in claiming that knowledge of freedom is impossible. As Kant has
argued, the intelligibility of freedom and its possibility are required for practical
reason, but its actuality, he insists, is not an object to which we have access. Because
one never possesses an experience of the actuality of freedom, which would provide a
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corresponding object, we can never make knowledge claims about freedom.465 And
yet, according to Kant‟s description of the application of the moral law, we may have
a single instance that not only demonstrates the necessity of freedom, but also
provides an instance according to which we may find an object of experience that is
freedom itself. Hence, I would like to push Kant‟s determinations in the 2nd Critique
further than Kant himself did, in order to demonstrate the actuality of freedom and
not just its possibility and intelligibility. To do so, we will have recourse to the
imagination and its function of image production and representation.
According to Kant‟s analysis, pure practical reason begins by determining an
a priori principle by means of which one may weigh deliberations concerning action.
Pure practical reason provides the moral law, to which one must adhere in order to
have moral worth for one‟s actions. We have even seen the possibility of applying
such an a priori principle to concrete situations and the role the imagination plays as a
liaison and facilitator between the pure, a priori principle guiding maxim formation
and concrete situations in which one acts. And while Kant‟s understanding admits no
medium of the imagination proper—rather, the typic is formulated by the
understanding—in order to exact the correlation between a concrete situation and the
a priori principle by deleterious abstraction and projective image formation in
considering the logical viability of universalizing any given maxim evidence for the
imagination at work is manifest. Furthermore, one can represent this very process to
oneself. In fact, one does experience the abstraction, deliberation, universalization,
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and logical judgment by which this process is enacted. In so far as one undergoes this
process, one also possesses the ability to represent such activities to oneself by means
of self-reflective imaging. Not only do we undergo this process, but, moreover, we
do have knowledge of the process undergone. To present such an internal process,
Kant has no recourse to sensibility as providing the receptive half of his formulation
for knowledge. And yet if knowledge is to obtain concerning our ethical
deliberations, one must have not only the conceptual half of knowledge, but also the
intuitive half. The imagination, I contend, might provide just such an image of the
internal process. Kant himself admits that the moral law furnishes “as a sensible
nature” the form of a world of understanding.466 The world of the understanding to
which the moral law, the image of it and the universalization process, provides the
conceptual requirements of the good will and pure reason‟s generation of an a priori
principle by which one can determine moral worth. Because the understanding
through reason provides the moral law, Kant‟s assertion about the understanding‟s
role in the objective reality, application, of the moral law remains true. But one now
has further recourse to illustrate the experience of the objective reality and application
of the moral law through deliberation and maxim formation. It is to this end that
Kant suggests one “can cognize freedom” even though one can “never become
conscious of freedom directly.”467
One can never become conscious of freedom directly like we are conscious of
other objects of experience because of the missing element of receptivity from the
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senses. And yet, in imaginative representation, we do find the presentation of an
image of the process by which we are applying the moral law. In this reproductive
use of the imagination, one literally presents an image of themselves enacting the
deliberative process and determining whether particular maxim‟s conform to the
moral law. Furthermore, in this depiction, the subsequent judgment and finally acting
or not on the maxim itself demonstrates the will in process. Because one decides,
either in conformity with the moral law or not, and acts according to such a decision,
representation of the process through internal, reflective images illustrates freedom
itself. Such a depiction, provides an image of the moral law, as a sensible nature, that
satisfies the epistemic requirement for knowledge claims according to Kant. We
become aware of ourselves as agents that determine permissibility and
impermissibility of maxims that are then enacted. Literally, but also figuratively, we
have an image of ourselves as free agents, and hence have an object of experience
that is freedom which allows one to claim knowledge of oneself as a free agent. Thus
Kant can claim to know in addition to the possibility, the actualization of freedom.
According to Kant, these claims may be justified by pointing out that the moral law
determines that which speculative philosophy had to leave undetermined. The
transcendental argument for freedom is now replaced with immanent use.468
This imaginative process has interesting parallels with the role of imagination
in the genesis of judgments and categories from the 1st Critique; in fact, the
qualifications of the knowledge claim of freedom in the 2nd Critique parallels the
knowledge claims found in the earlier work. Much as we found in the deduction of
468
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judgments and categories above, the role of the imagination in this practical
application is qualified as productive and a priori. Just like the “objects” found in the
original deduction earlier in this work, the “object” produced by the imagination in
practical reason is also pure a priori. Due to the process of deleterious abstraction
from concrete situations to discover the maxim under consideration for practical
judgment, such judgments are removed from any empirical determinations. One is
merely asking whether any particular maxim conforms to the logical prerequisite(s)
of the moral law. Certainly, it holds true that the motivation to determine whether
maxims do conform finds its impulse in empirical experience. But, nevertheless, any
empirical motivation and considerations are rendered obsolete in the application of
the moral law to maxims. Hence the process by which moral deliberation obtains is
an exercise of pure, practical reason and the judgments rendered are a priori.
Likewise, the representation of the process of deliberation and moral judgment
remains a priori and sensible (by means of the image/representation of the process).
Such a pure intuition of the conditions by which moral judgments are made and
application of categories to this process renders an a priori knowledge of the
actualization of freedom itself. Hence Kant‟s claim concerning knowledge of
freedom might be overly modest. We can and do experience freedom in moral
deliberation, and as such can have a priori knowledge of freedom, but only by means
of the imagination and its various functions in cognition.
This line of argumentation is, I believe, Kant‟s doctrine of the suprasensible
substrate. Kant continually affirms a knowledge of the suprasensible substrate,
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freedom, required for moral deliberations, and consistently affirms this knowledge as
intelligible.469 This intelligible knowledge is precisely the a priori knowledge of
freedom afforded by the imagination and thereby allows Kant to maintain the
distinction between a priori, synthetic, that is metaphysical knowledge, and
knowledge that pertains to the world of experience and the world as we experience.
Kant‟s purpose behind this distinction was to reform metaphysics and delimit what
may be safely vouchsafed as knowledge from the finite human condition.
Accordingly, Kant desires to relegate all metaphysical claims produced by mere
axiomatic rationalism to the transcendental dialectic of pure reason. This knowledge
of a suprasensible substrate differs, however, from such illusions because it is the
very experience of freedom as actualized. Freedom, understood from the standpoint
of theoretical reason is only a possibility, a possibility that may only be understood
noumenally. Practical reason avoids the requirement demanded of pure reason by
demonstrating the use freedom and the a priori knowledge we may have of it. In
short, practical reason proves freedom not merely as a possibility, but as an actuality,
and has “expanded our knowledge beyond the boundaries” provided by a critique of
pure reason.470 Thus the regulative idea of reason as found in the 1st Critique is
transformed by pure practical reason into an object of which we can have a priori,
metaphysical knowledge.
Such a determination of freedom permits Kant to comment on further
regulative ideas, God and the soul from the 1st Critique, but also a new regulative idea
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found in the dialectic of practical reason, the highest good. Unlike determinate
freedom, however, these ideas continue to remain merely regulative and not
determinative, but in so doing have a strong connection with imagination and its
ability to serve the vocation of reason in thinking the totality and completion of a
system. Even from a practical standpoint, reason‟s vocation remains dedicated to
considering the infinite in a regulative employment, but still must remain skeptical
regarding the actuality of these ideas. And yet, these ideas are still productive in
assisting practical reason in guiding action. Each regulative idea in turn will
contribute to both reason‟s vocation and the regulation of behavior.471
To open the section entitled the Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason, Kant
reminds his audience that “pure reason, whether considered in its speculative or in its
practical use…. demands the absolute totality of conditions for a given
conditioned…”472 And yet, this demand leads reason to “an unavoidable illusion
[which] arises from the application of this rational idea of the totality of conditions to
appearances as if they were things in themselves.”473 One such unconditioned
condition is the idea of freedom that has proven the “most beneficial straying into
which human reason could ever have fallen, because it ultimately impels us to seek
the key to get out of this labyrinth” as the imagination aided in doing above. In its
pursuit of totality of unconditioned conditions, pure practical reason is not so much
concerned with God, freedom or the soul, as was pure theoretical reason, but with
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the practically conditioned (which rests on inclinations and natural
need) likewise the unconditioned; moreover, it does not seek this
unconditioned as a determining basis of the will, but even when this
determining basis has been given (in the moral law), it seeks the
unconditioned totality of the object of pure practical reason, under the
name of the highest good.474
The notion of a highest good is the object for pure practical reason, but it is not an
object that obtains in human experience.475 And hence, any epistemic claims
concerning the possibility or actuality of such a concept in the world of possible
experience, appearances, must only be employed with a such a disclaimer. And yet,
such an idea is “most beneficial” because it delimits pure practical reason‟s scope
while providing distinctions by which one can reconcile “needless controversies,”
namely the apparent discrepancy between the worthiness to be happy and actually
being happy.
The issue centers around Kant‟s formulation of moral worth and its
compensation in the world. To be morally worthy, virtuous, the maxim‟s of one‟s
actions and the actions themselves, must be in conformity with the moral law. And
yet, we find that even when one acts morally, one may suffer misfortunes in life. On
the other hand, we often find immoral persons enjoying every luxury and happiness.
It would seem that virtue and happiness rarely find themselves in proportion.
According to Kant, two traditions have arisen to settle this difficulty. The
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“Epicurean” school of thought places happiness as the highest good, and argues that
one should work to ease the misfortunes of life by wanting less (or at least finding
efficient means for satisfying gratification) by means of prudence. The “Stoic”
school considers moral worth, virtue, the highest good, and encourages a selfsatisfaction of moral worth even in inhospitable circumstances.476 In order to regulate
behavior in a world where discrepancies between virtue and happiness exist, the
former position affirms happiness as the goal of morality, the latter virtue. Kant, on
the other hand, wishes to affirm both.
In order to affirm a state wherein “virtue and happiness together amount to
possession of the highest good, and thereby happiness distributed [to persons] quite
exactly in proportion to [their] morality (as a person‟s worth and his worthiness to be
happy) amounts also to the highest good of a possible world,” Kant illustrates this
very antinomy and wishes to expose the presupposition employed by both. Both
Stoic and Epicurean schools argue for the irreconcilability of the two because of the
discrepancies found in empirical experience. Kant‟s simple resolution to this problem
hearkens to the resolution of the dynamic antinomies of the 1st Critique. To affirm
that both are possible, Kant will argue that in the world of appearances such
discrepancies are found, but such disparity need not obtain in the noumenal world.
The presupposition both schools of thought rely upon is the idea that the world of
appearances, in Kant‟s terms, is the only way of conceiving these relationships. This
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presupposition amounts to a belief that this worldly existence of appearances is the
only existence. However, if one imagines a world in which empirical appearances do
not exhaust the metaphysical possibilities a resolution to the antinomy beings to
appear. We can, according to Kant, imagine a world in which one‟s virtue and one‟s
happiness are commensurate even though we may not find such states of affairs in our
empirical experience. And yet, in order to imagine such a world, Kant will need to
rely upon other regulative ideas.
One possible strategy to envision the highest possible good is to think as if
one‟s life does not end with the secession of this physical existence. Kant argues for
the immortality of the soul as a postulate of pure practical reason that permits one to
think of the highest good as “progression proceeding ad infinitum toward that
complete adequacy” of virtue and happiness.477 If one considers this infinite
progression, which presupposes the “existence and personality of the same rational
being,” an indefinite amount of time remains during which virtue and happiness can
be reconciled. Such a postulate is a “theoretical proposition, though not proveable as
such,” but yet one that permits a resolution to the antinomy. By imagining the
immortality of the soul, reason finds one explanation that can affirm the possibility of
the highest good and thus render it regulatory of both thought and action.
A second strategy that admits the possibility of the highest good is the
postulate of God‟s existence.478 If, as empirical experience informs us, there are
discrepancies between person‟s of moral worth and those who obtain happiness, and
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we are resolve this difficulty by thinking an eternity, “it must lead to the
presupposition of the existence of a cause adequate to this effect i.e. it must postulate
the existence of God.”479 In several ways, envisioning the existence of God resolves
the difficulties of postulating immortality of the soul and imagining the process of
progression from the perspective of eternity. God as the cause of immortal souls
resolves the causal difficulties (as found in Descartes), but furthermore, Kant can
employ the infinite perspective to address the established epistemological problem of
evil. Humans interpret their moral worth and happiness, but only from a finite
perspective. If one envisions an infinite perspective, the disparity can, once again, be
reconciled. Indeed, Kant ultimately wishes to employ both postulates as mutually
reinforcing, albeit unknowable, propositions that can allow finite humans to think the
highest good as possible, thereby providing a psychological mechanism by which he
can affirm the thinkability of a highest good, but remain epistemologically cautious in
affirming any of these ideas. These ideas, of the highest good, God, and immortal
souls, are the means by which reason regulates its own thinking in determining the
scope of pure practical reason. By thinking these ideas, by imagining them as
possible postulates, practical reason can seek for the unconditioned condition that is
the totality of moral considerations, without compromising the previous knowledge
claims of the moral law and its applicability through freedom to concrete situations.
These regulative ideas are purely rational exercises that permit reason to pursue its
vocation, but by exposing and illustrating their interconnectivity, Kant can counsel
his audience to remain skeptical regarding their existence. In this manner, regulative
479
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ideas in the 2nd Critique regulate thinking and perhaps actions, much as they have in
the 1st Critique.
Thus we find the imagination at the heart of pure practical reason and the
products of moral deliberation. By determining an a priori moral law, Kant requires a
liaison between the principle of pure, practical reason with concrete situations.
Moreover, in the process of applying the moral law to these situations we find a need
for abstraction from irrelevant elements in deliberations concerning maxim formation.
Much like we found in
Aristotle‟s deliberative imagination, we find Kant appealing to a deleterious and
projective employment of imagination in applying the moral law to action through the
typic of practical reason. Furthermore, when returning to the idea of freedom we find
the imagination, in its ability to represent as pure a priori intuition the process by
which we apply the moral law to concrete situations, providing a pivotal
demonstration of the actuality of freedom. This basic function of the imagination
provides a Kantian argument to affirm both the possibility and actuality of freedom
beyond its merely regulative use as found in the 1st Critique. One can now begin to
offer an argument for a determinative use and a priori knowledge of freedom. One
final parallel obtains to demonstrate the importance of the imagination in the 2nd
Critique. As with other regulative ideas, the imagination provides the means by
which reason can project an idea that remains epistemologically dialectical, but quite
instructive in its use. The ideas of the highest good as well as God and an immortal
soul, assist reason in its vocation, while remaining merely regulative ideas.
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Chapter Eleven: Implications and Integration II
Imagination in the Critique of Judgment

Because both theoretical and practical reason produce judgments, scientific
knowledge and moral knowledge respectively, Kant‟s attention is drawn to the nature
of judgment itself. That Kant is aware of a need to explore the capacity to judge itself
becomes apparent in the rapidly successive publication of the Critique of Judgment in
1790 (only one and a half years after the 2nd Critique and 3 years after his revision of
the 1st). To complete his programmatic of exploring various ways of judging and of
connecting the first two Critiques together, Kant will explore one further manner by
which humans do make judgments, the aesthetic, to put into relief species of
judgments made in both theoretical and practical employments of reason. This
strategy allows Kant to explore one further facet of human judging while illustrating
important aspects of judging itself.
In his Critique of Judgment, the imagination to which Kant makes reference
bears distinct differences from that cited in the 1st Critique. This discrepancy has left
many commentators puzzling over the use of the imagination as Kant would have it in
the 3rd Critique and its commensurability with that of the Critique of Pure Reason.
Following this puzzlement, and perhaps a consequence of it, is the tendency noted by
Rebecca Kukla:
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For most of the twentieth century, Kant‟s aesthetic theory was
marginalized by analytic philosophers, who systematically privileged
epistemology and (to a lesser extent) ethics as the core philosophical
subdisciplines and who did not see aesthetics as substantially relevant
to these subdisciplines. Kant‟s third Critique received vastly less
scholarly attention than the first two, and the little commentary that it
did receive was insulated from the rest of the corpus of Kant
scholarship.480
The focus on Kant‟s earlier critiques defines the imagination in light of epistemicmoral projects to the neglect and confusion of the imagination in the third. Kukla
notes that as this was the case, it has, however, been ameliorated in last couple
decades, and the 3rd Critique has enjoyed a renaissance.481 And while treatment of
the Critique of Judgment has flourished in the last 15 years, the imagination has still
been relegated to the margins and is often still cast in light of the epistemic-moral
understanding. It is not that commentary is not available on the imagination and its
role particularly in judgments of beauty and, somewhat less exemplary, in those of
the sublime. But what is lacking is a comprehensive treatment of the imagination in
the entirety of the 3rd Critique. Lacking also is an integration of the imagination and
its prominent place in the Critique of Judgment with that of the first two.482 It is to
these two issues I now wish to take up in this final chapter.
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It is my contention that not only is the imagination an essential component for
all reflective judgments, of the beautiful, of the sublime and of teleology, but also that
by looking to the specific uses of each, illumination on Kant‟s proposed thesis in the
preface of the Critique of Judgment:
to determine whether “judgment give[s] the rule a priori to the feeling
of pleasure and displeasure, the mediating link between the cognitive
power [in general] and the power of desire (just as the understanding
prescribes laws a priori to the cognitive power and reason to the power
of desire)483
can be provided. Conceived and understood according to a principle of
purposiveness, Kant‟s thesis, I intend to show, will become clear. In other words,
Kant establishes in his introduction the architectonic that he believes will complete
his critical enterprise. By looking to the concept of purposiveness, purported by
humans in various aspects of cognizing, theoretical, practical and aesthetic, all three
Critiques become bound together into a systematic whole. By looking to judgment
itself, Kant believes he can provide the a priori principle, purposiveness, found in all
manner of judgments. Thus the 3rd Critique is often hailed as the mediator between
theoretical, concepts of nature, and practical, concepts of freedom, to form a whole.
“There must after all,” Kant says, “be a basis uniting the supersensible that underlies
nature and the supersensible that the concept of freedom contains practically, even

483

Kant, Immanuel Critique of Judgment trans. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987) p. 5. All citations
henceforth will be provided with the page number followed by the Akademie edition of Kant‟s
collected writings e.g. 5/168.

322

though the concept of this basis does not reach cognition of it either theoretically or
practically.”484
Kant determines it is the idea of purposiveness that is the single a priori
principle that presides over judgments. But this principle differs from those found in
either of the first two Critiques. In the Critique of Judgment, Kant distinguishes
between determinate and reflective judgments. “If the universal (the rule, principle,
law) is given, then judgment, which subsumes the particular under it, is
determinative.” These determinate judgments are those found in Kant‟s exegesis of
theoretical cognition in the 1st Critique. In the 3rd, however, Kant wishes to discuss
judgments of reflection. “If only the particular is given and judgment has to find the
universal for it, then this power is merely reflective.”485 Popularly understood,
determinate judgments are described as cognition from concepts under which
particulars are subsumed, and reflective judgments are particulars from which
humans cognize universals. The signal difference between these two forms of
judgments is the idea that determinate judgments are the variety employed in
epistemic claims found in theoretical philosophy and its determinations about nature
and moral claims found in practical philosophy and those judgments determining
action guided by reason, while reflective judgments do not determine objects or
actions. Reflective judgment “gives only a law to itself [human reflection on
judging].”486 Thus the conclusions obtained in reflective judgment are not
designations of objects nor actions, but comment on the tendencies found in the
484
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function of these judgments. The suggestion that purposiveness is the a priori
principle that guides all judging does not determine that all things, neither objects nor
actions, do indeed have a purpose, rather it suggests that all human cognition orients
itself around a thinking terminus ad quem.
Kant presages this demarcation of determinate and reflective judgments,
when, in the Critique of Pure Reason, he distinguishes between the determinative and
regulative judgments. Determinate judgments, as cited above, determine the
particulars that are subsumed under universals for the sake of veritative knowledge
claims. Regulative judgments, on the other hand, cannot be determined true or false,
but, rather, are thought “as if” in order to regulate thinking. Epistemic judgments
concerning God, freedom and the soul cannot be proven or demonstrated by human
cognition, but can modify the ways in which thinking occurs, that is, they regulate
human thinking. Kant neither differentiates nor conflates reflective and regulative
judgments in the 3rd Critique, but one finds similarities in the function of such
judgments. 487 Both modify human thinking. Regulative judgments, often called
regulative ideas, Kant believes delimit the bounds beyond which human cognition
cannot trespass while still making objective claims according to his scheme of
metaphysics as a science. One cannot metaphysically speculate on god, freedom, or
the soul and do so within a sound critical philosophy. In similar, but different,
fashion, reflective judgments present an end to which human thinking can aspire.
While clearly not judgments warranting veritative epistemic claims, human cognition
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can think an end and purpose to its varied enterprises. In fact, Kant claims, we find
this very thinking pleasurable.488
It is within this context of species and functions of judgments that one finds
Kant‟s thesis regarding the single a priori principle of judging itself. One finds that
discovering “order is an occupation of the understanding with regard to a necessary
purpose of its own.”489 Kant reemphasizes here the tendency so often cited in the 1st
Critique— for human reason to think of ends, often beyond its own ability, and to use
these ends both to aspire to and delimit its thinking. Purposiveness found in nature
cannot be verified as true, nor, as is hotly contested, is purposiveness to be found in
acting morally. But humans find a pleasure in thinking a unified order of nature, all
empirical laws subsumed under one guiding aegis, and positing a kingdom of ends as
that to which all actions should aspire. What Kant seems to suggest is that humans do
indeed find pleasure in organizing the concepts of nature and concepts of freedom
into a systematic unity. These internal subjective states seem undeniable, even if the
value placed on these objects does not obtain in nature or freedom itself. The fact is,
humans find pleasure in this activity, and Kant wishes to evaluate these subjective
conditions of experience.
And yet, the pleasure found in these varied forms of thinking purposiveness in
any aspect of human cognition, itself, falls under scrutiny of its own principle. It may
very well be the case, Kant accedes, that in thinking all human cognition has an end, a
purpose, and unifying principle is not the state of affairs, but rather, that which must
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be thought because “only through such laws do we first get a concept of what a
cognition of things is.”490 This very enterprise, I would like to suggest, is quite
imaginative, and as such the imagination plays a prominent role in reflective
judgment. It is now to the actual examples of reflective judgment, of beauty,
sublimity and teleology, that I wish to examine. We find in so doing to what extent
these feelings are imaginative and what role, if any, the imagination plays in these
judgments.
To begin, we must return to a peculiarity in Kant‟s corpus alluded to earlier,
but not characterized. In the Critique of Judgment we find a shift in the vocabulary of
Kant‟s faculty psychology from that presented in the Critique of Pure Reason. Little
to almost no mention is made of receptivity and intuition in the 3rd Critique. Rather,
Kant seems to have replaced imagination for sensibility. This shift in imagination
elicits some comment.
In the 1st Critique Kant introduces a dualistic model to represent human
cognition. The faculty of sensibility is the receptive capacity responsible for the
deliverances of the sensuous encounter humans have with the world. Sensible
intuitions are the sense data received from objects in the world that are then ordered
and organized according to the faculty of understanding. The understanding, on the
other hand, is the spontaneous capacity that does not collect information from the
world, but, rather, operates with the deliverances of the senses to organize intuitions
according to pure categories. The synthesis of the deliverances of the senses with the
categories of understanding affords are, Kant reports, judgments—determinative
490
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judgments that warrant epistemic claims of objective validity, that is, knowledge. In
order to enact such syntheses Kant summons a third faculty, the imagination, but
presents it rather ambiguously. “Synthesis in general,” Kant reports “is the mere
result of the power of the imagination, a blind but indispensable function of the soul,
without which we should have no knowledge, but of which we are scarcely ever
conscious.”491 At this point, Kant allies the imagination with the understanding. No
combination, no synthesis can be given through the senses.492 The power of synthesis
and the subsumptive act of determinate judgments are allocated to the understanding.
Thus the canonical interpretation of the 1st Critique firmly places the imagination as a
sub-function of the understanding.493
More recently, this standard interpretation has come under scrutiny by authors
such as John McDowell and, to some extent, Henry Allison. McDowell argues
against the integration of imagination into the understanding.494 He suggests that,
prior to synthesis with categories, a synthesis of the deliverances of intuition must
obtain in order for the intuition to appear as a unity. To appear as a manifold,
McDowell contends a synthesis must take place at the level of sensation, much as we
have seen in the treatments of the Transcendental Deductions in the foregoing
491
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chapters. Discussion of McDowell‟s (Sellars‟) arguments on this topic extends
beyond the scope of the concerns here. But let it be said, for now, that Kant does
make concessions toward this very point, indicating a “figurative synthesis” by
stating “we need the imagination to combine the manifold of intuition.” A unified
presentation of the deliverances of the senses is necessary for us to intuit any object.
What is at issue here is the role of imagination in appearing, either figuratively, that is
through the senses, or intellectually, as objects of cognition. The shift in the 3rd
Critique is Kant‟s tendency to incorporate the imagination in sensibility for the
purposes of presentation. Since the imagination, whether allied with sensation or
understanding, is the mediating faculty that enables judgment, if Kant is to determine
the a priori principle governing judgment, imagination must be included.
This is precisely the shift we see from the 1st to the 3rd Critique. No longer
does Kant make numerous and overt references to sensation and receptivity. Rather,
his vocabulary shifts to incorporate the figurative synthesis of the 1st Critique as a
description of sensibility that delivers material upon which we can reflect. The
aesthetic half of Kant‟s dualism remains intact, but he moves away from calling the
deliverances of the senses sensibility, instead preferring the term „imagination.‟
Under the rubric of reflective judgment, it is not the object one experiences, but the
presentation of the object, often in its absence. Understanding this caveat, Kant can
still claim the imagination as an independent faculty, but one that is responsible for
the presentation of the manifold of sensibility that is the intuition under scrutiny in
judgments. This leaves the reader in a peculiar situation. The imagination presents
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the deliverances of the formerly called sensibility to understanding; its role is that of
delivering, but also of enabling synthesis. Thus we find what I shall call the
imagination in a receptive (albeit pre-conceptually synthetic) mode, coincident with
sensation as it is found in the 1st Critique,495 and as mediator between this receptivity
and the understanding. Recognizing the faculty of imagination as it is called in the 3rd
Critique and the continuation of its transcendental function from the 1st is vital in
delineating the role of imagination as well as the nature of aesthetic judgments.
When it comes to analyzing the beautiful, maintaining this distinction proves
beneficial. Not only will it provide a useful conceptualization to illustrate what Kant
means by “free play of the cognitive powers”, between the imagination and
understanding, but it also emphasizes Kant‟s overarching connection between all
aesthetic judgments and the human propensity to think in terms of purposiveness and
his final conclusion concerning the subjective conditions elaborated in reflective
judgment. Important to remember is Kant‟s characterization of aesthetic judgments
as reflective. In reflective judgment we are not dealing directly with the deliverances
of sensation, but with a presentation to ourselves of such. This may explain Kant‟s
conspicuous shift to imagination as the presentation of the deliverances of receptivity.
Kant merely does not present the imagination in this capacity in the clearest light, and
the ambiguity allows him to draw a comprehensive connections with other types of
judgments.
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To begin his analytic of the beautiful, Kant turns to feelings “connect[ed] with
the presentation of an object‟s existence.” In determinate cognition, pleasure or
displeasure is connected with the bearing such an object has on our own existence,
most often in terms of utility or gratification.496 In the case of a judgment of beauty, a
reflective cognizing, Kant argues that it is not the interest we take in the object
regarding ourselves that elicits the feeling of pleasure. Rather, this feeling is elicited
by the very object itself. In presenting an object aesthetically, we take no interest in
mercenary considerations, we take no interest in the object, but find the feeling of
pleasure, interest, in ourselves while contemplating the object. This disinterested
interest indicates that the feelings one has regarding the object is indifferent to the
existence of the object, but recognizes the feelings that the presentation elicits all the
same. Kant continues by pointing out that “this contemplation, as such” is not
“directed to concepts, for a judgment of taste is not a cognitive judgment (whether
theoretical or practical) and hence is neither based on concepts, nor directed to them
as purposes.”497 In viewing an object according to taste, aesthetically, a feeling of
pleasure arises, but not from any concept or purpose— we do not wish to use, but,
rather, to contemplate the object and our own presentation of the object to ourselves.
By dissociating pleasure from personal interest and basing it in the presentation of an
object, Kant can put forward an argument concerning universality and necessity.498
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The universality deemed appropriate to judgments of beauty is not that of
universal assent. Kant concedes that differences in era, culture and personal
temperament will provide wide contestation when judging whether an object elicits a
feeling of pleasure. Kant‟s claim of universality stipulates the possibility of universal
assent, once personal interests are put aside. Furthermore, Kant insists in the
necessity of universal assent in the fourth modality. But this necessity is not, once
again, one that is based upon the interest of the observer. It is based upon the
subjective condition that obtains in the “free play” of the faculties. Kant argues for
this universality and necessity based on sensus communis and the common cognitive
capacities all humans share. We even posit, he suggests, the objective necessity of
agreement upon judgments of beauty based on the sensus communis.
Morevoer, it is truly the “free play” of the faculties upon which Kant builds
his case for the modalities of judgments of beauty and it is in the third modality that
we find his exegesis most promising, but also most confusing. The third moment is
pithily characterized as purposeless purposiveness. And it is in this modality that we
see Kant‟s overarching theme of purposiveness incorporated into the particular
judgment of beauty.
In the presentation of an object, a two-fold process is underway. The
perception of an object is presented, but not in a unified way. The imagination
synthesizes the manifold into a singular appearance, affording a remove from
immediate perception and allowing for reflective contemplation. It may be the case
that this imaginative organization strays from the determinate understanding normally
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afforded in epistemically oriented cognition of the object presented. Yet this is
precisely the freedom necessary for “free play that is afforded by the imagination in
reflective presentation. In contemplation of the object one becomes aware of the
pleasure or displeasure sponsored by the presentation. If pleasure arises, the process
continues and the subject projects a purpose to the object presented. This purpose, as
Kant calls it, remains ambiguous. It is neither the case that the purpose allotted to the
presentation is a determinate cognition, nor is it entirely arbitrarily ascribed by the
observer. For example, when one sees a rose, one does not think according the
empirical laws of biology, nor according to the pure concepts of the understanding. It
may go without saying that in affording a unity to the presentation categories may be
operative, say the category of unity, but the presentation is not guided by the
categories for the determination of any particular empirical law, say of causality or
community of interrelated parts. The purpose that seems to arise is the purpose of
pleasing the individual. But this thinking would put the cart before the horse. It is the
feeling of pleasure that gives rise to the projection of purposiveness.
This purposiveness, of giving pleasure, that is projected onto the object of
reflection is generated by the spontaneity of the imagination. One can project many
possible purposes onto a rose upon its presentation, many of which may be beyond
determinate applicability. But the signal purpose projected upon the presentation of
an object of beauty is that it serves the purpose of pleasing. This free play of the
imagination corresponds to Kant‟s demand of the spontaneity of the imagination.
Furthermore, in organizing the material of sensation into a coherent unity, one
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becomes aware that the particular instance experienced, in exemplary cases deemed
beautiful, tend to present the understanding with a refined notion of the object
perceived. Aesthetic presentation creates the rule by which other instances of the
particular case may be judged. This movement from particular to general, and
subsequently rule generation, affirms Kant‟s suggestion that aesthetic experience
tends to the lawfulness of the imagination. By setting the bar for other possible
experience, discursive thought is served in a refinement of its concepts. Moreover,
discursive thought is placed in check by reflective judgment‟s demonstration of a
different possible way of viewing a presentation. Aesthetic judgments of beauty tend
to both provide the rule for subsequent concept employment, informing the
understanding while setting limits to it.
One further example may prove useful. In the presentation of an architectural
work, there appear to be at least two ways that humans can view the object. If taken
as the presentation of a structure that houses humans, providing protection and a
space to pursue actions, the judgment remains determinate. The building can
subsequently be deemed either suitable or not for the purposes guided by the concept
of dwelling. If viewed merely as a presentation of the deliverances of the senses
organized by the imagination into a unity, several options remain. By reflecting on
one‟s inner states, one must consider whether pleasure or displeasure obtains
regardless of the so-called determinate purposes of theoretical cognition. If no
pleasure obtains, aesthetic judgment does not deem the building beautiful and
recourse is typically to utilitarian considerations for further judgment. If pleasure
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does obtain, however, one sees the object not as a useful item for dwelling, but as an
object that “quickens the cognitive faculties.” In this quickening, Kant suggests, the
particular is seen in terms of its purpose, not in regard to utility, but in regard to its
expansion of human cognition. The building redefines the guiding empirical concept
of places of dwelling. In beauty, the particular provides the rule, rather than being
subsumed under it. But the purpose of buildings, commonly understood, is not for
the expansion of human cognition. The purpose reflective contemplation provides
obtains not in the object but in cognition itself. Hence the purpose is really no
purpose at all, but a projection by the imagination for the expansion of our cognition.
The organization of imagination provides the unity, at a sensorial level, the
quickening of the understanding is afforded by the work of the imagination as a
harmonizer of the presentation and the lawfulness of the understanding in its
delineation of the world.499 Purposeless purposiveness is thus a harmony of
presentation with lawfulness, and is afforded in the free play of the imagination in its
organizing and synthesizing processes. The purpose and lawfulness found in a
judgment of beauty resides not in the object, but in the subject and hence is not the
purpose of the object, but remains a projection of subjectivity itself.
A similar interplay between the faculties is found in a judgment of the
sublime. Whereas a judgment of beauty affirms pleasure and harmony of the
imagination and understanding, the sublime involves a feeling of “agitation connected
with our judgment of the object,” one which concerns our faculties of reason and
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imagination. 500 In other words, when we experience the sublime, we find a feeling of
discomfort at the presentation of an object, one that thwarts our capacity to
comprehend. For our purposes, I wish to treat the differences in judgments of the
sublime, Kant‟s distinction of mathematical and dynamic, as one— not to dismiss the
differences, but, rather, to see the experience of the sublime in terms of imagination
and Kant‟s theme of reflective judgment in its role of providing a unity to human
cognition. Paradigmatically, I will focus on the dynamic sublime, for it affords a
poignant illustration of the reconciliation of imagination and reason.
According to Kant, the sublime is that which “arouses in us, merely in
apprehension and without any reasoning on our part” a feeling “countrapurposive for
our power of judgment, incommensurate with our power of exhibition, and as it were
violent to our imagination.”501 In other words, we judge sublime a feeling aroused in
us— a feeling aroused by the apprehension of something with such great magnitude
(mathematically) or with such great force (might, dynamically) that we cannot present
to ourselves a unified field. The sublime defies reason‟s ability to comprehend,
reason cannot fathom the immensity presented, even though it is a single presentation.
The sublime encounter is one that denies what is perceived can be made
commensurate with our reason.
Furthermore, when with the sublime “we judge an object aesthetically,” “this
judging strains the imagination to its limit, whether of expansion (mathematically) or
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of its might over the mind (dynamically).”502 This straining arouses in us a certain
feeling—a feeling of our faculties at work—a feeling of the inability of the
imagination in its presentation of an object and reason to make sense of the
experience— a feeling “bordering on terror.”503
But simultaneous with this unpleasant sensation, one acquires a new sense of
the power of one‟s faculties. Because the phenomenon presented exceeds the power
of imagination, and reason recognizes this situation, a new horizon, a new limitation
is consequently implied. In an experience of the sublime the imagination cannot
represent in a unity that which is delivered by the senses, in a manner commensurate
with reason. For example, when one witnesses the Grand Canyon or a hurricane, the
imagination finds difficulty in presenting the entirety of the experience as a single
manifold of intuition. It is as if these experiences are too much for us. The inability
to represent to ourselves what is presented in intuition stresses and strains the power
of the imagination and pushes it beyond its presently denoted domain. Yet in the
awareness of the limitation, one can provide a projected purpose to the experience—
the expansion of our cognitive capacities, concept and rule generation.
The initial limitation of the deliverances of the senses as presented by the
imagination is experienced as a negative feeling. Certainly, this thwarting of
imagination to make a unity of the experience, of our faculties in general, is
unpleasant. But, Kant insists, one does “feel the very power‟s [the imagination‟s]
might” to surpass itself. This feeling of “horror” thus becomes a pleasure, a “sacred
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thrill—one derived from acquiring “an expansion or might that surpasses the one it
sacrifices.”504 In other words, because the imagination cannot reconcile what it
perceives with reason, negative feelings are aroused, but because it sees a new limit to
which it can expand, it transforms this negative feeling into a delight in feeling its
own expansion, a delight in cognition itself. Recognizing its own growth, and the
projected growth of reason itself, the imagination transforms an “amazement
bordering on terror” into a pleasurable experience, one which serves the projected
purpose of expanding cognition.
By feeling the might of our own imagination we are moved by the sublime
and our once unpleasant feelings of awe are transformed into admiration of our own
powers. Hence it is only by reflection on our own faculties, not the object, that we
can experience the sublime. This reported purpose of expanding cognitive abilities,
in the representation of unity and the expansion of reason‟s laws, by particular
examples, are the purpose one finds in sublime experience. The purpose of expansion
and the feeling of pleasure that accompanies is an awareness that, despite the initial
failure of coordinating presentation and reason, experiences of the sublime may serve
a purpose in the reconciliation of experience and cognition.
One suggestion, for which I will not argue here, but that seems to follow, is
that once this expansion takes place, one cannot experience the object/event and feel
and judge it sublime. If the concept of Grand Canyon, roughly, big hole in the
ground, is expanded in such a way that it can then encompass the entirety of the
presentation, the initial moment of presentation‟s inability is no longer operative,
504

CJ, 129/269.

337

hence no terror and no sublimity. The experience is thus seen to further the purpose
of expanding human cognition, and yet this purpose is merely the report of reflective
introspection, not the purpose of the Grand Canyon found in nature. On this topic
Kant writes: “The judging strains the imagination because it is based on a feeling that
the mind has a vocation that wholly transcends the domain of nature (namely, moral
feeling) and it is with regard to this feeling that we judge the presentation of the
object subjectively purposive.”505 The purposiveness one finds in the experience of
the sublime is, again, merely subjective purposiveness.
The final form of judgment found in the 3rd Critique, the teleological, is one
that attempts to coordinate determinate judgments with purposes imaginatively
suggested, but yet ones of which no determinate judgment be made. Returning to this
comprehensive outlook on the idea of purposiveness as the ground for all judgments,
one returns to Kant‟s suggestion that the 3rd Critique is the conclusion that can unify
his critical enterprise. And it is in reference to teleological judgments that Kant can
unify the numerous empirical laws determined by theoretical reasoning.
Among the many types of teleological purposes we allocate to concepts of
nature, Kant distinguishes between formal and material. Formal objective purposes,
mathematical concepts, seem “as if [they] for our use had been intentionally been so
arranged, while yet it also seems to belong to the original nature of things, without
concern as to how we might use [them].”506 The a priori nature of these concepts
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differentiates them from material objective purposes. Material purposes, on the other
hand, are “cases where I find order and regularity in an aggregate, enclosed within
certain boundaries, of things outside me.”507 The contingency of such empirical
presentations permit purposiveness, but they cannot claim a priori status, and as such
are merely empirical determinations. Additionally, Kant distinguishes between
intrinsic and relative ends. Kant states, “we may regard the effect [of objects of
nature] either as a purpose, or as a means that other causes employ purposively.”508
The former, as in the case of a river depositing silt, is intrinsic to the function of the
river for the benefit of nature itself. In the latter case, the activity is seen with other
goals in mind e.g. when humans develop arable land for the purpose of agrarian
cultivation. Kant questions whether the former cannot also be seen as a case of
relative purpose, suggesting that nature itself might deposit silt in order for land
propagation and human use, but doing so relegates this to human artifice rather than
nature‟s intrinsic purpose. Kant‟s final distinction pertains to human activity, and he
considers the multiplicity of human behavior and its ability to be intrinsic, as in the
case of pursuing happiness, or relative, the means by which we attempt to attain
happiness. The central theme of Kant‟s evaluation of teleology concerns cause and
effect, and how one should conceive the application of this pure concept in terms of
empirical examples whether for nature or for human happiness.
Kant‟s treatment of cause and effect from the 1st to the 3rd Critique proves
grounds for some confusion, but he can and does maintain a consistent position. In
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the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant affirms the knowability of cause and effect. And
yet he retains a skepticism that, although cause and effect can be known a priori,
when dealing with empirical examples caution should be employed. We employ
cause and effect in the top-down 1st Critique model in order to affirm determinate
concepts of nature, which make epistemic claims. The concept of cause and effect
conditions human comprehension of empirical examples. And yet, this does not
provide grounds to determine actual causes to effects and to subsequently determine
the purpose of specific causes. He regards the examination of pure reason as found in
the 1st Critique “a propaedeutic to the system of pure reason” which will further need
supplementation in a metaphysics of natural science. 509 This skepticism
acknowledges and embraces the Humean skepticism that propelled Kant‟s critical
enterprise while providing grounds to overcome Hume‟s radical position. It is in the
3rd Critique that we find the final articulation of such skepticism. Kant writes, “We
have to judge a relation of cause to effect which is such that we can see it as lawgoverned only if we regard the cause‟s action as based on the idea of the effect, with
this idea as the underlying condition under which the cause itself can produce the
effect.”510 In other words, the only way one can see cause and effect is to see
purposiveness, the cause bringing about the effect with a goal in view (either intrinsic
or relative). In order to empirically employ the concept of cause and effect, Kant
argues we must have a projected purpose that unifies why and how the cause is
efficacious in bringing about the effect.
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Kant‟s treatment of empirical laws of nature in terms of cause and effect
unites the properly called aesthetic portion of the 3rd Critique with the section on
teleology. When evaluating the possibility of judgment in general, purposiveness is
the essential component. In order to make human experience intelligible, humans
posit purpose onto the action. But after evaluation of judging itself, we realize that
we can lay no epistemic claim to these purposes. In regards to teleological judgments
Kant discusses the harmony that arises when disparate empirical laws are united in
the comprehensive plan of nature. The awe of the majesty of nature, once mitigated
by imaginative purpose transforms from amazement to admiration. This admiration
itself is “an entirely natural effect of that purposiveness observed in the nature of
things,” suggesting that this admiration also falls under the rubric of reflective
judgment and the purposiveness created by humans to express unity. In this case it is
the harmonization afforded by imaginative projection that transforms awe to
admiration. The admiration we find is a product of reflection on our faculties at work
in the process of unifying the concepts of nature. Purposes found in nature are not in
the objects themselves, they are, rather, imaginative positings we place on experience
in order to obtain meaning from experience. Kant declares that
this harmony, despite all that purposiveness, is cognized a priori rather
than empirically, and that fact alone should make us realize that the
space to which I had to give a determination (by means of imagination
in conformity with a concept) so as to make the object possible is not a
characteristic of things outside of me but a mere way of presenting
[them] within me; I should realize, therefore, that when I draw a figure
in accordance with a concept, I introduce the purposiveness into the
figure, i.e. into my own way of presenting something that is given to
me from outside, whatever it may be in itself rather than this
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something‟s instructing me empirically about that purposiveness, and
hence should realize that I need no special purpose outside of me in
the object to account for that purposive harmony.511
The harmony we find in a unified system of empirical concepts, in singular instances
of cause and effect, are not in the objects, but within the individual cognizer‟s
projection of purpose. Owing to the subjective character of this form, and all forms,
of reflective judgment, and the synthesis necessary in order to collate all empirical
laws of nature into, at times singular purposes, but inevitably a single purpose, Kant
has recourse only to the imagination, as the power of synthesis. It is in fact, the
imagination that enables cognitive harmony in projecting a telos onto nature.
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Conclusion

The provocation employed to summarize Kant‟s philosophy states: “Two
things fill the heart with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the starry skies
above, the moral within.” To his epitaph, I would like to submit one further
candidate, the imagination. For it is in the imagination that one finds a vital function
that enables both theoretical and practical philosophy.
From the work presented in this essay, one finds a coherent, historical
development of the imagination, one that begins with general philosophical questions
pertaining to the connectivity of the deliverances of the senses and the judgments
made by the powers of cognition. Beginning with ancient philosophy, continuing
through the Medieval period and into modernity, the question concerning the
accuracy with which we “get the world right” has long occupied philosophical
investigation. Such a questioning has led various philosophical figures to both
denounce and employ the imagination as a liaison between the passivity of sensation
and activity of thought, often eliciting a subordination or superordination of the
faculty. Such ambivalence to the imagination has led to a rather incomplete and
imbalanced treatment of such a ponderous faculty. What I hope to have shown are
common themes resonating throughout the history of philosophy and a possible
resolution to the protracted debates. One such resolution is to affirm the activity of
the imagination as a liaison, while demonstrating such a role despite changes in
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metaphysical presuppositions. By providing duplex interpretations of archetypal
thinkers in conjunction with projective interpretations to uncover the origins of our
use of the imagination, I believe one finds the increasing importance and continuing
development of the imagination. One can, I believe, affirm with Eva Brann a
definitive role of imagination while accounting for the epochal shifts found in
Richard Kearney‟s exposition. In other words, the imagination does find a
fundamental role in the human cognitive processes, regardless of whether one
assumes a theo-centric or anthropocentric metaphysical model. Although, depending
one‟s metaphysical presuppositions, how one conceives this fundamental role will
shift in place of emphasis, but not the role itself.
Furthermore, by Kant‟s time the importance of imagination becomes manifest.
I have argued that Kant himself feels the need for such a faculty, even if he fails to
fully develop his own insights. By providing a duplex and inversive interpretation of
Kant‟s major works, I have demonstrated not only a consistent account of Kant, but
also developed his theory of the imagination in such a way as to illustrate the
fundamental employment Kant‟s make of this faculty, but also have illustrated its
fundamentality and necessity in all aspects of cognition. When developing his own
theory of human cognition, I believe Kant upholds the concerns of connecting various
aspects of cognition, but also transforms the often marginalized faculty of
imagination in so doing. What enables Kant‟s formulation is his employment of the
imagination as a liaison faculty, much like it was found in philosopher‟s works prior
to the Critique of Pure Reason. Yet Kant also transforms and radicalizes this faculty
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to justify and explain the self, pure concepts and the deliverances of the senses, thus
providing the objective validity required in “getting the world right”, but also the
means by which we gain contact with the world. Such a projective and visionary use
of the imagination and its products inform and guide our thoughts and actions. By
inspecting the critical corpus, one begins to gain a sense of the fundamentality and
necessity of a power that can enframe, can build, can create and can project purposive
meaning in our lives, an Einbildungskraft.
By providing such a solution to his project, Kant expresses and fulfills the
Enlightenment ideals of his own time. Not only does such a projective and visionary
use of imagination enable various aspects of cognition, but the transformation and
radicalization of such a faculty highlights the need for such a faculty for the sake of
progress. It is only by envisioning the goals to which humans aspire, and then acting
upon the teleological projection, that progress is possible. As the capstone of modern
philosophy, Kant upholds the Enlightenment ideals of progress, provides the means
by which it is possible, and does so by illustrating the faculty by which we ground our
theoretical and moral pursuits and by which we find a purpose in our lives. The
imagination is truly an awesome power, one that enables the various modes of human
activities, theoretical, practical and projective.
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